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Abstract 
This study investigates: (1) the conception and charac-
teristics of the legal system of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in 
order to highlight the extent to which intellectuals can be le-
gally protected. It also shows: (1) the reform and continuity 
of the legal system under Deng; (2) why there exists a phenomenon 
criminal liability of intellectuals in Communist China for coun-
terrevolutionary crime being much higher in degree than that of 
the workers and peasants, especially under Mao; (3) the sources 
criminal responsibility of intellectuals; (4) why the degree of 
criminal responsibility of intellectuals varies under the leader-
ship of Mao and Deng respectively; and (5) the limitations and 
prosepcts for the legal system under Deng to offer legal protec-
tion to intellectuals so as to reduce their criminal respon-
sibility. The ultimate purpose of the study is to search for 
ways to improve the socialist legal system in light of the fact 
that the degree of criminal responsibility of intellectuals il-
luminates the defects and shortcomings of the legal system under 
Mao and Deng. 
This study, mainly based on the analysis of relevant docu-
ments, information and materials, is a comparative study from a 
political perspective. It compares the basic conception of the 
legal system under Mao and Deng; their attitude and policies 
towards intellectuals; their responses to the intellectuals' de-
mands for freedom and democratization, as well as justice in the 
application of law in handling these cases. Using· a political 
approach implies that the focus is on the role of politics in 
influencing the organization and practices of the legal system in 
Communist China. 
Although the time period covered in the study is ·from 1949 
to 1982, indeed the period of the Cultural Revolution. is excluded 
since at that time the legal system was completely destroyed, 
1982 was a crucial year in Communist China which marked a mile-
stone in the political and legal developments in the People's 
Republic of China since two important Constitutions were born --
the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and the Consti-
tution of the People's Republic of China. It is on these two 
documents that the principle of the supremacy of law is 
confirmed. 
The cases chosen for comparison are the •au Feng incident• 
(1954-55), the •blooming• and •contending• and the •Anti-
Rightist• campaigns (1957) in Mao's era on one hand, and the 
Beijing Spring Democratic Movement (1979) on the other hand. 
These incidents are linked by the fact that all the victims were 
intellectuals. The comparison is aimed at illustrating the de-
gree of criminal responsibility of intellectuals within the legal 
frameworks of Mao and Deng. 
The study concludes that the legal system, either und~r Mao 
or Deng, is chiefly a tool for achieving the Party goals as de-' 
fined by the Party leaders. Indeed, Communist ideology, as 
- v -
interpreted by Mao and Deng, determined the wor~ing principles of 
the legal system, as well as the Party attitude and policies to-
wards intellectuals. This in turn dictates the degree of legal 
protection for intellectuals. The legal system under Deng (which 
is characterized as a "procedural justice system") is superior to 
that under Mao (which is characterized as a "revolutionary 
justice system"). This is true not only in the sense that the 
former can offer certain legal protection to the intellectuals, 
but also in that the pursuit of procedural justice marks an end 
to the revolutionary era, and that the system is evolutionary in 
nature on the basis of socialist democracy. In short, this study 
demonstrates that the criminal responsibility of intellectuals is 
a function of: (1) the degree of the monolithic rule demanded by 
the Party leader 1 and (2) the legal protection that can be of-
fered by the legal system. Finally, in assessing the limitations 
and the prospects for socialist rule of law under Deng, one must 
not neglect the inherent dictatorial and anti-democratic tenden-
cies of Communist ideology. 
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Introduction 
Two correlated political phenomena in Communist China moti-
vated this study. First, in Communist China, the social and 
political order has been in constant chaos. Stability, which is 
the pre-condition for socialist construction, is rare. Indeed, 
since the establishment of the Communist regime, economic 
development has been emphasized, the goal of which is to •trans-
form the country from an agricultural to an industrial one. •1 
Yet political struggles and movements have been the order of the 
day until late 1978 when Deng Xiaoping resumed leadership. The 
suppression of counterrevolutionaries, land reform movement, 
"three-anti• and "five-anti,• liquidation of counterrevolutionary 
movement, Anti-Rightist campaign, •tour-cleans• movement and Cul-
tural Revolution have all disrupted stability. These political 
phenomena. raise quest ions about the role of the legal system 
which has long been the institution for maintaining order. The 
principle targets of these movements were claimed to be •reac-
tionaries.• The Chinese Communist leaders like Mao Zedong 
reasserted the vitality of a sound legal system and stressed the 
observance of law,2 yet social and political conflicts have sel-
dom, if ever, been resolved through the legal means. Throughout 
the Maoist era, a well-established legal system never did come 
into being; what existed was totally destroyed during the Cul-
tural Revolution.3 
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China {CPC) is a point of demarcation 
in legal development in Communist China. The program for the 
reconstruction and the modernization of the country after ten 
years of turmoil as embodied in the Communique promulgated on 
that occasion is claimed to rest on the basis of a sound 
socialist legal system and an internal environment of stability 
and unity. Never have the Chinese Communists openly affirmed the 
value of the legal system and social order in the past three de-
cades of Communist rule. With the rise and the consolidation of 
the power of the pragmatic leaders under Deng, they have voiced 
the resolution to restore and strengthen the legal system. In 
fact, the Communique formally put an end to the past controversy 
over the line of development and the role of the socialist legal 
system. It is both fruitful and significant to compare the legal 
conceptions of the Party leaders in these two distinct periods to 
highlight just how far the legal system in the new era has to go 
to perform the functions of resolving conflicts and preserving 
order. 
Second, although the Communist leaders have stressed the 
indispensable role played by the intellectuals in socialist rev-
olution and construction, since 1954 onwards the intellectuals 
have constantly suffered from struggles, humiliation and persecu-
tion. They have been labelled as "reactionaries, • •r ightists, • 
and even •counterrevolutionaries• durinq the Bu Feng incident, 
the Anti-Rightist campaign, as well as the Cultural Revolution. 
Moreover, they were not only unable to enjoy the rights and free-
doms as provided by the Constitutions, but their exercise of 
these rights and freedoms has been the source of their criminal 
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responsibility. The legal sy"stem has been a complete failure in 
offering any protection to the intellectuals. This phenomenon 
has been moderated since late 1978 with Deng's reassertion of the 
positive contributions of the intellectuals. But the arrest and 
trial of the "dissidents" and criticism on the intellectuals per-
sists. This study will thus delve into the question of why in-
tellectuals have been criminally responsible for their seemingly 
legal actions. 
These two political phenomena are correlated in the sense 
that if the legal system can offer legal protection to the intel-
lectuals, their criminal responsibility can be greatly reduced. 
Yet this depends highly on the conception of the legal system of 
Mao and Deng, as well as their attitude and policy towards the 
intellectuals. 
Purposes of the Study 
The orientation of the study is basically a comparative one: 
1. To compare the conception and characteristics of the 
legal system of Mao and Deng in order to highlight the extent to 
which the intellectuals can be protected. This also shows how 
far the legal system under Deng has been improved. 
2. To study why there exists the 
criminal responsibility of intellectuals 
counterrevolutionary crimes over that 
peasants, especially under Mao. 
phenomenon of greater 
in Communist China for 
of the workers and 
3. To establish the sources of criminal responsibility for 
intellectuals. 
4. To study the reasons why the degree of criminal respon-
sibility of intellectuals varied under the leadership of Mao and 
Deng. 
s. To enumerate the limitations and prospects for the legal 
system under Deng to offer legal protection to the intellectuals 
so as to reduce their criminal responsibility. 
In short, the degree of criminal responsibility of the in-
tellectuals shows the defects and shortcomings of the socialist 
legal system under Mao and Deng. Thus the ultimate purpose of 
the study is to search for ways to improve the socialist legal 
system. 
~e Significance of tbe Study 
The significance of the study is fourfold: 
1. There are few book length studies of China's legal sys-
tem from Mao to Deng. Recently, Chiu and Leng, and Amnesty 
International published two insightful studies. These aside, 
most of the studies in the field are out-of-date. Recently, for 
example, Brady wrote a fairly comprehensive work, but it covered 
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the period only up to 1979, the time when Deng had just assumed 
power and his conception of legal system was just put into ef-
fect.S Thus, an in depth study of the legal system from Mao to 
Deng may provide a positive contribution, especially from a com-
parative perspective. 
2. Most studies are historical and socialogical ratner than 
analytical, and lean away from legal analysis. Few touch on the 
legal frame of Deng comprehensively. Brady is the one among the 
few, yet his study is mostly from an historian-sociologist's per-
spective. Moreover, he has not explored Deng's conception of a 
legal system in adequate depth. 
3. Most scholarly works are historical case studies. The 
case study in this article is a comparative analysis of cases 
that were.handled under the legal framework of Mao and Deng. The 
cases are compared in terms of concepts, which illustrate their 
different conceptions of legality with concrete examples. 
4. Few have mentioned the criminal responsibility of the 
intellectuals and used this as the point of departure to demon-
strate the merits and demerits of the legal system between Mao 
and Deng as well as the defects of the legal system. 
As a whole, these comparisons further discussion in the im-
provements Deng has made as well as the problems and prospects in 
the perfection of the legal system in Communist China. 
Limitations of tbe Study 
There are clear limitations of this study. First of all, 
due to the author's lack of training in law, this study of the 
legal system might seem superficial in the eyes of professionals 
in legal studies. Rather than employing a legal approach, this 
author wrote from a political perspective. Second, since the 
cases are compared in terms of concepts of freedom, democratiza-
tion and justice, an instrinsic difficulty lies in how to expose 
and compare the defects and strengths of the legal frameworks of 
Mao and Deng with regard to these concepts. This is by no means 
an easy task. 
Source and tbe Organization of the Study 
This study is based on relevant reports in primary sources, 
including documents, Renmin Ribao, Beijing Review, and Honggi, 
and law-related periodicals of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), such as Minzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and Legal System), 
Faxue zazhi (Legal Studies) and Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in Law). 
It is mainly a comparative study from a political perspective. 
The organization of the study is as follows: 
Chapter One discusses the legal system and the crimina! 
responsiblity of intellectuals within the single Communist Party 
regime. This includes a comparison of the legal conceptions of 
- 3 -
Mao and Deng as well as the sources of criminal responsibility of 
intellectuals and their relationship with the legal system. 
Chapter Two carves out the different characteristics of le-
gal systems under Mao and Deng in order to show the reforms and 
continuities in legal practices under Deng. In fact, legal prac-
tices have a direct impact on the criminal responsibility of in-
tellectuals, especially in the application of law. This in turn 
reflects the defects of the legal system. 
Chapter Three is a study of Mao's attitude and Deng's poli-
cies towards intellectuals. A study of the legal policies to-
wards the intellectuals would be lacking without any knowledge of 
the Communist leaders' attitudes and policies towards the 
intellectuals. 
Chapter Four and Five are comparative case studies which 
form the core of this study. They attempt to verify the above 
analyses through concrete examples. 
Chapter Six is a discussion of the limitations and prospects 
for the institutionalization of the legal system and democratiza-
tion of the political system under Deng. These two are related 
since it is said that the perfect socialist legal system would be 
the socialist rule of law on the basis of a socialist democracy. 
Moreover, the degree of democratization determines to what extent 
the legal·system can offer legal protection to the intellectuals. 
- 4 -
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Chapter One 
Conception of the Legal System and the Sources of Criminal 
Responsibility of the Intellectuals: The case of China 
The Chinese Communists, from the very beginning of their 
rule in China, denied the Western conception of the legal system 
which is based on a "rule of law.•l From their point of view the 
Communist system should have its own legal framework. In the 
early years of the Communist regime, then President Liu Shaoqi 
adopted the structural components of the Soviet legal system. 
Mao Tse-tung inherited the legal philosophy and practices of the 
Soviet Union along his lines of revolutionary ideology. In con-
trast, Deng Xiaoping's conception of a legal system is a combina-
tion of political experience combined with the consideration of 
the objective condition and the need of Communist China to be 
built on the line of institutionalization of judicial procedures. 
In fact, his conception of the essence of the legal system is by 
no means the same as the Soviet Union's. He insisted: 
We should learn from foreign countries and 
draw on their experiences. But mechanical 
copying and application of foreign experience 
and models will get us nowhere. • • To 
integrate the universal truth of Marxism with 
the concrete realities of China, blaze a path 
of our own and build socialism with Chinese 
characteristics •••• 2 
A continuity of Liu 's line on legal justice changed with 
Deng's assertion that the legal system of Communist China must be 
"Chinese" rather than "Soviet." Indeed Deng was a hardcore mem-
ber of Liu 's faction, if it ever existed as asserted by the 
Maoists. 
In fact, both Mao and Deng manipulated the legal system as 
an instrument in the pursuit of their goals. Though it is 
superficial to say that the ultimate goal of the two is the same 
-- Communist society -- yet this is only the case ideologically. 
From another dimension, if only intermediate goals are taken into 
consideration, differences between them can be identified. For 
Mao, the legal system was only useful and could serve as an in-
strument if it facilitated the promotion of his own conception of 
justice. He would not hesitate to put aside the law whenever it 
constituted an obstacle to "class struggle.• But it is just the 
opposite for Deng. He treats the legal system and law as indis-
pensable instruments which in all circumstances can facilitate 
the achievement of his goals. This is mainly because their con-
ception of legal systems were based on different premises and 
ideological considerations, as well as their perception of the 
objective political environment. 
Indeed, ever since the establishment of the PRC, many have 
characterized the political system a a monolithic party rule or 
"party supremacy. • Within such a ruling framework, the essence 
- 6 -
and nature of the legal system has been inevitably affected by 
the line of political development adopted by the top Party 
leaders. 
The political system under Mao de-emphasized institution-
alization. In Mao's conception, it was to be a moral unit in 
which equality and human potentiali-ty were the central values. 
Since Mao had faith in the human potential of becoming good 
through education, it was a process to internalize Mao's concep-
tion of new Communist morals and ethical values. As a result, he 
did not emphasize formal law within its institutionalized legal 
structure. To some extent, this was due to his distrust of in-
tellectuals or "experts." Since "politics in command" was the 
basic characteristic of the single party Communist system, it was 
a closed system under Mao's directive. 
Since the demise of Mao and the rise of Deng in late 1978, 
the Communist system has been evolving towads bureaucratization. 
After decades of political chaos, what Deng looks for is politi-
cal stability and social unity for socialist modernization. The 
regime stresses pragmatism which presupposes rationality and ef-
ficiency, and this tends to accelerate the process of routiniza-
tion and depolitization, as well as to raise demands for par-
ticipation in the political system. Thus the political system 
under Deng has tended to be an open system in which democracy has 
begun to acquire value. The legal system is to develop along the 
line of institutionalization since it is treated as playing an 
indispensable role in maintaining order. 
Based on these premises, the concept of legality in Mao's 
and Deng's eras, as well as the sources of the criminal respon-
sibility of Chinese intellectuals will be discussed. In fact, 
the former has a direct impact on the latter. 
A. The Communist Conception of Legality: Mao versus Deng 
In the legal realm, the Communists believe in the existence 
of "correct" justice. For the Chinese Communists, substantive justice is "proletarian" justice3 which possesses a strong class 
nature and should be the justice for all in the advent of the 
Communist society. 
Basically, the top leaders in the CPC agree on the notion of 
substantive justice for the socialist and Communist society. Yet 
there have been disagreements about how to achieve it. Mao sub-
scribed to the "mass line" whereas Liu Shaoqi and later Deng were 
inclined to promote justice through an institutional framework. 
One may characterize the two trends as "revolutionary justice" 
and "procedural justice• respectively. 
1. Mao's Conception of the Legal System 
The Communists believe that law will be abolished following 
the withering away of the State. Having adopted the viewpoint of 
Marx, Lenin confirmed the instrumental function of law as an in-
strument of suppression and class rule, a system of sanctions 
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designed to safeguard the fundamental principles of class rule 
and the particular interests of the ruling class.4 Mao basically 
inherited the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of law. Thus law 
for him was just for the purpose of consolidating Communist rule, 
and eliminating enemies of the revolution as well as attaining 
the development of a Communist society. Finally, law in all 
cases had to give way to politics. Politics for Mao was just the 
struggle of class against class.S In this regard, Cohen has al-
ready pointed out the overriding influence of Communist ideology 
on Mao's conception of legal system.6 
Following Marxism-Leninism, Mao asserted that class struggle 
was still to be carried on or even intensified during the period 
of socialist construction or transition.? Thus, in his mind the 
dictatorship of the ~roletariat was established on the basis for 
class confrontation. So Mao, in most cases agreed with Lenin 
that: 
and 
The dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, 
the organization of the vanguard of the op-
pressed as the ruling class for the purpose of 
suppressing the oppressors. • The dic-
tatorship of proletariat imposes a series of 
reconstructions on the freedom of the oppres-
sor, the exploiters, and the capitalists. We 
must suppress them in order to free humanity 
from wage slavery, their resistence must be 
crushed by Force. It is clear that where 
there is no~edom, let alone democracy, 
where there is suppression and where there is 
violence 19 
Briefly: the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is the rule -- unrestricted by law based on 
force -- of the proletariat over the bour-
geoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and sup-
port of the laboring and exploited masses.lO 
Under the belief that "suppression" and "violence" were re-
garded as necessary and were the essence of dictatorship, revolu-
tionary justice was discriminated against classes other than the 
working class and the peasantry, or in Mao's terms, those being 
excluded from the club of "people." Communist law under Mao had 
neither objectivity nor universality. Thus relentless violent 
struggles and purges against "enemies" were confirmed. Law was 
implemented not so much by judicial bodies, but chiefly by mass 
participation in the form of political campaigns and mass move-
ments. In fact, the revolutionary society denied pure legal or-
der, justice and law must be considered under a larger framework 
of politics and ideology.ll Mao just took "law as politics" and 
wanted justice to be an active revolutionary force. 
To Mao, class struggle and "politics in command" were the 
order of the day under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The 
- 8 -
struggle was not only limited to physical elimination, it was 
also to take place in the domain of thought, that is, the ideolo-
gies. This was especially obvious from 1954 onward when most of 
the overt "enemies" had been eliminated since Mao had emphasized 
ideological purity: 
Our country is a great socialist country under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat •••• 
We need a united thought, revolutionary 
thought, correct thought, that is, Mao Zedong 
thought. Only under this ideology can we pro-
mote our energetic revolutionary spirit and 
firm, correct political direction.l2 
In fact, the essence of politics in command was "Mao Zedong 
thought in command.•l3 In Mao's conception, everything was to be 
subordinated to politics, be the issue economic, military or cul-
ture. Since Mao felt that Communist revolution was not subject 
to legally binding or judicial regulations,l4 a sense of legality 
is lacking in Mao's ideology -- those who wield supreme political 
power are not bound by legal norms.lS Under Mao's leadership, 
the legal system was only a coercive instrument for the promotion 
of revolutionary justice. "The law is the so-called state ideol-
ogy, which the ruling class enforces by the use of arms. Laws, 
like the state, are merely tools that protect the interests of a 
given ruling class.•l6 Accordingly, Mao endorsed the class 
character of law and its subordination to political dictates. 
Law, in Mao's view, was the totality of the rule of conducts 
reflecting the will of the Party leadership and it was enforced 
by the coercive power of state to ensure the development of a 
desirable social outlook. "Law is nothing but the manifestation 
of the Party leadership. • As a whole, the legal system was 
designed for political expediency. Mao's extremely low assess-
ment of the importance and utility of law or even a contempt for 
the law during the Cultural Revolution highlights this point.l7 
The chief source of legitimacy and guidance in the revolutionary 
judicial system was not so much from law but from political 
ideology. 
The central task of revolutionary justice in Mao's mind was 
educational. The legal system had to be oriented toward 
guidance, training and discipline of the people to be loyal, and 
devoted to the aims of the society as formulated by the Communist 
Party. It was used as an instrument for educating the masses 
about the correct values and norms of Communist ethics of Maoist 
vision.l8 Under the revolutionary judicial system, wrongdoers or 
those who violated the new norms of conduct were punished not 
through formal legal procedures, but through struggle and cam-
paigns. The standard was a political rather than a legal one 
since politics overshadowed legality in Mao's ideology. In Mao's 
view, words (or more precisely, ideology and thought) and deeds 
can be judged as right only if they: (1) help to unite the peo-
ple of all nationalities1 (2) are beneficial to socialist trans-
formation and socialist construction1 (3) help to consolidate 
the people's democratic dictatorship1 (4) help to consolidate 
derocratic centralism1 (5) help to strengthen the leadership of 
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Communist Party; and (6) are beneficial to international social 
unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.l9 
Under these six criteria, there was no distinction between 
criminal and civil cases. As L.S. Tao once stated, "Hardly any 
legal question is not resolved, sooner or later, into a political 
or ideological question.n20 
Since political expediency was the chief consideration, rev-
olutionary justice was to be pursued under Mao's guidance since 
he had always considerd himself as a social engineer. Moreover, 
China remained a revolutionary society, marked by rapid, violent 
social change, even after the establishment of the Communist re-
gime. Since struggles and conflicts were common political phe-
nomena, under these uncertain and unstable political conditions, 
law would soon become outdated, and new measures and policies had 
to be promptly issued to resolve conflicts and struggles. Thus 
to Mao, since law was unable to meet revolutionary needs, it was 
better to use his own judgment and policies as the substance of 
the revolutionary justicial system. After all, Lenin stated that 
"the power of proletarian dictatorship is not restricted by law." 
This was the case in Mao's era. In the final analysis, Mao's 
conception of the legal system was indeed, a system of the "rule 
of man" since the Party rule under Mao never relied on law but 
was based on his policies and decrees.21 Law was not in an es-
sential position in the operation of the revolutionary justice 
system which was marked by a lack of a written set of laws, 
simplicity and flexibility as well as mass participation. In 
fact, under the rule of Mao, the PRC operated a legal system 
without a criminal code or criminal procedure code.22 
2. Deng Xiaoping's Conception of the Legal System 
As early as the 1950s, Deng already held that socialist con-
struction through a well-structured political and legal system 
was the first priority of the regime rather than class struggle. 
His political experiences only reinforced his ideas. 
Most pragmatic leaders, especially Deng, have had bitter 
political experiences due to past mass movements particularly 
during the Cultural Revolution which was at times a state of com-
plete lawlessness. The ten years of internal instability had 
taught them that the socialist legal system is the "only" power-
ful weapon to protect the people, to strike against the enemies 
and to consolidate the people's democratic regime. They came to 
realize that only with a complete set of legal codes and a sound 
legal system could a country be ruled properly and developed 
smoothly; otherwise political chaos and turmoil will result. At 
the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng pointed out the defects 
of Chinese political system.23 In order to correct past mis-
takes, he denounced the past practice of disregarding the law and 
made clear that he intended to establish the spirit of observing 
the law throughout the whole country since this tradition had not 
yet taken root in the Party-state: "We must now earnestly es-
tablish a socialist democratic system and socialist legal system. 
Only then can the question be resolved. "24 Thus his conception 
of the legal system is a highly institutionalized one which sets 
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its base on socialist de100cracy. Indeed he shared with Liu the 
idea that it is possible to attain substantive justice through 
certain institutionalized standard procedures which are ap-
plicable to all. 
Since his rise to power, Deng has paid close attention to 
restoring order, preventing the danger of another "Cultural Rev-
olution," and promoting the well being of the society. He 
planned to establish and maintain long-term "political stability 
and unity," to "make China a modern, powerful socialist coun-
try." 25 To pave the way for achieving these ends, Deng formally" 
declared the end of class struggle which he regarded as the chief 
source of social instability and an obstacle for his moderniza-
tion program. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central 
Committee convened in December 1978, the pragmatists already de-
nounced the principle of "taking class struggle as the key 
link.n26 Deng later repeated that °Class struggle no longer con-
stitutes the principal contradiction after the exploiters have 
been eliminated"27 and "we are opposed to intensifying the class 
struggle, we do not believe that there is a capitalist class 
within the Party, or that under the socialist system in which the 
exploiting classes and exploiting conditions have been destroyed, 
that it is still possible to create a capitalist class or other 
exploiting classes. n28 Although social contradictions still ex-
ist in Chinese society, few of them belong to the realm of class 
struggle. Since class struggle and conflict are no longer the 
major contradictions, the task of the country has been shifted to 
socialist construction. A party member stated: 
After socialist transformation was fundamen-
tally completed, the principal contradiction 
our country has had to resolve is that between 
the growing material and cultural needs of the 
people and the backwardness of social produc-
tion. It was imperative that the focus of 
Party and government works be shifted to 
socialist modernization centering on economic 
construction and that the people's material 
and cultural life be gradually improved by 
means of an immense expansion of productive 
force.29 
Thus the present obJective of the Party's struggle in the 
new historical period is to turn China step by step into a power-
ful socialist country with 100dern agriculture, industry, national 
defense and science and technology and with a high level of de-
mocracy and culture.30 Yet, Deng worried 100st over the problem 
that Professor Ch iu once raised: How could the PRC administer 
its 100dernization program under the past irrational, unpredict-
able and repressive criminal justice system?31 
Under these considerations, Deng has intended to establish a 
stable, predictable and secure political environment based on 
unity which de-emphasized struggle and conflict but stressed le-
gal order. Indeed the procedural judicial system under Deng is 
designed for creating and maintaining an orderly, predictable 
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environment for socialist modernization. In Deng's eyes, politi-
cal stability is to be built on the foundation of a sound legal 
system with a formal set of laws and well established legal 
procedures whereas unity is to be achieved through the promotion 
of socialist democracy. The very essence of strengthening the 
legal system is that "there must be laws for the people to fol-
low, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be 
strict and law breakers must be dealt with.n32 Equally important 
is 'socialist democracy which contributes to mobilizing the peo-
ple's vigorous efforts, initiative and creativity for the Four 
Modernizations and serves as the cornerstone for unity. As 
stated, the Party line is that 
In order to safeguard people's democracy, it 
is imperative to strengthen the socialist le-
gal system so that democracy will be systemi-
tized and written into law in such a way as to 
ensure the stability, continuity and full au-
thority of this democratic system and these 
laws ••• ,33 
Of the greatest significance is the inner-Party democracy which 
helps to prevent the emergence of a personal dictator who would 
force the whole system back to "the rule of man." Ye Jianying 
concurred with Deng's idea that: 
The People want to strengthen and improve Chi-
na's socialist legal system. An improved le-
gal system can effectively guarantee the peo-
ple's democratic rights provided for by the 
Constitution and constantly develop stability 
and unity and a lively and vigorous political 
situation in the interest of socialist 
construction.34 
Peng Zhen, in explaining the Criminal Law, has explicitly 
spelled out the ultimate aim of Deng who entrusts the fate of 
Communist China to the legal system to 
• protect the interests of the people 
and the state, consolidate and promote the 
lively political environment of stability and 
unity and ensure the smooth advance of 
socialist modernization.35 
The legal system pervades every aspect of society, it must be 
strengthened "adequately to protect socialist democracy, to com-
bat against enemies, to maintain revolutionary order, to consoli-
date the people's deiOOcratic dictatorship, to protect socialist 
economic base, tp foster the development of production and to 
speed up the four modernizations. n36 The immediate task of the 
regime is: 
• • • to improve our Constitution and laws 
and ensure their strict observance and in-
violability. We must turn the socialist legal 
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system into a powerful instrument for protect-
ing the rights of the people, ensuring order 
in production, work and other activities, 
punishing criminals and cracking down on the 
disruptive activities of class enemies.37 
In order to perfect the legal system for the safe of creat-
ing a legal order, its substance, that is, law, must be enacted 
in respect to every aspect of people's life. In sum, there must 
be laws and regulations for all kinds of social political 
economic as well as cultural activities. Upon the approval of 
seven draft laws, which is regarded as a monumental step, during 
the second session of the Fifth NPC in June 1979, Peng Zhen, Di-
rector of the Commission of Legislative Affairs of NPC Standing 
Committee, shared the view of his colleagues Dong Biwu and Deng 
who have always been concerned over the inadequacy of laws and 
the need for legislation, in declaring: 
As the focus of nation's work has been shifted 
to socialist modernization, China must ear-
nestly strengthen socialist democracy and the 
socialist legal system so that its 900 million 
citizens will have laws to abide by and 
restrain and punish those who do evil.38 
In fact, under Deng's leadership a series of laws covering all 
social activities have been passed by the NPC. Only with a com-
plete set of laws can the country be ruled by law. 
It is generally accepted that the law must possess the na-
ture of stability and continuity, as well as au thor itativeness, 
and only through legal procedures can the laws be amended. 
Universality and impartiality in the application of law must be 
guaranteed in the sense that all people are equal before the. law 
which has made possible since most of the population are •people• 
with the extinction of the exploited classes. Theoretically, 
then, no person would be allowed the privilege of being above the 
law. Under this new framework, law governs both the Party 
leaders and Party members. No longer is the •Party above the 
law. • All social contradictions must be resolved by law and 
political campaigns and large scale political criticism are pro-
hibited in solving social contradictions. Legal reformers also 
emphasize that the law must be publicized among the mases and 
party-members, and they must be educated to observe and act ac-
cod ing to the law. Measures have been and must be taken to 
strengthen the legal sense of the people in order to eliminate 
the legacy of legal nihilism. Thus law is no longer treated as 
seriously as an instrument for class struggle, but rather serves 
as a means to maintain order, protect the people and people's 
democracy, as well as a means for realizing the fruits of 
modernization.39 
If the revolutionary political system under Mao was charac-
terized by •politics in command,• Deng aims to establish a Chi-
nese political system with •1aw in command.• The socialist legal 
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system under Deng has been elevated to an unprecedentedly presti-
gious and authoritative position in Communist China and the prin-
ciple of the "supremacy of law" is confirmed: all contradictions 
should be handled "in accordance with the procedures prescribed 
by Constitution and Law." Thus, procedural justice draws its 
legitimacy and guidance from the Constitution and laws. In sum, 
Deng believes that a sound legal system is a sine qua non in 
"protect[ing) people's democratic rights, consolidat[ing) politi-
cal stability and unity, develop[ing) socialist economic con-
struction and rais [ing) the living standards of the people. n40 
It is a legal system in which law nwould not be changed because 
of a change of leadership, or because of a change in the view-
?oint or attention of the leadership.•41 
Although Deng has stressed the role of law, his conception 
of socialist legal system is one appproximate to nrule by law." 
The legal system is far from being a system based on the nrule of 
law." Even in the sense of the 0 Socialist rule of law" which is 
based on socialist democracy, the system is still backward: 
Only with the completion of all kinds of law, 
and at the same time, the realization of de-
mocratization and legalization and in-
stitutionalization of democracy, among which 
are included the continuous improvement and 
perfection of all political institutions of 
the state, the managerial •system of the state, 
the system of elections, supervision and re-
call of all levels of leading cadres. In all 
these respects, there must be laws to follow, 
and all must work strictly according to law, 
only under these conditions can "socialist 
rule of law" be possible.42 
"Rule by law• is the only system in which both citizens and 
rulers are subject to law,~3 whereas the "socialist rule of law" 
must possess all the above conditions. 
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Table I 
Content 
1. Nature 
2. Structure 
3. Staffing 
4. Essence 
A Comparison of Two Ideal Types -- Revolutionary 
Justice versus Procedural Justice* 
Revolutionary Justice 
Politicized 
Simple and flexible 
Politically reliable 
"red" cadres 
I. Justice for 'people' 
not for 'non-people' 
II. De-emphasis of 
procedure 
Ill. Absence of a set of 
legal codes 
lv. Polley above law 
The principle of 
"Supremacy of 
Law" Is denied 
v. Party In leadership 
Court Is only tool 
vi. It Is hope through 
mass participation 
to cultivate the 
class conscious 
of the mass 
Aimed at the trans-
formation of 
'non-people' to 
socialist men 
vii. Sanction through 
social Intimation 
viii. Hass mobilization In 
the execution of 
law 
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Procedural Justice 
Depollt lc I zed 
Bureaucratic 
Professional 
I. Justice for all 
II. Procedures applied to 
all 
Ill. Complete set of legal 
codes 
lv. Law above policy 
The principle of 
"SupreMacy of Law 
Is attained 
EMphasis on uniformity 
continuity, authori-
tativeness of Law 
v. Administered by 
Independent organs 
subject to law 
vi. Aim at maintaining 
order and social 
stability 
Aim at maintaining 
justice 
vii. Sanction through 
legal bodies 
! •••• (to be continued) •••• 
( •••• continued •••• ) 
Content 
5. Definition 
of Crime 
6. Highest 
Form 
]. 
Condition 
Revolutionary Justice 
There Is no differentiation 
between political, 
criminal and civil case 
All are handled by the same 
method and of same nature 
-permanent revolution 
the ideological and 
demand become upgraded 
target Is being enlarged 
perfect monolithic 
society 
Cyclic 
(or dialectic) 
but cyclic Is the common 
phenomenon whereas dialectic 
is an Ideal 
1. Revolutionary fever is 
still carried on 
The charismatic leader 
Is still alive 
2. Proletarian justice 
cannot be applied to 
all since enemies 
still exist 
3. Contradictions are the 
dominant phenomena 
and can only be 
resolved by struggle 
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Procedural Justice 
Separation of political 
crime from criminal 
(general) and civil 
crime 
Different procedures and 
laws for different nature 
of cases 
Socialist rule of law 
based on socialist 
democracy 
Evolutionary 
Revolutionary fever is 
retreated and order is 
emphasized to facilitate 
construction 
The demise of charismatic 
leader 
Proletarian justice is 
believed to be capable of 
achieving through a 
complete set of legal 
procedure and law 
Only when there is an end 
to class sturggle can the 
system be perfected, that 
Is, conflicts are to be 
solved by legal procedure 
between state and people, 
Party and people, and 
Party and state 
! .... (to be continued) •••• 
( •••• continued •••• ) 
Condition Revolutionary Justice 
4. Extra-legal means are 
uti 1 i zed such as 
campaigns 
5. Enemies are always 
present and must be 
reformed through the 
mass line 
6. Closed system in the 
law making process 
- Party direction 
People only act and 
react but no inter-
actions 
], A clear distinction 
between 'people' and 
'enemies' 
8, The legal sense is 
weak or simply 
absent 
9. Political reliability 
is emphasized 
10. Social intimation is 
believed to be most 
effective in forcing 
one to reform and 
adopt the socialist 
world view 
11. Revolution and struggle 
are not subject to 
the limitations of 
legal institution or 
laws which are only 
tools for such 
purpose 
12. It is believed humans 
can be reformed 
through permanent 
revolution 
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Procedural Justice 
Extra-legal means are 
condemned 
No 'non-people' elements 
exist which according 
to Communist ideology 
must be treated by 
revolutionary methods 
Open system in the law 
making process 
People are permitted to 
participate in the 
perfection of the 
legal system 
No such distinction 
Only possible when the 
whole population 
especially the cadres 
have acquired a strong 
legal sense 
It is presupposed 
People are to be educated 
by formal means of 
socialization through 
school and mass media 
All must be worked accord-
ing to law any violations 
will be punished 
/ •••• (to be continued) •••• 
( •••• continued •••• ) 
Consequences Revolutionary Justice Procedural Justice 
1. Power Is law 
2. Discriminative 
3. Confusion and struggle, 
mass mobilizations 
are order of the day 
1. Supremacy of law 
2. Non-discrimination 
3. Pure legal Order 
Limitations 
Remarks 
1. Only beginning 
2. Ideological and 
revolutionary 
limitations and 
legacy 
3. Certain past unhealthy 
working principles 
remain unchanged 
(see Party II) 
4. The legal education of 
people and the cadres 
Is Inadequate 
1. The transformation has already taken place from revolutionary 
justice to procedural justice. 
2. The prototype existed during the Hao 1 s era when revolutionary 
justice was the dominant system. It existed as a competing 
system. 
3. It Is characterized as 'revolutionary' because It Is not only 
aimed at mass education but the transformation of those non-
people's weltanshauung as well as those decadent elements who 
formerly possess a proleterlan weltanshauung. 
4. It Is characterized as "procedural" but not "Institutionalized" 
or "BureaucratIc" (as used by Brady), because It Is more ap-
propriate a on one hand, It shows the stress on the legal pro-
cedure In handling cases prescribed by the Constitution and law1 
on the other hand, "procedural" already presupposes the pre-
requisite of an Institutionalized or bureaucratic legal 
structure. 
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*Mao's ideal type of revolutionary justice was put into 
practice during the Cultural Revolution, whereas Deng 's ideal 
type of procedural justice is at its genesis and is still evolv-
ing. This table will contrast these two ideal types. The ideal 
type simply means the orientation of development of the legal 
system means the orientation of development of the legal system 
under the Communist leaders. Although revolutionary justice and 
procedural justice are two extreme ideal types, they both aim at 
the promotion of proletarian justice. 
The legal system developed along the line of procedural jus-
tice in the early years of the PRC. Because of the opposition 
from Mao, procedural justice was never fully established and was 
forced to co-exist with the revolutionary justice. It was com-
pletely eliminated during the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the 
two were incompatible rather than complementary: the revolution-
ary and procedural justice systems stand in sharp ideological and 
political contrast. The promulgation of Criminal Law and the Law 
of Criminal Procedure in latter 1979, as well as the statutory 
provisions in the 1982 Constitution for the organization of a 
formal legal system, herald the end of revolutionary justice and 
the final triumph of procedural justice as the "correct" way to 
pursue substantive justice. 
It is no doubt that Mao's model of justice was predominant 
while Liu 's line of legal justice was a competing model until 
late 1978 when Deng resumed his leadership position in Communist 
China. The sequential development of these two alternative mod-
els can be graphed as follows: 
D gree of Intensity 
1952-57 
Co-exist 
GLF 1960-66 
Anti-
Ri:ghtist 
/', 
/ ' 
/ ' 
I ' I \ 
1966-1976 
Cultural 
Revolution 
Procedural Justice 
' ' Revolutionary 
' Justice 
' 
' 
' 
1976-82 
Deng's Era 
Time 
Dimension 
B. The Sources of Criminal Responsiblity of Chinese 
Intellectuals within the Single Party Communist Regime 
A single party Communist regime is typified as totalitarian. 
Political control penetrates into every sphere of the people's 
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daily life. Intellectual life is without exception. The criti-
cal character of the Chinese intellectuals and the "dogmatic" 
nature of the Communist regime are incompatible. Intellectuals' 
individualistic and eccentric tendencies are direct challenges to 
the Communist goals of a monolithic, collective society. In the 
first instance, their subjective demands for a free environment 
is the chief source of their criminal responsibility. Intellec-
tual freedom and the freedom of speech would lead to open criti-
cism and challenge of the correctness of the Party ideology and 
Party policy. The liberalization of thought which presupposes 
independent thinking would result in the emergence of deviant 
ideas and ideological deviances. These mean the denial of 
thought control and thought reform and thus go against the Party 
principle of strict ideological conformity and the Party's aim to 
eradicate all non-Communist ideologies in order to create a "col-
lective society with a uniform proletarian world view." Mao made 
his aim explicit in the ideological front: 
In our country, bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
ideology, anti-Marxist ideology will continue 
to exist for a long time ••• but we have not 
yet won complete victory on the political and 
ideological front. In the ideological field, 
the question of who will win in the struggle 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie 
hils not yet been really settled. We still 
nave to wage a protracted struggle against 
bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology •••• 
All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all 
ghosts and monsters must be subject to criti-
cism: in no circumstance should they be al-
lowed to spread unchecked.44 
Under the Chinese Communist system, students and intellectuals, 
in order to progress both ideologically and politically, should 
study Marxism-Leninism. It is considered that "one • • • [hasl 
no soul if he does not have a correct political point of view.n4S 
Whereas the demand for the democratization of the political sys-
tem by the intellectuals clashes with the very essence of the 
system, single Party leadership has been regarded by Mao and Deng 
as the most important principle in Communist China. All these 
demands, if realized, would result in pluralism which is con-
tradictory to monolithic rule: one party, one authority, one 
ideology and one culture. Thus, the regime is hostile to the 
intellectuals' way of speech and style of thinking, which would 
undermine the Party single rule on which the whole system of con-
trol is based. This is why "ideological accusation" has been so 
common in Communist China. Indeed the definition of the crime is 
rather politically relative. In sum, the criminal responsibility 
of the intellectuals in Communist China is more or less a func-
tion of the scope and degree of the monolithic rule demanded by 
the Party leaders. To be more precise, it depends on the demo-
cratic values of the Party leaders, which to a large extent 
determine how far legal protection can be offered to the 
intellectuals. 
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On the other hand, the 1mage of the intellectuals in the 
eyes of the Party leaders determines their vulnerability to 
political forces. This is especially important with regard to 
legal treatment under revolutionary justice which denies the 
principle of "all are equal before the law." Because class na-
ture is de-emphasized in the procedural judicial system, criminal 
responsibility becomes a function of the level of institution-
alization of the legal system and the degree of democratization 
of the political system. Finally, since Communist ideology has a 
tremendous impact on legal practices, which are subjected to the 
open interpretation of Party leaders, justice in the application 
of law towards the intellectuals is a dependent variable of the 
Party leaders' attitudes and policy toward the intellectuals. 
The degree of criminal responsibility of the intellectuals 
and the legal protection provided to them in Mao's and Deng's 
period can best be compared by their reactions to the intellec-
tuals' demands for freedom and democratization, and the justice 
realized in the course of the application of law to the intellec-
tuals within the two legal systems. 
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Chapter Two 
The Characteristics of the Legal Systea in Coaaunist 
China: Change and Continuity 
The legal philosophies of Mao and Deng are opposite. There 
are great differences between the revolutionary justice system 
and the procedural justice system despite the fact that they both 
intended to achieve "proletarian" justice. The former system is 
profoundly influenced by politics, while the latter depoliticizes 
the system and restores it to neutrality as a means to uphold 
justice. 
A. Relationship between the Party and the Judiciary 
1. The Redefinition of Party Leadership and the Assertion 
of Judicial Independence 
The leadership of the Party over the judiciary in Com-
munist China under Mao was absolute. The judiciary never ac-
quired an independent status insulated from political influence. 
In fact, the Chinese Communists never concealed their rejection 
of the principle of judicial independence based on the assumption 
that "law and politics are inseparable.•! During the Anti-
Rightist Campaign, the Party even openly and repeatedly declared 
that "Party leadership is indispensable.• The reason given was 
that law could not provide sufficient guidance, since the law in 
China was not yet complete.2 Article 78 of the 1954 Constitution 
provided that "People's Courts shall conduct adjudication in-
dependently and shall be subject only to the law.• It was never 
put into practice with the excuse that independent adjudication 
was a denial of Party leadership·. Soviet propagandists also 
criticized Peking's violation of "socialist legality.• In 1964, 
Izvestia declared that: 
Things have come to a strong pass when the 
secretary of a district Party committee ousts 
the judge, sits at the bench himself, and 
starts to decide cases. Such instances are 
presented in the press as positive 
experience.3 
Shen Chunzhu, first President of the Supreme People's Court, 
stated that •our judicial work must serve political ends active-
ly, and must be brought to bear. on our current political tasks 
and mass movements.•4 Franz Schurmann concluded that "the Party 
in effect had supplemented the judiciary as the instrument of the 
law.•S It followed that only the Party could choose the 
judiciary's scope of jurisdiction at any given time, and that the 
Party was in a position to decide whether and what kinds of cases 
ought to be handled by legal procedures - which were rather for-
malistic ones under the system of Party committee review and ap-
proval cases. 
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With the intention of establishing the "supremacy of law" 
which is the basis of legal order as well as the separation of 
work between the Party and State, the CPC explicitly decided to 
restore judicial independence.6 In July 1979, the "Organic Law 
of the People's Court" was adopted in which Article 4 stipulates 
that "the people's courts shall exercise judicial power indepen-
dently in accordance with the law." The Central Committee of CPC 
later declared to abolish the system of Party Committee reviews 
and approval cases. "The Directive of the Central Committee of 
the CPC Concerning the Resolute Guarantee of the Strict Implemen-
tation of the Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure" has 
pointed out that "the leadership and cadres of the Party and all 
administrative organs, no matter how high their post, and how 
great their powers, cannot 'replace law by words,' or use ones' 
will or opinion as law or force others to implement."? It fur-
ther stated that all cases tried must be conducted according to 
law. 
The new working principle in the organic law of the judiciary on one hand denies the interference of any administra-
tive organs, public organization or individuals in the adjudica-
tion process either secretly or openly when the courts conduct 
the trial. On the other hand, it affirms that cases must be 
strictly handled by law and the People's courts should obey the 
law only rather than the order from any organs or individuals.S 
This manifests the pragmatists' concern over the unhealthy ef-
fects of external influence (e.g., the Party) in the judicial 
process and the legal nihilism (falu xuwuzhuyi), which was preva-
lent in Mao's era. 
While advocating the importance of judicial independence, 
the Party has also redefined the "Party leadership of the 
Judiciary" with emphasis on upholding the dignity and uniformity 
of law which are expressed in its inviolability and its universal 
application.9 The leadership of the Party Committee over the 
administrative judicial departments should be strengthened with 
respect to major guidelines and policy problems should not inter-
vene in the handling of individual cases by the People's Courts. 
The same applies to the People's Procuratorate. In so doing, the 
Party first of all denounces the past practices of "replacing law 
by words," "replacing law by power," and "replacing law by Party 
discipline" in order to establish the dignity of law by remold-
ing the attitude of the cadres and the masses from "being afraid 
of power but not law" to the "being afraid of law but not 
power."lO The Judiciary, thereafter should obey the law instead 
of power. The most important task for strengthening Party 
leadership over the judiciary, as claimed by the Party, is "to 
perfect the law through legislation, to guarantee the enforcement 
of law and the independence of the people's courts in exercising 
adjudication power.•ll As stated by a leading Party official: 
In exercising leadership over State affairs 
• • • the Party must • • • ensure by every 
means the effective functioning of the organs 
of • • • judicial organizations • • • carry 
out their work =esponsibly and on their own 
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initiative. As with other social 
organizations, Party organizations at all 
levels must conduct their activities within 
the limits permitted by the Constitution and 
the Law.l2 
Thus "to handle cases based on law is equivalent to obeying Party 
leadership.•l3 In the light that "all must observe law" and "law 
must be strictly enforced," the Party at the same time asserts 
that cadres must set an example and lead the masses to observe 
the law and it reminds the Party members that "they do not 
transcend but are within the limits of law." 
In building up the dignity and the prestige of the judiciary 
which was trampled during the Cultural Revolution, an eminent 
jurist declared that "the authority of the judiciary must be re-
spected, the decision of the Courts must be obeyed."~4 Since the 
people's court is the only organ authorized by the Constitution 
and the law to exercise the exclusive power of adjudication, the 
verdicts and convictions of the court possess legal binding force 
after being put into effect. They cannot be changed arbitrarily 
except through prescribed legal procedure, and must be strictly 
enforced even if they are in doubt. In order to prevent any 
intervention, the Party committee is now being deprived of its 
former power of changing court decisions. It is strictly the 
responsibility of the judiciary to investigate and make final 
conclusions. 
In sum, as presented by Jiang Hua, the President of the 
Supreme People's Court, the most essential principle of socialist 
legal system is "strictly handling cases according to law and 
unswervingly insisting on the independent adjudication of the 
people's courts." The strengthening and correctness of the party 
leadersip in the new era is a function of how far this principle 
can be achieved. In short, these are the guidelines for perfect-
ing procedural justice. Thus, the expansion of the activities of 
the courts and the de-emphasis of the role of extra-judicial in-
stitutions are the prominent phenomena of the legal development 
in the PRC since the rise of Deng. 
2. Recruitment and Staffing 
The Party has controlled the recruitment policy and the 
staffing of the judiciary. This was especially significant 
during the Anti-Rightist Movement. The Party took action to 
•purify" the judiciary by removing from its ranks all those cad-
res -- both Party and non-Party -- whose behaviors or words were 
considered as "rightist • or "anti-party. • To ensure the 
ideological purity of the judiciary, the Party restricted the 
selection of judges to Party cadres. Judiciary personnel were 
subject to study, criticismJ struggle and other techniques of 
ideological indoctrination.!~ The "redness" of the legal cadres 
prevailed throughout Mao's leadership. 
This policy has not been abandoned by the pragmatists but 
the orientation and the spirit are completely different. The new 
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staffing policy is based on ra1s1ng the professional standards of 
the legal cadres. Summing up their past experiences, the Com-
munist leaders have realized that only with a profound under-
standing of the law can legal cadres and judges enforce the law 
properly. Thus, what they have endeavored to do is to emphasize 
the professional quality of the legal cadres. Jiang Hua has said 
that adjudication is a professional task, thus the legal cadres 
must be experts.l6 Other leaders like Ye Jianying have called 
for "fearless judges and procurators who are read_y_ to sacrifice 
their lives for the dignity of the legal system"I7 by being an 
impartial judge who enforces the law strictly without any fear of 
power. The Party has now undertaken the task of professionaliza-
tion of the legal system as a form of strengthening the Party 
leadership over the judiciary and has formally put an end to dis-
pute over "red" and "expert" in the field of the judiciary. 
3. Party Policy Versus Law 
Before 1976, the contents and application of law, espe-
cially criminal law, typically the Act of the People's Republic 
of China for the Punishment of Counterrevolution (hereinafter 
referred to as "Act"), as well as court verdicts, were decided by 
Party policy and the Party line, but did not strictly adhere to 
the "law." This means that Party policy was above law. The Par-
ty directed and led the judiciary through its policy: "The 
relationship betwen Party policy and the people's democractic 
legal system is one in which the policy of the Communist Party is 
the soul of the people's democratic legal system. It is an im-
portaii'tinstrument for the realization of Party policy.nl8 The 
Communists stressed that "the policy of the Communist Party is 
not only the basis for enactment of law, but also for the ap-
plication of laws, and jurisdiction changes as Party policy 
changes.nl9 Law was on1y the routinization and regularization of 
Party policy which shared the same nature and status with Con-
stitution and laws. It was said that "even after the completion 
of law in the future, we must still work according to the con-
crete conditions, and grasp the spirit of Party policy in order 
to enforce law accurately. n20 Party policy thus determined the 
contents and essence of the law, for example, the 0 Act," which 
varied at different times, or with different movements. Due to 
the ambiguity of the crimes and penalties defined in the "Act," 
the legal cadres, especially during mass campaigns, had to adhere 
to Party policy or directives to decide the degree of severity of 
the crime and punishment, whether "suppression" or "leniency.a 
Thus, when the legal cadres conducted trials on counterrevolu-
tionary crimes, they had to have a full understanding of Party 
policy, otherwise they would be accused of being "conservatives" 
or "rightists 0 : 
The Party leadership of counterrevolutionary 
struggle is done through party policy. The 
policies made during the struggle is the 
weapon that guarantees the entire enforcement 
of law.21 
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In short, there was a lack of a written legal code throughout 
Mao's era. 
Under the new principle that the "law is supreme,• the 
relationship of law and policy has been redefined. It is said 
that •only when the law is incomplete should we follow policy. 
But after there is law, we must act according to the law.•22 The 
past practices are criticized as the "rule of man• in the light 
that the cadres thought that when there was policy, there was no 
need for law. This idea that "Party policy is law• is being de-
nounced because the Party leadership recognizes that the major 
cause for past mistakes was a lack of law and a lack of respect 
for law. Although the law is the crystallization of Party policy 
and is the regularization of Party policy, it cannot then be in-
ferred that policy can replace law.Z3 The understanding of Party 
policy of course contributes to realizing the essnce of law but 
the function of policy cannot be exaggerated for this will lead 
to overlooking the prescriptive nature of law. The Party for the 
first time has asserted that in practice one must not stress 
policy too much and disregard law. The proper relationship is 
that the two are complimentary and cannot replace each other 
since they are of different natures. Although law is enacted on 
Party policy, it is more mature and perfect than policy, in terms 
of stability, continuity and uniformity. Policy is in the hands 
of Party leadership, and is the will of the leadership, so it is 
rather unstable as it changes when the will and attention of the 
leadership are changed. Law cannot be changed by any individual, 
any amendments must be publicly declared and worked out according 
to prescribed procedures. 25 Moreover, the law is above policy 
since law is enacted by the highest authority of the state. The 
Party, on the other hand, makes policy. Thus the law possesses 
the mandatory nature and authoritativeness which outweighs poli-
cy. Thus, policy is bound by law which cannot contradict to law 
but must facilitate its enforcement. Furthermore, the compulsory 
nature of policy is not for all, whereas law is enforced through 
the coercive power of the state organs imposed on the whole coun-
try. The violation of laws will be penalized. Though law can be 
proposed by the Party, it must, however, be scrutinized, passed 
and promulgated by the NPC. Since law is supreme, there are no 
individuals or organs that transcend the limits of the law or who 
are above the law. One may conclude that the enactment of and 
implementation of law are the fundamental form and important 
methods of Party leadership and •to obey law is the same as obey-
ing Party leadership.• Finally, the Party has warned that policy 
cannot direct the enforcement of law, for this would be a denial 
of the value of law. 
B. The Distinction of "Two Cateqories of Contradictions• versus 
the Principle of "All Are Equal Before The Law• 
Mao's ideas deeply affected the operation of the Chinese 
legal system. He explicitly pointed out that in handling legal 
cases, the legal cadres had first to decide the nature of the 
case whether it was •a contradiction among people• or •a con-
tradiction between the people and the enemies.•26 These consid-
erations dominated and politicized the application of law. 
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In Mao's theory, the proletariat constituted the core group 
of "people." The peasants came next, as the surest allies of the 
proletariat. As for the bourgeoisie, petty or national, it was 
stipulated that they were only admitted to the exclusive club the 
"people" on good "political" behaviour. With the exception of 
proletariat, peasants and soldiers, the political and legal sta-
tus of all other classes or strata was uncertain. Even within 
the same group, for example, the intellectuals, some might be 
categorized as "people," while others are "enemies." The 
categorization of the contradictions was totally dependent on the 
understanding and the interpretation of the "six criteria" laid 
down by Mao in the "Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People" which were strictly political ones. In fact, the nature 
of the contradictions depended on one's political attitude and 
behavior as well as "class essence": one was likely to receive a 
more severe punishment for a given offense than a person who was 
not a black element.27 The contradictions between people were to 
be dealt with by the methods of persuasion and education, de-
mocracy and discussion while coercion, repression and compulsion 
were to be applied to antagonistic contradictions. Based on 
Mao's legal philosophy in which political force remained the sole 
judge of the category of contradictions, the use of distinction 
of contradictions publicly repudiated the principle of "all are 
equal before law." 
The legal practice of "all are equal before law" seems to be 
a challenge to the former practice of the distinction of two cat-
egories of contradictions. Under this principle, law is applied 
to all without exception: all must obey law, whoever violate the 
law must be dealt with and sanctioned according to law, 
All are equal before the law - this is a 
slogan of our entire people, the entire 
Party membership and all or revolutionary 
cadres; it is an ideological weapon in our 
fight against any one who pursues privilege. 
Before the law, Party members and revolu-
tionary cadres have only the obligation to 
take the lead in observing it in an exem-
plary fashion, and they have no special 
right whatsoever to violate it. Whoever 
breaks the law and commits a crime, no mat-
ter how great his seniority, how important 
his office and how large his contributions, 
shall not be indulged and shielded but shall 
be punished according to law.28 
According to the Party, regardless of socio-political sta-
tus, differences of social essences and political backgrounds, 
whether or not the crime of the accused committed belonged to 
antagonistic contradiction, all are equal before law in the ap-
plication of law which also refers to the equality of judicial 
process. Based on this, even counterrevolutionary crimes should 
be punished according to law. The same is for the crimes among 
the people.29 In other words, regardless of whether the crime is 
classified as one between the contradictions among the people or 
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the Criminal 
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contradictions or a general crime or counter-
crime, all must be tried and punished according to 
Law. Thus, the application of law is being 
It is clear that the crimes among the people are beyond the 
question of "correct and incorrect." They are instead legal 
questions. Thus all should be sternly punished by law since the 
subject of punishment is a criminal offender, with all offenders 
receiving punishment of the same nature.30 This sheds light on 
the Party's denial of the disctinction of the nature of con-
tradictions which are to be handled differently especially when 
the sphere of dictatorship gets smaller and smaller. It is said 
that the distinction of two categories of contradictions is 
fundmentally based on political attitudes. This is incompatible 
with decisions based on the nature of the crime which is a con-
crete action. 31 It is standard to distinguish people from ene-
mies but in no sense the standard for evaluating whether one has 
committed a crime. In fact, the nature of contradiction and the 
constitution of a crime are two completely different concepts 
which must not be confused. It follows that antagonistic con-
tradictions do not necessarily constitute a crime and by the same 
token, not all criminal cases belong to antagonistic contradic-
tions. To adopt the practice of the distinction of contradiction 
falls short in two respects. The first one is the question of 
criteria, for it is difficult to distinguish "people" from •ene-
mies. • Secondly, there is a tendency to confuse political con-
cepts with legal concepts and indeed, political standards cannot 
supersede criminal provisions which would lead to a disregard for 
the status of the law and would be unrealistic. With the promul-
gation of the Criminal law, any distinction of contradictions 
would only lead to the violation of the principle of "all are 
equal before the law" as well as "handling cases only subject to 
law." Indeed although the Party has not yet openly abandoned the 
old practice, the assertion of the restoration of the principle 
of "all are equal before the law" has rendered the distinction of 
contradictions irrelevant and it eventually will become insig-
nificant in the legal practice. 
c. Legality Concerning the Deeming of Offenses and the 
Application of Penalties (Zuixinq Fading Zhuyi) 
The Party under Mao adopted the principle of flexibility in 
the definition and application of law. According to the Chinese 
Communists this practice possessed positive value during the 
transitional period which was marked by radically changing condi-
tions and complicated political struggles. Flexibility was the 
guiding principle of the "Act" which the Party preserved as an 
elastic interpretation of the criminal law. Thus, the "Act• ex-
plicitly stipulated the use of analogy in Article 16: "Those 
who, with a counterrevolutionary purpose, commit crimes not 
covered by the provisions of this Act may be given punishments 
prescribed for crimes [enumerated} in this Act which are com-
parable to the crime committed." The reason given was that since 
struggles were of a long term nature, it was impossible to list 
all types of crime. It further argued that if crime by analogy 
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was not employed, the Party could not suppress the crime in a 
timely effective and efficient way. But in Western practice use 
of analogy should be permitted only when such an action is advan-
tageous to the criminal prosecuted and is prohibited in case of 
any discriminative effects that would arise.32 The practice by 
the Chinese Communists is just the opposite. Punishing by crime 
by analogy contradicts the general principle of nulla poena sine 
lege (no crime without a pre-existing prohibitory rule). Under 
this principle, if the crime is not "clearly" or "explicitly" 
defined in the criminal lawk it does not constitute a crime and 
is not subject to sanction.~3 The spirit is built on the basis 
of the protection of individual rights and the prevention of 
criminal abuse. But to the Party, this principle only restricted 
its power: the limitations imposed by law, its rigidity and bind-
ing force, all prohibited the Party from carrying out "struggles" 
through political campaigns at whim. The method of analogy was 
flexible and could be widely used without any limitations. At 
the same time, it also confirmed the principle of severity of 
punishment and the practice of "it is better to risk condemning 
an innocent man than to save a guilty one.• The Party ideology 
is in fact incompatible with this principle. The flexibility of 
the •Act" was enhanced by the permission in Article 18 for the 
retroactive application of the "Actn to "counterrevolutionary 
crimes• committed before the "People's Republic" carne into 
existence: 
It applies to the crimes committed in the 
basis of People's Revolution which have not 
been tried, and all the crimes committed 
during the KMT reactionary rule.34 
Moreover, after the Communist regime's abolition of all the laws 
of the Republic of China, civil and criminal codes were never 
enacted. This enabled the Party to make full use of the "Act, n 
as an omnipotent tool for struggle. Thus power and rank became 
the decisive forces in trials. Power was the law, truth and 
•crime and punishment were stipulated by power:" whether one had 
committed the crime and the severity of the punishment depended 
on the will of those who held power. "Legal nihilism" thus de-
veloped. The phenomenon was that: 
As there is no unified Criminal law, law-
lessness has become universal • • • The 
concept of a legal system has become very 
shadowy indeed among both the cadres and the 
masses • • • • There are cadres who openly 
protect criminal members of their unit 
• • There are cadres who set up their own 
laws.35 
With all its ambiguities and vagueness, the law possessed the 
character of a universal penal code and afforded the Party maxi-
mum flexibility for the purpose of eliminating its political op-
ponents and thus furthering Party policies. 
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With the promulgation of the Criminal Law, one must ask 
whether its enforcement is based on the principle of nulla poena 
sine lege or on "criminal analogy." Engels once said that "all 
parties and classes which seize the power through revolution de-
mand the absolute recognition for the legal s~_stem created by the 
revolution, and is to be treated as holy. •36 This highlighted 
the importance of upholding the dignity of law. In light of past 
practice, the Party under the pragmatists has realized the ad-
vantage of conducting crimina! convictions and punishment based 
on the principle of nulla poena sine lege. It enables crimina! 
trials to punish accurately the criminal offenses, to protect the 
people and to create a stable social order for social moderniza-
tion. Secondly, only if cases are handled by law can the defects 
of the "rule of man" be rectified thereby working toward the 
universality of law. Thirdly, the law which explicitly pre-
scribes on paper what is legal and illegal advises people clearly 
of which conduct is criminal. With the adoption of the principle 
of "crime and punishment stipulated by law," the legal cadres and 
judges no longer hesitate in their adjudications to suit the will 
of the leaders. On the other hand, the Party does not deny the 
practice of analogy. But the crime must be "serious" so as to 
make analogy necessary. Even so, the Party has warned that anal-
ogy must be employed "cautiously" and "must be confirmed by the 
Supreme People's COurt" (which is not specified in the "Act") .37 
A commentator stated that "our legislation is inclined to the 
principle of crime and punishment stipulated by law (hereinafter 
referred to as "Principle") in adopting the method of criminal 
analogy. n38 All these aim at timely sanctions for those 
criminals whose crimes are not written in Criminal Law and at the 
prevention of arbitrary analogy. Towards the perfection of the 
Criminal Law, it is believed that the boundary of "criminal anal-
ogy" ought to be narrowed. Only when "criminal analogy" is based 
on the "Principle" can the law be used to protect people's rights 
and people will no longer be afraid of the law. The confirmation 
of the positive value of the "Principle" reveals that the prag-
matists have become conscious about the past practice of •crime 
and punishment decided arbitrarily," and are aware of the lack of 
authoritativeness of the law which has been the object of policy. 
All these have negative effects on the long term social stabili-
ty. The "Principle" indeed can define the criminal law more ac-
curately, and correct the above defects in order to preserve so-
cial order. 
The Criminal Law differs from the "Act" in that although 
both provide for a retroactive application, yet the former is 
more precise and clear concerning the time for retroactivity. 
The Criminal Law has certain prescriptions: 1. If the highest 
legal punishment is life imprisonment and capital punishment, the 
case must be reviewed after twenty years; after confirmation by 
the Supreme People's Procuratorates, it can be investigated; 
2. The time for retroactivity is a function of seriousness of the 
crime committed - the heavier the longer. It can be over twenty 
years for individual cases.39 The time and conditional limits 
set for retroactivity can reduce the room for flexibility. 
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D. Towards Deeoliticization in the Distinction Between Criminal 
and Non-Cr1minal 
The "Actn in the People's Republic of China under Mao chief-
ly served the political purpose of eliminating the enemies of the 
regime. An individual's family, economic, political and even 
educational background could also constitute the source of coun~ 
terrevolutionary crimes. Thus counterrevolutionary crimes were 
of a political nature and were of the content of "purges" and 
"struggles." "The theory of the unique importance of class ori-
gin" was the typical expression of the political nature of the 
"Act." 
Counterrevolutionary crimes tended to be all inclusive 
crimes. The Party did not separate counterrevolutionary crimes 
from other general criminal crimes or civil cases. From the 
viewpoint of the Communists, who employed the principle of a pre-
sumption of guilt,40 all categories of crime contained the es-
sence or aim of "anti-Party" or "anti-Communist" regimes. The 
sole standard was political. General speaking, any words, deeds 
or ideologies which hindered the achievement of the monolithic 
rule or attempted to damage the monolithic order, or violated the 
newly-set standards of social behavior, were said to be counter-
revolutionary: politically opposing the Party leadership, or 
criticizing policiesi opposing the socialist roadi ideologically 
opposing or doubting "Chinese Communism"i or violating Communist 
ethics. In sum, whatever deeds, words or thoughts, no matter how 
serious, intentionally or unintentionally, all were regarded as 
counterrevolutionary if they were opposed to the Communist rule 
or harmful to its interests. 
In realizing its past defects, the Party has tried to be 
more clear in the content, conception and definition of what is a 
"crime" in the distinction between criminal and non-criminal, 
especially between counterrevolutionary crimes and general 
crimes. Depoliticization of definition of crime tends to be the 
direction taken. 
Generally speaking, the core criterion for criminal offense 
is conduct or action. Accordingly, first, the conduct must be 
harmful to the societyi secondly, the conduct must be intention-
ali and third, all crimes and conduct must be punished in accor-
dance with the Criminal Law.41 The Criminal law is thus aimed at 
preventing the reappearance of "ideological crimes" (sixianq fan) 
by which one is proved to be guilty purely to one's ideological 
thoughts as well as crimes which are based on irrelevant objec-
tive criteria such as social status and family background. An-
other objective is to separate counterrevolutionary crimes from 
general crimes which have been generally confused in the past. 
The Party has openly announced that there is no such crime 
as an "ideological crime. •42 Any ideology or thinking which is 
wrong or even reactionary, as long as it has not been translated 
into action, is not harmful to the society. It thus does not 
constitute a source of crime. The Party has in fact admitted 
that the appearance of "incorrect" ideologies is inevitable, and 
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has accepted this fact. Dong Biwu has also pointed out that 
"there is a strict difference between treatment towards those who 
only possess reactionary ideologies but without counterrevolu-
tionary activity and counterrevolutionary elements. •43 The Par-
ty's "Guiding Principle for Inner-Party Poltical Life" adopted at 
the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee ex-
pressed that "matters of right or wrong in ideology and theory 
can be solved only by the method of presenting facts and reason-
ing things out and conducting democratic discussions, and on no 
account should the method of coercion be adopted.•44 Party mem-
bers point out: 
Opposition to a certain view of a certain 
comrade cannot be equated with opposition to 
this comrade; opposition to a certain com-
rade of a certain leading body cannot be 
equated with opposition to the leadership, 
let alone opposition to the Party.45 
The same spirit can be applied to the judicial practice in dis-
tinguishing the boundaries of ideological questions, political 
questions and criminal questions. Article 90 of the Criminal Law 
has set conduct as the sole source of judgement for counter-
revolutionary crimes, but it is emphasized that not under all 
conditions is this judgement correct. Marx once said that "those 
laws which do not set its base on conduct but the style of think-
ing of the people concerned as the chief standard of crimeJ it is 
equated with the open recognition of illegal conducts. •46 The 
Communist Party seems to have the intention of rectifying the 
past practice of subjectivity. 
Moreover, the Party has cautiously redefined "the crime of 
counterrevolutionary propaganda incitation" and the principle of 
"blame not the speaker. • More concrete elaboration has been 
made. The Party clearly shows that freedom of speech is relative 
but not absolute: in case of not violating those legal condi-
tions concerning rebellious incitation, slander, obscenity, pro-
fanity, false witness and the leakage of state secrets; one can 
speak freely.47 Thus, freedom of speech must be conducted ac-
cording to law. On the other hand, since the •crime of revolu-
tionary propaganda incitation" is the most confusing and sensi-
tive one, the Party has made it more specific. The Criminal Law 
defines this crime as "inciting the masses to resist or to 
obstruct the implementation of China's laws or decrees with a 
counterrevolutionary motive; or such things as distributing coun-
terrevolutionary leaflets or other means of propaganda inciting 
the overthrow of the dictatorship of [the] proletariat and the 
socialist system." This is not to punish thoughts and words but 
the conduct that breaks the law. Actionable conduct must: 
first, be counterrevolutionary; and second, be harmful to the 
PRC. It is claimed that only reactionary thought short of incit-
ing behavior does not constitutee a crime. For the principle of 
"blame not the speaker,• it is specified that if the speeches do 
not fall into an¥ article on the Criminal Law, all are to be con-
sidered non-crim1nal. 
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In condemning "ideological crimes," cautiously defining the 
crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda incitation and the 
principle of "blame not the speaker" as well as making a clear 
distinction between criminal and non-criminal, the Party has en-
couraged legal cadres and the general public to understand the 
boundaries of the freedom of speech in order to prevent the past 
practice of accusing guilty parties based on ideological dif-
ferences. The Party has also reasserted that "we cannot arbi-
trarily label as 'anti-Marxist' or counterrevolutionary crime in 
dealing with those who have different ideas." People have the 
right to criticize the leadership and cadres and to raise 
opinions. Even if the criticisms are incorrect, the people still 
cannot be punished. Marx's idea that "Law is the Holy Bible of 
the people's freedom•48 perhaps has become the new legal philoso-
phy of the Party. 
E. From Mass Trials and Mass Movements to Qpen Trials and 
Strict Observance of Legal Procedures 
Mass trials and mass movements have been the common practice 
in the Chinese legal system under popular just ice, especially 
during the early years and the Cultural Revolution. Both were 
judiciary practices for popular participation. Mass trials, the 
trials of landlords, rich peasants and all exploited classes were 
held publicly, mostly before peasants. The final verdicts were 
usually conducted based on the demand of the "masses." The mass 
trials were based upon the policy of "mass line" which charac-
terized the administration of the law during that time.49 
Mass movements were of a similar nature. They were lawful 
movements for developing mass self-consciousness, demanding de-
mocracy and carrying out laws and decrees.SO It was said that 
the principle of the legal work of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat was basically speaking, the question of relying on the 
masses to carry out dictatorship.Sl 
Mass trials and mass movements were treated by Mao as a 
means to educate the masses about values, and policies of the 
Party. Their political use thus outgrew their legal purpose. 
They were used to arouse the hatred of the exploited masses 
against the classes other than the working class and peasantry, 
such as counterrevolutionaries and "undesirable elements" and 
thus to involve the masses directly in the struggles. The Com-
munists wanted to promote political consciousness because: 
The Chinese peasants have for thousands of 
years undergone the cruel political, 
economic, ethical and cultural exploitation 
and oppression of feudalism, and unless we 
have a moment to awaken them, we will not be 
able to educate the masses in their 
thoughts, to awaken the awareness of the 
masses, or to achieve economic and political 
equality. That is to say, unless we go 
through the force of a movement, we will not 
be able to break down the firmly rooted old 
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feudal system or the old order, and we will 
not be able to establish a new democratic 
system or a new order.52 
As the focus of the regime has shifted to the restoration 
of social order for socialist modernization under the leadership 
of Deng, it is said that the class struggle should be handled in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Constitution and 
the Law: 
• to launch this struggle, it cannot 
take the past form of political campaign but 
to follow the principles of a socialist le-
gal system.53 
Thus the procedural judicial system stresses conformity to legal 
procedures. The People's Public Security Bureau is responsible 
for the investigation of all criminal cases. The People's Pro-
curatorate is responsible for review and decisions for arrest and 
prosecution; whereas the People's Court is responsible for 
trials.S4 
It is prescribed by Article 8 of the Law of Criminal Pro-
cedure that "all cases handled by the People's Courts, except for 
those involving special circumstances as specific by law, shall 
be heard in public. • A public trial is conducted by the Court 
openly and independently. This differs from a •mass trial. • 
Only after being sentenced as guilty through a trial can the le-
gal status of the •accused" be converted to that of a criminal 
offender. Throughout the trial, the court adopts neither the 
principle of assumption of guilt nor the presumption of innocence 
but the principle of "neither guilty nor innocent•: no accused 
shall be adjudged guilty and sentenced without evidence other 
than his confession; he shall be convicted and punished if there 
is sufficient evidence against him without his confession -- that 
is, the principle of taking facts as the basis and the law as the 
sole criterion.SS In principle, the burden of proof rests on the 
prosecutor whereas the accused has no right to refuse to answer 
related questions. The accused has the right of defense, appeal 
and the demand for protection during the proceedings which enable 
him to have an adequate chance of self defense. All these rights 
were not provided in the past. The Party stresses that punish-
ment is to deter crime, and it has no relationship with the dis-
tinction of the two categories of contradictions which are based 
on political attitudes. The Party has indicated that the •theory 
of essence• cannot be adopted as a source of adjudication in 
criminal proceedings. Criminal conduct must be separated from 
family background and the political history of the accused. The 
trial focuses only on the crime committed by the accused. The 
President of the Supreme People's court, Jiang Hua, pointed out 
that public trial must conform to legal procedures and it must be 
conducted by the court organized on the basis of law. Adjudica-
tion must be made by the court members and adjudicators must be 
professionals; the trial cannot be conducted in mass assembly and 
the verdict cannot be announced by those other than the official 
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members of the court.56 These assertions have formally 
repudiated the use of mass trials, the system of Party committee 
review and approval cases as well as those trials which are not 
conducted according to legal procedures which have been the 
manifestation of despising law. 
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Chapter Three 
The Chinese eo .. unists' Attitude and 
Policy Towards the Intellectuals 
Mao's policy toward the intellectuals was heavily influenced 
by his attitude towards the intellectuals which was formed even 
before the beginning of his revolutionary career. Reviewing 
their past political experiences, Deng and his colleagues have 
realized the mistakes committed by the Chinese Communist Party 
under Mao. Thus they tend to be more realistic and careful in 
formulating their policy toward the intellectuals. 
A. The Communist Attitude towards the Intellectuals under Mao 
The Chinese Communist attitude towards intellectuals, as 
represented by Mao, is a conflicting one. On one hand, they 
valued the positive contribution of the intellectuals. On the 
other hand, they believed there is an ideological contradiction 
between them and the intellectuals. 
As early as the revolutionary period, Mao emphasized the 
significance of support from the intellectuals: 
In the long and ruthless war of national 
liberation, in the great struggle to build a 
new China, the Communist Party must be good 
at winning intellectuals, for only in this 
way will it be able to organize the millions 
of peasants, develop the revolutionary cul-
tural movement and expand the revolutionary 
united front. Without the participation of 
intellectuals, victory in the revolution is 
impossible.l 
After establishmemnt of the Communist regime, Mao and the 
top party leadership endeavored to draw the intellectuals' sup-
port. This can be observed in the Communists' efforts during the 
early years in administrative recruitment and absorption of in-
tellectuals into the state machinery and their unequivocal ex-
pression of welcome to the non-Communists to serve the •central 
People's Government to Build up a new China.• It was mainly due 
to the realization that without the co-operation and participa-
tion of the intellectuals, the Communists would not run the 
government smoothly and successfully. In fact, many Chinese 
•liberal intellectuals" -- educators, writers and artists, tech-
nlclans, professional people had accepted the Communist 
leadership and its program of "New Democracy. •2 Moreover, the 
intellectuals were the chief source of knowledge and skill for 
social and economic reconstruction which could not totally rely 
on the workers and peasants who were mostly illiterate or poorly 
educated. As expressed by Zhou Enlai in 1956: 
• • • if we want to go ahead with our 
socialist construction on the largest 
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possible scale, quickly, effectively and 
economically, we must rely on the energetic 
labor not only of the working class and the 
broad masses of the peasants, but also the 
intellectuals. • • • The different construc-
tion projects in which we are now engaged 
require the participation of intellectuals in 
ever growing numbers. • Thus intellec-
tuals have become an important factor in 
every aspect of our national life. To find a 
correct solution for the question of intel-
lectuals to mobilize them more effectively 
and make fuller use of their abilities in our 
gigantic work of building socialism, has 
therefore become essential if we are to ful-
fill the fundamental tasks of the transition 
period •• ,3 
Although Mao recognized the indispensable role of intellec-
tuals in the building up of socialism, his treatment of the in-
tellectuals was chiefly utilitarian. As described by Jerome B. 
Grieder: 
Even a government which distrusts the elitist 
implications of the intellectual vocation and 
resists the intellectuals' claim to autonomy 
must make use of their skills and make place 
for some exercise of independence on their 
part: if not "freedom of speech and 
opinion,• then at least some encouragement to 
preserve and perpetuate intellectual skill.4 
According to Marx, only the proletariat alone is really a 
revolutionary class while all other classes are conservative or 
even reactionary.S Mao yielded to tbis notion and had faith only 
in the working class and peasantry. Mao thus never concealed his 
discriminative attitude in favor of the workers and peasants: 
I started as a student. • • • At that time I 
felt that the only clean people in the world 
were the intellectuals •••• After the rev-
olution when I joined with with the workers, 
peasants, and soldiers, I gradually came to 
know them thoroughly, and they too gradually 
came to know me •••• Only then did I basi-
cally outgrow those bourgeois and petty bour-
geois sentiments which the bourgeois school 
had taught me. I came to feel that the in-
tellectuals not only were in spirit unclean 
in many places, but their bodies too were 
unclean. The cleanest ones were still the 
workers and peasants -- even taking into ac-
count that their hands were black and their 
feet covered with cow dun9, they were still 
cleaner than the bourgeois1e, big and small.6 
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In fact, Mao, before the beginning of his revolutionary career, 
already possessed an anti-intellectual sentiment. His distrust 
and prejudice against intellectuals developed from his personal 
experiences and ideological bias. Throughout his life, he lacked 
confidence in the revolutionary spirit of the intellectuals and 
was continually suspicious of their devotion to the Communist 
cause. 
Mao's attitude towards the aloofness of the intellectuals 
was shaped by a sense of resentment which came from his un-
pleasant contacts with the intellectuals, namely, the philosopher 
Hu Shih, when he was a library worker in Peking University. It 
was these contacts that contributed to a bitter distrust over 
intellectuals as a group in Mao's mind.7 During his revolution-
ary years, his prejudice was deepened by the tendency of the in-
tellectuals to "use words but to avoid direct involvement in 
practical problems." This led him to conclude that the intellec-
tuals were only to be regarded as necessary collaborators and 
could never be the central elements of the revolution. To him, 
the intellectuals often tend to be subjective 
and individualistic, impractical in their 
thinking and irresolute in action until they 
have thrown themselves heart and soul into 
mass revolutionary struggle or made up their 
mind to serve the interests of the mass and 
become one with them. Hence although the 
mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China 
can play a vanguard role or serve as a link 
with the masses, not all of them will remain 
revolutionaries to the end •••• Some will 
drop out of the revolutionary ranks at criti-
cal moments and become passive, while a few 
may even become enemies of the revolution.B 
His bias against intellectuals can be reflected in a comparison 
on the firmness of the standpoint of them on revolution to that 
of the workers and peasants: 
Once a storm comes, the intellectual's posi-
tion is clearly different from that of the 
workers and the majority of the peasants. 
The former is wavering while the latter is 
firm; the former is ambiguous, while the lat-
ter is clear. 9 
Mao always asserted that the workers and the peasants were where 
the strength of revolutionary force rested. The Chinese Com-
munists summarized the weakness of China's intellectuals as 
follows: 
( 1) Because of their close association 
landlord class and the bourgeoisie, 
tellectuals are disdainful of the 
people. 
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with the 
most in-
laboring 
(2) Since most intellectuals have not partici-
pated in the hard struggle for production or 
in the bitter national and class struggles, 
they can only rely on book knowledge and 
consequently commit such ideological errors 
as subjective thinking, reformism, utopian 
socialism, and egalitarianism. 
(3) They lack courage in combating reactionary 
forces •••• They are eager to participate 
in the revolution when it is successful, but 
become pessimistic when it suffers a reverse. 
(4) The petty bourgeoisie are accustomed to a 
liberal and individualistic way of life 
and are averse to organization and 
discipline .10 
Reduced to a more fundamental level, it is the class nature 
of Communist ideology that had strengthened Mao's bias against 
intellectuals. To Mao, the "Chinese intellectuals" could be 
placed in the category of petty bourgeoisie, judging by thei~ 
"family-origin," their living conditions and their political out-
look. The Party later pointed out the bourgeois background of 
the intellectuals: 
• • • Most of the intellectuals come from 
families of landlords, rich peasants, and the 
bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes, and 
have been contaminated by bourgeois educa-
tion.ll [emphasis added] 
Therefore, from the viewpoint of Mao and other Chinese Commu-
nists, the relationship between the Party and the intellectuals 
remained basically one of class struggle. Moreover, since "they 
are more or less equipped with bourgeois scientific knowledge," 
their ideology belonged to the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie. 
It was clear for Mao that only a few of them had accepted 
Marxism-Leninism, even those who had joined the Party. Mao had 
once said that: 
There are many Party members who have joined 
the Communist Party organizationally, but not 
yet joined the Party wholly, or at all 
ideologically. Those who have not joined the 
Party ideologically still carry a great deal 
of the muck of the exploiting class in their 
heads, and have no idea at all of what pro-
letarian ideology or communism, or the Party, 
is.l2 
It is then clear that the nature of the conflicts between the 
Chinese Communists and the intellectuals is a question confined 
to the ideological realm: the contradiction between bourgeois 
and petty bourgeois ideology and the proletarian ideology, or in 
- 48 -
another sense, the contradiction between Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong thought and that of non-Communist ideologies. 
Mao's thought was characterized by revolutionary romanti-
cism. For him, profitability and efficiency had to give way to 
political expediency. Ideological purification and political 
reliability were his own image of the intellectuals' outlook: 
what he wanted was to remould intellectuals into a functionary 
group with •correct ideology• because their knowledge came from 
the old society and from bourgeois education, and they could not 
be used until they had undergone Party education and revolution-
ary conditioning. He would feel easy only when the intellec-
tuals' bourgeois ideas had been totally eliminated and replaced 
by Communist ideology as well as their integration with the work-
ers and the peasants: 
If our intellectuals and art workers who have 
come from the rank of the intelligentsia one 
would make their own work welcomed by the 
masses, they must transform and completely 
reconstruct their own thought and feelings.l3 
He had demanded without reservation, even with coercion, that the 
intellectuals reform themselves ideologically. Accordingly, •the 
intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass strug-
gle over a long period.•l4 Indeed, •struggles• had been launched 
on that party of •proletar ian ideology against non-prole tar ian 
ideologies• since the rectification campaign in Yenan, 1942: 
They [the intellectuals] must continue to 
remould themselves, gradually shed their 
bourgeois world outlook and acquire the pro-
letarian Communist world outlook so that they 
can fully fit in with the needs of the new 
society and unite with the workers and 
peasants. The change in world outlook is 
fundamental. We hope that they will continue 
to make progress that in the course of the 
work and study, they will gradually acquire a 
Communist world outlook, grasp Marxism-
Leninism and become integrated with the work-
ers and peasants.l5 
Thus the intellectuals were urged to develop themselves by taking 
part in the struggles of the masses and to practice •self-
criticism• known as inner cultivation or ideological cultivation: 
it is ••• in the main struggle in our mind 
between the ideology of the proletariat and 
other ideologies as a struggle in our minds, 
between the Communist outlook on life • 
and other outlooks on life •••• 16 
Mao, due to his distrust of the intellectuals, redefined the 
role of the intellectuals, especially the traditional relation-
ship between them and the workers and peasants. In the past, it 
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was the intellectuals or the so-called elite of the society who 
monopolized the political power and were in the dominant position 
to design the social outlook, that is, to socialize the value or 
ideology they wish to mould the society. But under the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, it is the workers and the peasants, as 
represented by the Communist Party, who hold the power and impose 
their own ideology on the intellectuals, forcing them to remould 
their thought so as to get rid of their bourgeois ideology and 
feudalistic thinking which are harmful to the construction of 
socialism. Thus the intellectuals are "deprived of the authority 
of design. They become like other men, laborers: skilled arti-
sans who could render services essential to the construction of 
the new order, but who are no longer entitled to think of them-
selves as its architects.nl7 
Since not all the intellectuals were willing to reform them-
selves and accept Marxism-Leninism, in Mao's words, "there are 
still some intellectuals who are skeptical about socialism or do 
not apprve ot if.nl8 A forceful method, for example thought re-
form or indoctrination, was deemed necessary. 
As a whole, the attitude of Mao towards the intellectuals is 
an ambivalent one: he needed the services and the prestige of 
the intellectuals, yet he suspected the intellectuals of harbor-
ing latent anti-Communist tendencies and did not feel comfortable 
unless their non-Communist weltanschaaung was totally eliminated. 
Indeed the intellectuals had been all subject to various kinds of 
attacks, discrimination and humiliation because the Communist 
regime under Mao had relegated the role and status subordinated 
to that of the workers and peasants and were excluded from the 
category of "people." 
B. The Policy Towards the Intellectuals under Deng 
Having learned their lesson from the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution, the pragmatic leaders have only 
strengthened their feeling that without the participation of in-
tellectuals as well as their support, any attempt to modernize is 
doomed to failure. They are still shocked by the price paid 
under the ruling of the "red" cadres. Yet the knowledge and ini-
tiative of the intellectuals can be effectively translated into 
constructive efforts and benefits to the regime only in the case 
of voluntary support rather than a coercive one. Though the role 
of the intellectuals has become more important than ever as the 
system is evolving towards an institutionalized single Party sys-
tem, there must be a corresponding change of the ruling patterns 
within the system in order to accommodate the demands for democ-
racy from the intellectuals. Otherwise those conflicts that oc-
curred in the past might reoccur. Disillusioned by the Communist 
rule under Mao as well as their unpleasant relationship with the 
Communist Party, the intellectuals tend to be more realistic, and 
in some sense, more cynical. They cannot forget Mao's suppres-
sion, humiliation and persecution of the intellectuals since 1954 
which culminated in the Cultural Revolution. They thus demanded 
more concrete guarantees for their status, freedom and dignity. 
In realizing the hostile character of the Communist regime toward 
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their so-called "bourgeois world outlook" and having been subject 
to criminal sanctions in the past, they hardly trusted the sys-
tem. Absent fundamental reform in the system has been which 
would create a better environment for them, both political and 
academic, the intellectuals would continue to harbour such 
sentiment. Moreover, unless their basic rights and freedoms, as 
written on the Constituion, could be guaranteed through legal 
institutions and their class status could be improved, their con-
fidence in the regime will remain shaky. As long as the intel-
lectuals still hold the viewpoint that they are only an "indis-
pensable cog" in the modernization and that their role is in-
strumental only, it will be difficult for them to be devoted 
wholeheartedly to the regime, especially when they have doubts in 
the goodwill of the Party. In short, the contribution of the 
intellectual is a function of dissipating their suspicions to-
wards the Party. 
The Party must convince the intellectuals that they will be 
treated by the Party as "intellectuals," as "people" and their 
relationship with the Party is no longer one of class struggle, 
that their demand for basic freedom is met and safeguarded from 
any infringements. To what extent the freedom of intellectuals 
can be tolerated within the system does constitute a serious 
question for the Party leadership. Provided with the intolerance 
of the Communist Party and the exclusive nature of the Communist 
system, it i~ extremely difficult for the Party to gain the in-
tellectuals' trust. From the viewpoint of the intellectuals, the 
Party's future policy towards intellectuals lacks credibility. 
They are not optimistic about the present leadership. Further-
more, it is highly questionable whether the goals and interests 
of the Party and the intellectuals are compatible. It is true 
that both groups hope for the modernization and strengthening of 
China. The difference is still the old one: how? The intellec-
tuals demand democratization and the rule of law, which is not 
surprising since these conditions are the only ways to safeguard 
their interests from arbitrary rule. Within the present system, 
the intellectuals feel uneasy because even if the leadership is 
sympathetic to the demands of the intellectuals, Party policy 
changes frequently, and there is a lack of institutionalized 
guarantees. These are the fatal defects of the single party re-
gime that cannot be denied. The nature of the system and the 
Party ideology have in fact set the limits for the longitude and 
latitude of the reforms that can take place. In the past, it is 
the Party that distrusted and discriminated against the intellec-
tuals, now it is the intellectuals who feel alienated from the 
system and lack confidence in the Party. 
In light of the above analysis, the most urgent task for the 
regime is to solve the conflicts between the Party and the intel-
lectuals. The former persecution and oppression of the intellec-
tuals are denounced. The basic orientation of the present policy 
of the Party is to remove the intellectuals' suspicions towards 
the Party regime in order to re-establish their faith in the 
sincerity of the leadership in eliminating all the past 
discriminatory policies. In order to achieve this, the Party has 
to rectify the prevailing attitudes of despising knowledge and 
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intellectuals which have taken root among the cadres. This is by 
no means an easy task. Despite the difficulties, the Party 
leadership has abandoned the Maoist policy and has introduced a 
range of new policies within the limits permitted. Indeed, the 
aim of the policy is to create the image that the Party there-
after would respect the intellectuals as "human." In short, 
"treat them equal politically, use them with trust, and be con-
cerned with their living standards"l9 are the three great princi-
ples of the appeasement policy towards the intellectuals. The 
aim is to remove the anti-elitist image of the Chinese Communists 
as represented by Mao.20 
1. The Redefinition of the Class Status of the Intellectuals 
The unpleasant relationship between the Party and the intel-
lectuals in the past is derived from Communist ideology. 
In order to eliminate the root of the past conflicts of the 
Party with the intellectuals and to win their support to work for 
modernization, the Party has formally redefined the class status 
of the intellectuals. The intellectuals are now identified with 
the working class and have become part of the "people." As early 
as 1978, Deng had already "upgradedn the political status of the 
intellectuals: 
• • • Generally speaking, the overwhelming 
majority of them [intellectuals] are part of 
the proletariat. The difference between them 
and the manual workers lies only in their 
different roles in the social division of 
labour. Those who labor, whether by hand or 
by brain, are all working people in a 
socialist society.21 
The term 0 stinking number nine" which was assigned to describe 
the intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution has been de-
nounced. In doing so, the Party hopes to provide a sense of 
political security to those who have long been considered as 
"bourgeois.n Their vulnerability to political forces due to the 
past uncertainty of their status as "people" or "enemies"1 
"revolutionaries" or "reactionaries"1 and "proletariat" or 
"bourgeoisie" is greatly reduced, at least apparently. The Party 
has further made this change official by condemning discrimina-
tive policies and affirming the new status of the intellectuals 
in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our 
Party since the Founding of the CPC" in 1981, saying that: 
We must firmly eradicate such gross fallacies 
as the denigration of education, science and 
culture and discriminating against intellec-
tuals, fallacies which had long ex is ted and 
found extreme expression during the Cultural 
Revolution. We unequivocally affirm 
that, together with the workers and peasants, 
the intellectuals are a force to rely on in 
the cause of socialism.22 
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The Party has often reiterated that the intellectuals can no 
longer be treated as "forces opposed to the people" or •enemies•: 
In the past few years, the Party has done a 
lot of work in bringing order out of chaos 
for intellectuals. The Party has in theory 
and policy expounded and affirmed that the 
intellectuals of our country, like workers 
and peasants, are part of the working people 
and an important supporting force of our 
Party.23 
The correct way to treat the intellectuals, it is said, "is a 
question of correct[ly] handling the relationship among the work-
ing class itself: it is no longer one of handling the relation-
ship between the working class and its allies. •24" In short, Hu 
Yaobang said that it is imperative to strengthen the unity among 
the workers, peasants, and intellectuals. He claimed that any 
viewpoint that separates mental labor from physical labor is 
wrong.25 There, in reality, exists no class distinction between 
mental and physical labor. The intellectuals are now politically 
equal with the working class and peasants. 
On the other hand, this policy is in tended to show that the 
Party has faith that the intellectuals are politically reliable: 
it is an historical prejudice that intellectuals are politically 
unreliable. 26 Most in te llec tuals are said to have acquired a 
proletarian outlook since "they are patriotic, love the Party and 
socialism, and are willing to serve the people.•27 Thus no mat-
ter what their background, most are trustworthy according to the 
Party leaders. They have already integrated themselves with the 
workers and peasants in terms of their commitment towards the 
Communist regime. Under these circumstances, the title of "bour-
geois intellectuals" is removed and is now the working class in-
tellectuals. At the same time, the past policies of •uniting, 
educating and remoulding" are declared outdated and no longer 
applicable to the intellectuals.28 
The Party has refuted the past idea that "the more 
knowledgeable, the more reactionary" and has denied that the in-
tellectuals can only "be used" but cannot be trusted. Deng and 
other leaders said that "we must fully trust and freely use 
people with specialized knowledge. •29 In fact, under the new 
policy, the Party has already rehabilitated the reputation of the 
intellectuals. Many intellectuals who were purged during the 
Cultural Revolution have been restored to their former position. 
Deng now considers the political standard of redness in 
terms of contribution instead of in a purely political sense. 
This is more realistic: •to devote oneself to our scientific 
socialism and contribute to it is an important manifestation of 
being red, the integration of being red and expert.•30 In other 
words, the greater one's devotion to his work, the greater one's 
devotion to socialism. In regarding the proper party leadership 
towards intellectuals, it is said that the Part¥ ought to assess 
accurately the role of intellectuals in social1st construction, 
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trust them and rely on them, place them in proper positions and 
help them to attain progress ideologically and politically.31 
Most significant of all is that Party membership, which in the 
past was monopolized by workers and peasants, is now open to the 
intellectuals. Accordingly, it is estimated that up to 1982, 
one-fourth of the members admitted into the Party were intellec-
tuals.32 For the first time in the history of Communist China 
the intellectuals have received the same political treatment as 
the working class and peasant in concrete terms. The spirit of 
the present party policy is reflected in the Communist assertion 
that •under present circumstances, if we should reform the intel-
lectuals, we should reform them in the same way as we reform the 
workers and peasants.•33 
2. The Reassertion of the Indispensable Role of Intellectuals in 
Socialist Construction 
Since the "Anti-Rightist n campaign, the Chinese Communists, 
notably Mao, reduced the role of the intellectuals in building 
socialism. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to boost 
economic development by relying on the workers and peasants. 
This tendency culminated in the Cultural Revolution during which 
nearly all the intellectuals, both Party and non-Party, were 
either purged or dismissed from the leading posts. They were 
replaced by •red• cadres. The disasters resulting from these two 
•experiments" led to the bankruptcy of Mao's mass-line politics 
in modernization since most cadres were "red• rather than "ex-
pert,• and thus were professionally incompetent. 
The post-Mao Party leadership shares the consensus that the 
Party can successfully promote the well-being of society only if 
it can co-opt the intellectuals into the gigantic task of the 
Four Modernizations. In fact, this is the chief motivation be-
hind the Party policy for including the intellectuals in the 
working class. In this regard, the Party has shown unprecedented 
concern for the recruitment of the intellectuals into the Party 
and the establishment and the emphasis on the importance of 
knowledge. Indeed never since the establishment of the PRC have 
the intellectuals been regarded by the Party as so important. 
The same is knowledge which the Maoists had openly condemned. In 
these respects, the Party has admitted without reservation: 
In the past, owing to the influence of 
•leftist• ideas and the small-producer men-
tality, erroneous views such as the under-
estimation of the importance of education, 
science and culture and discrimination 
against intellectuals were rife in our Party 
over a fairly long time.34 
The reversal of past policy towards intellectuals began in 
early 1978 when Deng delivered his speech at the opening ceremony 
of the National Science conference and the policy was further 
consolidated in the Third Plenary Session of CPC Central Commit-
tee in late 1978. Attempts have been made to resume the tradi-
tion of respect for knowledge and intellectuals. To eliminate 
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ideological obstacles for enlisting the support of intellectuals, 
oeng has made clear that knowledge itself is not class-bounded. 
He emphasizes the importance of "acquiring a higher level of 
scientific knowledge and general knowledge" as the country moves 
towards modernization. In short, "to raise the status and expand 
the role of education, science and culture in our drive for mod-
ernization"35 has been adopted as the basic policy line which 
paves the way to raise the status of intellectuals. Hu Yaobang's 
words have to a large extent, highlighted the Communist treatment 
of knowledge: 
In our country which is backward economically 
and culturally, it is the key to determine 
the success or failure of construction or 
whether we can master the modern science, 
culture and knowledge.36 
Since knowledge is power, and is vital to the socialist 
development, the intellectuals are now regarded as a force on 
which the Party must rely. The Party intends to build "a mammoth 
force" of well-educated and more professionally competent cadres 
to assume the responsibility of administering the modernization 
program. It is said that: 
We must put intellectuals, both Party and 
non-Party members • • into appropriate 
leading posts so as to gradually raise the 
number of cadres who have a good educational 
level and technical expertise and who know 
how to manage in the leading bodies of enter-
prises and undertakings to 30, 50, and 70 
percent of the total staff.37 
Intellectuals are thus considered as indispensable since there is 
a severe shortage of talent in China. A commentator recently 
stated that "without the participation of the intellectuals, it 
is impossible to achieve the four modernizations. n38 Deng has 
claimed that "we must value talent since it is difficult to have 
talent"39 and "in order to achieve success in socialist modern-
ization, we must have knowledge and talents. n40 Other Party 
leaders like Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, and the late Liao Chengzhi 
have also foreseen that as modernization proceeds, there will be 
an increasing need for the services of intellectuals. In 
response to this, Liao pointed out that "as the country develops, 
the obligation of the intellectuals will become heavier and 
heavier. "'~l Hu confirms that "in the course of our great mis-
sion, we must respect and rely on the intellectuals. •42 This 
culminates in the condemnation of Mao's theory that •red can lead 
everything" and it puts forward the assertion that the intellec-
tuals are "core • members in science, technology, culture and 
education, public health, literature, and art. 
3. The Guarantee of Certain Freedoms 
The Party leaders now have a true understanding from past 
experience that "no talents can be cultivated if there is no 
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freedom of expression. n In fact, dogmatic thinking imposed on 
the intellectual world and suppression of freedom in the pursuit 
of knowledge choked the academic circle of its vitality and 
creativity for nearly three decades. Scientific and general 
knowledge were in a state of inertia. In order to reverse the 
tide, the Party advocated the policy of the emancipation of the 
mind and the policy of the "two hundreds": 
In the academic field, the policy of "letting 
a hundred flowers blossom, and letting a hun-
dred schools of thought contend" must be im-
plemented in real earnest and different view-
points and schools must be allowed to freely 
contend. [sic]43 
Indeed, there would be no creativity and initiative if there 
were no debate among various schools of thoughts and if the atmo-
sphere of free discussion in academic circles was suppressed. 
The intellectuals would soon lose the incentive to study and 
research if too many restrictions were imposed on them. To the 
intellectuals, progress can only be made in a free academic en-
vironment in which the scholars can exchange their ideas. Learn-
ing that science and the intellectual world cannot prosper in the 
absence of democracy, Deng has criticized the "suppression of 
discussion" and "the prohibition of intercourse" under the Gang 
of Four w.hich he described as an improper style of learning.44 
Independent thinking is now re-emphasized. "Dare think, dare say 
and dare do" as well as "seeking truth from facts" is Deng's con-
ception of the proper style of learning.45 In light of the fact 
that academic democracy is very important, he and other Party 
leaders like Hu Yaobang have encouraged intellectual discussion 
and the exchange of viewpoints in scientific and academic 
circles. "At present," as pointed out by Deng, "the contentions 
among different ideas and discussions are not too many but too 
few. n He comforts the intellectuals by saying that "incorrect 
ideas may appear through discussion but this is not strange and 
need not be afraid.n46 
In order to eliminate doubts over the sincerity of the Party 
policy in adopting a democratic line in the intellectual world, 
Deng has publicized the need for the institutionalization and 
legalization of democracy.47 At the same time, he reiterated the 
"principle of three nots": not seizing others' faults, not put-
ting labels on people and not using the "big stick." By saying 
that, "it is not horrible even if some people use democracy for 
other purposes out of discontent, n48 Deng intended to show the 
Party's resolution in promoting democracy even with some uninten-
ded consequences. The core of the policy which the Party is 
going to uphold is that opinions must be permitted to be raised 
and academic contention must be allowed. As a whole, freedom of 
discussion, freedom of creation and freedom of competition in the 
intellectual world are confirmed. Through these measures, the 
leadership hopes to satisfy the demands of the intellectuals in 
order to mobilize their positivity and creativity for the four 
modernizations. 
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4. The Creation of A Better Objective Environment for the 
Intellectuals 
Other than rhetorical measures, the Party has indeed in the 
past few years taken concrete actions to improve the treatment of 
the intellectuals. All such measures are intended to raise the 
incentive of the intellectuals in order to transform their 
knowledge and skills into a constructive force to foster the Four 
Modernizations. Simultaneously, they are also intended to im-
prove the image of the Party in the eyes of the intellectuals. 
The Party is concerned about the living standards and work-
ing environment of the intellectuals. The Party leaders have 
realized that only with adequate living standards and better 
working conditions can the intellectuals concentrate their atten-
tion on their work, study and research. The conclusions of a 
survey on intellectuals' present conditions reveal that: 
In general, the working, studying and living 
conditions of these intellectuals are rela-
tively unsatisfactory and there are many 
problems. 49 
In Communist China, the pay for the intellectuals has been lower 
than that of the workers and peasants because of class discr im-
ination. Many have criticized that: 
Intellectuals, especially middle-aged intel-
lectuals, who are the backbone element of 
teaching and scientific research, are shoul-
dering heavy tasks. Their burden of liveli-
hood is also heavy. It is unreasonable that 
their wages are below average. They must be 
paid accordin9 to their work.so 
Reacting to this phenomenon, Deng has said that it is necessary 
to subsidize and offer assistance to the intellectuals who there-
after must be paid with the salary they deserve.Sl His statement 
has formally put an end to egalitarianism and now one's pay is 
assessed according to his competency. Wage adjustments, the 
problem of overcrowded housing, health problems, and the problem 
of married couples being assigned to separate localities have 
already received attention. 
The intellectuals can also be exempted from political af-
fairs such as political study. Deng has claimed that hard work 
in research is not a crime but must be encouraged. Thus he 
specified that with regard to the intellectuals, for example the 
scientists, "we cannot bother them with political affairs, we 
must provide them with time and the environment which will enable 
them to conduct their research."52 Moreover, the Party has also 
tried hard to improve their access to books and information. 
The leading cadres are now encouraged and urged by the Party 
to assign the intellectuals to the work that needs their 
services. As instructed by the Party, they must trust the 
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intellectuals fully, respect them, use them without reservation 
and give them both authority and responsibility. The Party is 
very concerned about whether the intellectuals have been placed 
in proper positions so that they have the opportunity to make 
full use of their knowledge. It is said that in working with the 
intellectuals, the cadres must be democratic and take care of the 
intellectuals: 
and 
Leading comrades and comrades in charge of 
Party work and political work must have a 
democratic style of work, listen earnestly to 
the opinions of scientists and technicians, 
actively back their rationalization proposals 
and inventions, encourage them to continue to 
ponder on and raise problems and solve them53 
when a problem arises, there should be frank, 
sincere exchanges of views to reach an under-
standing and proper settlement. As to intel-
lectuals with failings and mistakes, warm-
hearted help should be given.54 
Also, they must listen and accept the opinions of the intellec-
tuals who must be given a free hand to work in planning. Then 
cadres are also assigned the task of selecting outstanding intel-
lectuals to take over leading posts and managerial tasks. They 
are warned that this must be truly implemented. To facilitate 
their work, the Party has also established a special system for 
the intellectuals. For example, a sound technological respon-
sible system is set up for technicians who can take part in the 
management of the enterprise.55 
In order to clear the way for the new policy toward intel-
lectuals the Party has already taken action to rectify incorrect 
attitudes of cadres towards intellectuals by eliminating the 
legacy of the Gang of Four. It condemns the wrong idea of dis-
criminating against the intellectuals: 
All cadres at various levels must realize the 
role and contribution of education, science 
and culture in the socialist modernization. 
This is the key to implementing correctly the 
policy towards intellectuals.56 
Within the party, the leadership has launched a lesson to educate 
the cadres about the policy towards intellectuals and the correct 
attitudes toward non-Party intellectuals. 
To increase the incentive for the intellectuals to work, the 
Party has announced that those who have the qualifications must 
be conferred with suitable titles and are to serve the NPC and 
People's Congress at various levels as well as CPPCC, especially 
the middle-aged. The intellectuals can also be recruited into 
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the Party regardless of their family, historical and social 
background. 57 
Finally, outstanding intellectuals are offered the oppor-
tunity to further their study in advanced Western countries and 
absorb advanced knowledge and technology. Academic exchange with 
foreign scholars is arranged and encouraged. The leadership 
hopes that through these interactions, the level of academic 
knowledge and scientific knowledge of the country can be raised. 
This knowledge is an invaluable asset for Socialist 
modernization. 
In short, the Party has made every endeavour to create and 
provide a favorable environment for the intellectuals whose con-
tribution is essential to the success of socialist modernization. 
In sum, the core of the Chinese Communists' new policy to-
ward intellectuals can be summarized by Hu Yaobang 's speech on 
the centenary of Marx's death: 
Firstly ••• to establish the correct con-
cept to valuing scientific and general 
knowledge, and to mobilize the whole Party 
and the whole people to strive to acquire 
knowledge of modern science and culture. 
Secondly, to oppose the erroneous ten-
dency of separating intellectuals from the 
working class, juxtaposing them with the 
workers and regarding them as "alien force," 
to confirm the correct concept of intellec-
tuals as part of the working class~ and to 
strengthen a hundred fold the unity between 
workers and peasants on the one hand and in-
tellectuals on the other. 
Thirdly to implant the correct 
concept that all leading personnel must 
strive to be experts~ and to ensure that our 
cadres become better educated and profes-
sionally more competent by becoming more 
revolutionary-minded.58 
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Chapter Four 
Demands for Intellectual Freedom and 
Democratization of the Communist System 
Intellectual freedom is subsumed under the broad concept of 
"human rights." Human rights is a totality of political rights 
and civil liberties that people exercise and enjoy in a society. 
It presupposes both the advancement of individual's material and 
spiritual well-being. Intellectual freedom can only be possible 
under the condition of emancipation of mind and freedom of ex-
pression. It is impossible to practice intellectual freedom 
under the imposition of a dogmatic thinking of mind. The basic 
principle of freedom of person in a spiritual sense is based on 
the confirmation of the supreme value of human dignity. While 
the Communists believe that there are only two diametrically op-
posed class world views -- that is, proletarian versus bourgeois 
-- and that the latter must be replaced by the former under Com-
munist rule, the intellectuals deny the class nature of world 
view. They do not believe that there is an authoritarian world 
view which is the sole standard of "truth" and which possesses 
the nature of absolute truth. Democratization of a political 
system, generally speaking, is a process through which insti tu.:. 
tions, whether formal of informal, become under popular control. 
Thus, what the democrats and democratic dissidents demanded 
during the "Hundred Flowers" and the "Beijing Spring" Democratic 
movement was the opening of the government to the general public 
so that the people would have more chances to influence or par-
ticipate in the policy making through direct election. 
Intellectual freedom and democratization of the political 
system have been advocated by the intellectuals in Communist 
China which by its nature, negates all these demands. 
A. Conditions in the Maoist Era before the Hu Feng Incident 
The most severe violation of freedom of person in Communist 
China is the ideological reform or indoctrination imposed on the 
intellectuals who .traditionally were highly respected. This 
practice transcended physical torture to the spiritual realm by 
using a technique which is considered to be the most inhumane in 
the liberal world: the notorious "thought control." The Com-
munists were uneasy about the bourgeois background of the intel-
lectuals. Mao had already paid attention to this question during 
the revolutionary period and demanded the intellectuals to remold 
their thoughts on a "voluntary" basis. Thought reform did not 
receive serious attention until the Communists consolidated their 
power in the post-revolutionary period. The most important 
requisite for the intellectuals in serving the regime properly 
was a "correct" ideological viewpoint and political outlook. 
This meant the open repudiation of non-Communist ideologies and 
the acceptance of a proletarian ideology. The intention of the 
regime to construct an ideological monolith had rendered thought 
reform of the intellectuals a primary concern, especially after 
such a practice had been institutionalized. 
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The ideological rectification movement was launched in 1952 
after the Third Meeting of the First Plenary Session of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference. At the meeting, Mao emphasized the importance of 
"ideological remolding of all intellectuals." The utmost insult 
to the dignity of the intellectuals came from criticism and self-
criticism as well as the coerced acceptance of an ideology from 
which they were alienated. Though the program of "reform through 
labor" did not become penal law until 1954, yet in reality, it 
had already been applied to stubborn intellectuals (e.g., Feng 
Yulan and Liang Shuming). It possessed the nature of penal law. 
Party policy, in fact, was the law in the Communist mind. 
Although it was stipulated by the Chinese Communists that 
the citizens of the People's Republic of China "shall have free-
dom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association ••• 
• ,•1 which were later formally written to the Constitution (Arti-
cle 87) in 1954, there were no legal guarantees for people to 
exercise these rights. It was surprising that "freedom of 
thought" and "publication" were deleted in the 1954 Constitution. 
On one hand, the Party had always asserted that people could en-
joy unprecedented freedom under the Communist regime. Yet, on 
the other hand, it was the Party which constantly violated the 
Constitution and encroached on the fundamental freedoms of the 
people. The stipulation was significant to the intellectuals 
since a free working atmosphere was the driving force behind 
their trek to Yenan. During the Yenan era they pleaded for less 
interference in cultural and intellectual activities, more oppor-
tunities for debate, and a greater tolerance of different 
viewpoints. 
In the post-revolutionary period, the Party set up •strict" 
ideological standards for intellectual work and also prescribed 
that work "must be related to the political and class struggle.•2 
To the Communists, knowledge was to serve only as a tool for 
achieving political objectives that is, it had a strict 
utilitarian role. Knowledge had to belong to and serve a defi-
nite class, as well as express a definite political line. Never 
had the intellectuals been given a free hand to go ahead with 
their work and they were not encouraged to assume responsibility. 
Though the Party had warned the intellectuals to obey the Party 
line and policy, yet the intellectuals did not give up any at-
tempt to voice their ideas and opinions on the dictatorial nature 
of Party policies and the suppression of freedoms. 
The political system, from its very beginning, was already 
under the strict control of the Communist Party. This tendency 
became more prominent after the 1954 Constitution when the coali-
tion Government was transformed into Communist Party rule. The 
Communist monopoly of political power aroused widespread discon-
tent especially among the intellectuals because this meant dic-
tatorial rule which violated the democratic rule as promised by 
the Communists. 
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Case One -- The Hu Feng Incident 
Hu Feng was the first intellectual who took action to re-
flect his discontent with the Party's imposition of dogmatic 
thinking and authoritarian policies on the literary and art 
circles. 
A Brief Account of Hu Feng and His Relations with the CPC 
Hu Feng was a Marxist critic who for thirty years sided with 
the CPC and the leftist writers. He was one of the chief disci-
ples of Lu Xun. As early as the 1930s, Hu already treated him-
self as an orthodox leftist literary theorist and Marxist.3 Yet, 
his line of thinking was less dogmatic than Mao and Zhou Yang. 
To a large extent, he disagreed with their ideas about the 
Marxist theory of literature. Zhou Yang, for the most part, was 
the decision-maker and the leader of the Communist literary cir-
cle. Mao backed his group both before and after the establish-
ment of the PRC. Hu and Zhou had long struggled for the orthodox 
position in the Communist literary circle. During the War, Hu as 
the editor of the literary magazine Xiwang [Hope] had already 
established his theory and his own circle to contend with the 
•yenan group•: the theoretical base was Mao's "Talks at Yenan on 
Literature and Art" (hereinafter referred to as Talks). While 
the Communist literary leadership treated Mao's "Talks" as the 
•Holy Bible, n Hu had expressed his discontent with the "Talks" 
and advocated a •subjective spirit• which Mao intended to combat. 
Hu continued to debate with Zhou's group and never concealed his 
discontent with their manipulation of Party literary policies and 
the imposition of their interpretation of Marxism on writers. 
Hu's group was in fact the opposition "party" within the leftist 
literary circle. In 1952 Hu was forced to engage in self-
criticism about his theory of literature. This only served to 
increase his discontent with the Party policy of strict control 
represented by Zhou, in both ideology and creation. In July 
1954, he boldly submitted his three hundred thousand character 
•apinions on Literary Questions• (hereinafter referred to as 
Opinion) to the Central Committee in hope of reversing the tide 
in order to liberalize the literary circle. Though Hu's aim was 
merely to present his opinion in ·the field of literature, the 
Party had treated it as a direct challenge to Party leadership 
and policies on literature. This led to the purge of Hu Feng and 
his followers. 
The Demands of Hu Feng 
1. The Attack on the "Five Daqgers" 
The first dagger concerned •the compulsory nature of 
Marxist ideology. a Hu refuted the Communist idea that the ac-
quisiton of the Marxist world view was the pre-requisite for cre-
ation. He felt that as soon as a writer had mastered the cre-
ative method of socialist realism, the writer could produce mean-
ingful articles without invoking systematic Marxism. 4 He cited 
Lu Xun as an example of a writer who never read deeply into 
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Marxism. Hu also warned that such a requirement could only 
hinder the writers from creation. 
The second dagger which he attacked was that only the life 
of workers, peasants and soldiers was the sole viable source of 
inspiration. In this regard, there came his own theory that 
"life is everywhere, •5 and thus, there was more than one source 
of literature.6 This was contradictory to Mao's idea that peo-
ple's life was the sole legitimate source of literature. In pro-
posing there were alternative sources, Hu intended to eliminate 
the restrictions on writing imposed by Mao. 
Hu's third dagger was related to ideological reform. He 
opposed making thought reform compulsory and suggested that 
writers ought to engage in it on a "voluntary" basis. For Hu, 
ideological reform could be done only through the practice of 
writing, and only then could Marxist literature be created. The 
writer would otherwise be trapped in dogmatism. Hu and his fol-
lowers rejected the Communist idea that the only way for 
ideological reform of the writer was either through the study of 
Marxism-Leninism or through the participation in the mass strug-
gle.? Indeed Hu's conception of thought reform was just the op-
posite of Mao's theory that "being determined consciousness.• 
The fourth "dagger" was "literary form imposed by the Par-
ty.• For Hu, the most urgent task was not to learn the cultural 
heritage but to inherit the new cultural tradition of the May-
Fourth Movement and to learn its modern form. He objected to the 
doctrine of "back to the ancients" because there was not much 
worth learning from the ancient literary forms. On this point, 
he shared same idea as Lu Xun. Guo Moruo accused Hu's advocacy 
as an attempt to "weaken and destroy the national prestige and 
dignity of China.•B 
The fifth "dagger• was the topic defined by the Party. What 
Hu disagreed with was the subordination of literature to politics 
which deprived the autonomy of literature. He believed that 
topic for writing should be broader and without restriction. 
This idea was a reaction to the Party prescription that writers 
were allowed only to praise "the brightness of revolutionary vic-
tory,• to write about the life of workers, peasants and soldiers, 
to write their glories but not their dark sides. For him, a re-
alist writer had to disclose both the brightness and the darkness 
of the proletariat, revolution, socialism and the Party. On the 
other hand, the bourgeoisie ought not in all cases be condemned. 
His philosophy emphasized the loyalty to reality and had room for 
•art for arts' sake.• 
Basically, Hu's non-dogmatic attitude towards Communist 
literature and opposition to Maoist literary theory owed its ori-
gin to Stalin: write the reality. Let the writer learn from 
life. If he can reflect the real life by means of high level of 
artistic skill, he can surely attain Marxism.9 Thus Hu's under-
standing of Stalin's literary theory was his chief inspiration in 
looking for a total liberalization of the literary circle. 
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2. Hu's Demand for Organizational Reform in the 
Literary Circle 
As soon as the Communist regime was established, the 
Party set up a framework of control over the activities of the 
writers through organizations. The Party adopted this practice 
from the Soviet Union and set up the All-China Federation of Art 
Circles (hereinafter referred to as Federation) and the Chinese 
Writers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union). All news-
papers, journals, and magazines were placed under the control of 
these two organizations. The writers had to join either the 
Federation or the Union before they could write and publish. 
Thus, for the sake of survival, all the wirters became members 
either of the Federation or the Union. As a result, the writers 
whose style of life was originally characterized as liberal and 
undisciplined were forced to earn their living and conduct their 
writing under strict organizational discipline. Standards and 
criteria were set for writers in the publication of their arti-
cles. They were constantly under the supervision of personnel 
cadres and the Party Committee within the Federation and/or the 
Union.lO Unhappy with pervasive Party control in the literary 
circles, Hu proposed the disengagement of Party leadership in 
literary organizations. 
In his •apinions,• Hu's directions for reform of the 
literary organizational method were based on the Soviet example 
in order to show that he had no intention to detach from Com-
munist principles. In reviewing the Soviet theoretical guide-
lines in the literary circle, Hu had pointed out the speciality 
of literature and thus concluded that free competition should be 
practiced in the literary world. 
His four suggestions for reform which paved the way for free 
competition were, first, the abolition of the media and magazines 
under Party contro1.11 Second, the dismissal of all "czeation 
centers• which were under the administrative control of the Par-
ty. He believed that the Federation and the Union were "offi-
cial• organizations possessing no mass character.l2 Third, 
writers should have free association and organization in the 
reorganization of publications, presses and magazines, each of 
which should be under the editorship of an influential writer. 
The selection of writings to be published and the determination 
of salary should be under the jurisdiction of the editors and not 
the Party. Creation centers should be organized publisher which 
was aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of creation of the 
writers.l3 Last, reform was in need with regard to the Party 
leadership over literature. This included the abolition of the 
system of compulsory study and emphasized self-study by the 
writers. Editors were obliged to report the conditions of the 
literary circle to the Central Propaganda Department. The daily 
work of the publications were to be administered by the writers 
and not the Party. Although there were still Party Committees, 
they had to respect the speciality of literature.l4 
In sum, the new arrangements entailed the total surrender of 
Party leadrship. Hu' s suggestions were exactly what Guo Moruo 
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had criticized: to dissolve the organization unit of literary 
circle from Hu 's point of view was unnecessary and would only 
have a harmful effect on the literary circle: to stop the present 
publications since they were under the control of the faction 
Zhou Yang and had lost their autonomy. These were to be replaced 
by "free competition" based on market regulations and "publica-
tions run by individuals.•lS 
The demand for liberalization was attacked as based on 
"capitalist ideology" which would lead to "the disintegration of 
the literary circle, and detachment from the ideological leader-
ship of the proletariat.• The result would be "the disintegra-
tion of the literary circle, and detachment from the ideological 
leadership of proletariat," as well as "factionalism and the 
domination of capitalist ideology. •16 Thus, Hu was accused of 
being "Anti-Party" for his advocacy for the abolition of Party 
leadership and for his hatred of the re-enforcement of Party 
leadership on the literary movement and the support it 
received.l7 
Case Two -- The Advocacy for Democratization of the 
Political System During the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
In order to relax the tension between the Party and the in-
tellectuals after a series of repressive activities and thought 
reform since the rise of the regime, Mao saw the need for a more 
moderate policy to appease the intellectuals' discontent senti-
ment. It was this consideration, together with the Hungarian 
Crisis that provoked the policies of "Let A Hundred Flowers Blos-
som, Let A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" and "Long-term co-
existence and Mutal Supervision. •18 These policies took "blame 
not the speakers but be warned by his words" (yanzhe wu zui, 
wenzhe zu jie) as the basic principle.l9 
Along with the slogan of "long-term co-existence and mutual 
supervision" in the Communist political system, there came an 
earnest desire for the democratization of the regime which had 
been monopolized by the Communist Party since 1949. The pressure 
from the leading non-Communists was especially strong. In fact, 
the political system was a dictatorial one. Zhang Bozhun, 
Minister of Communication and the Deputy Chairman of the Demo-
cratic League, and Luo Longzhi, the Minister of the.Timber Indus-
try and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic League, are representa-
tive advocates for democratization. 
1. The Attack on the Dictatorship of Party Rule 
"True socialism is highly democratic but the socialism 
we have here is not democratic. •4!0 So Lin Xiling accurately 
described the totalitarian nature of the Communist Party regime. 
She stated explicitly that socialism belonged to the people and 
not to the Party. Zhang and Luo were moderate compared to Lin, 
but their speeches did not conceal their discontent with dic-
tatorship by Party rule. In stating that "democracy is not 
enough," Zhang questioned the Party, "Inasmuch as democracy is to 
be developed, why stress the leadership of the Communist 
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Party?•21 He suggested that Party organizations and Party mem-
bers in fact exercised control over virtually everything, and 
this had deprived the members of democratic parties the chanc~ to 
play their due role in state affairs during the past several 
years. 
On this point, Zhu Auping, Editor-in-Chief of the Guangminq 
Ribao [Enlightenment Daily] frankly criticized the key problem of 
political life reflected in the relations between the Party and 
the masses which was the idea that "the World belongs to the Par-
ty.•22 He pointed out that •a party leading a nation is not the 
same thing as a party owning a nation. The public supports the 
Party, but members of the public have not forgotten that they are 
'masters of the nation.••23 He criticized the Party in its 
violation of promises for a coalition government: 
Before the liberation, we heard that Chairman 
Mao wanted to organize a coalition government 
with non-Party members • Now there are 
twelve deputy premiers in the State Council, 
not one of whom is a non-Party man. Could it 
be that there is not a single person among 
the non~Party people who can sit in a deputy 
premier's chair, or that none of them can be 
groomed to hold this chair?24 
The same phenomenon was 
"Before the Constitution was 
like a coalition government. 
have been kicked away.•25 
observed by Yang Yue when he said, 
promulgated, the government looked 
But now, all the democratic parties 
Both Wang Gulun (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee) and Zhang had cited the 
operation in the Standing Committee of the NPC in decision-making 
to show the dictatorial nature of the Party regime in the name of 
coalition government. According to Wang, "On many occasions when 
important matters were under discussions, often only the demo-
cratic personages spoke, whereas the Party members declined to 
utter a word. Does this indicate that the Party has already dis-
cussed and made its decision on the matters concerned?•26 If so, 
some contended that the discussion on major policies as well as 
their approval was only a gesture. Zhang also had the same 
opinion and said that "if the Party or State Council respects our 
opinions, why do they not ask for our opinions before dec is ions 
are made? Without discussion in the Assembly, the issues pres-
ented for approval were the result of formalism and oligarchy. 
Bow could this be democracy and democratic politics?•27 He used 
the "character reform• as an illustration: before a draft was 
announced, the policy was treated as if it had already been ap-
proved. There was no discussion of whether the characters ought 
to be reformed and how to reform them. The implementation tended 
to be compulsory. The people simply had no channel through which 
to speak. This as described by Zhang, could only be Party 
dicta tor ship. 
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Luo stated the case differently, "the Party has replaced the 
government." In fact, the Party was attacked for monopolizing 
everything: the Party made decisions about everything, the Party 
was the whole people, the Party was the state and the law. There 
was opposition to the notion of substituting the Party for ad-
ministration and suggestions for the separation of the Party and 
State. The duties and authority of the State administrative or-
gans and of the Party organizations had to be clearly demarcated. 
2. The Abolition of One-Party Rule 
As pointed out by Gao Peizhi, a lecturer at China 
People's University, "China belongs to 600,000,000 people in-
cluding the counterrevolutionaries, it does not belong to the 
Communist Party alone."28 Therefore, the first step for the 
democratization of the political system was the abolition of one-
party rule. Huang Ziping, a teacher in the Third Girls' Middle 
School of Tianjin was the first to advocate allowing the non-
Communist parties to rule. Accordingly, Huang said: 
Although the democratic parties are allowed 
to exist and the political platform of those 
parties is to advance in the direction of 
Communism, why could not the method of rotat-
ing the democratic parties in power be adop-
ted? If we cast away one-party rule by the 
Communist Party and let the Communist Party 
and all other parties put forward their dif-
ferent political platforms, leaving the deci-
sion to free election by the masses of the 
people, the Communist Party and all the demo-
cratic parties would work harder to overcome 
their shortcomings in order to solicit more 
votes on the basis of their services to the 
people.29 
The democratization of the political system, in fact, is 
incompatible with single-party Communist rule. 
3. The Demands for the Enlargement of the Role of 
Democratic Parties 
The democratic parties were described as the eyebrows, 
but not the nose and eyes of the Party. The eyebrow "is not in-
dispensable." At that time, both Zhang and Luo only wanted the 
democratic parties to have a greater role to play in the 
decision-making process as well as greater powers for their mem-
bers. They had no intention of competing with the Communist Par-
ty for the ruling position. Zhang had made such a plea in the 
early period of the rectification campaign: 
The role and develoment of the CPPCC are 
being strengthened. I think that beginning 
from its 3rd plenary session, more political 
_tasks for the CPPCC fihould be considered. 
res powers, for 1ns tance, to hold 
- 71 -
consultations, make proposals and exercise 
supervision could be strengthened. The CPPCC 
could gradually be turned, in the course of 
political life, into a democratic link in the 
parliamentary system required for the Chinese 
people's democracy. After this plenary ses-
sion, we should strengthen the work of the 
CPPCC at all levels from the central to the 
local.30 
Concerning the present role of democratic parties, Hu Zitang 
was discouraged by the attitude of the Party towards the demo-
cratic parties: "at the present moment, the relationship between 
the Communist Party and democratic parties ought to be closer. 
But in fact, this was not the case, rather their relationship has 
been relatively estranged. For example, since the declaration of 
the line of 'long-term co-existence and mutual supervision,' the 
Party has not yet discussed with the democratic parties about a 
set of concrete measures in order to carry out mutual supervi-
sion.•31 He suggested that from the angle of an organizational 
connection, a set of measures related to their relationship and 
working methods should be established to facilitate that purpose. 
In order to enlarge the role of the democratic parties, Luo 
treated it as a demand that all democratic parties should decide 
the national policy with the Communist Party as well as the 
mutual share of the power. Thus, Luo demanded an equal status 
with the Communist Party in the decision-making process. The 
past practice was that: 
What embarrassed the democratic parties most 
was the lack of information required for the 
study of policies. At the Standing Committee 
meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC, the demo-
cratic parties could not voice any effective 
opinion on matter under discussion because 
they were not informed in advance of the mat-
ters to be discussed, and they had no time to 
study them at the moment of discussion.32 
He therefore proposed that when any major policy was to be de-
cided, the democratic parties should be provided in advance with 
the information and materials related to it and should be allowed 
the chance to discuss it at the same time as the members of the 
Communist Party. 
Luo was supported by Zhang who believed that equality, in-
dependence and freedom between the Communist Party and democratic 
parties ought to be relative. For him, suitable conditions had 
to be created in order to achieve these aims. He pointed out 
that •at present, some institutions, and regulations exist as 
obstacles for the realization of equality and independence and 
freedom as well as the functions to be performed by the democrat-
ic parties.•33 
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On the question of the power of democratic parties and their 
members, it was said that it had to be decided how to organize 
the participation of democratic parties in the governmental ad-
ministration. Zhang said that at present many state affairs were 
decided by the Party and the orders were made through the party 
system but not the administration.34 The members of democratic 
parties who took up administrative responsibilities felt that 
they did not have the power corresponding to their official posi-
tion. Thus, they hoped that real power was to be given to the 
non-Party administrators so that they could function effectively. 
Later Zhang made the suggestion for a political design department 
and said that the Communist Party should fully co-operate with 
the National Committee of the CPPCC, the Standing Committee of 
the NCP, the democratic parties and the people's organizations in 
discussing important policies and problems. The department as 
advocated by Zhang should take in more non-Party intellectuals 
with technical and field experience to work with them. 
All these proposals were aimed at improving the power posi-
tion of democratic parties vis-a-vis the Communist Party as well 
as breaking down of the latter's monopoly of the political 
system. 
4. The Demand for a Better Working Environment 
To permit active participation of the democratic 
parties, the political environment had to be improved. Wang 
noticed that the democratic parties lacked a stable working en-
vironment. He cited the case of the Standing Committee of the 
NPC as an example and disclosed three shortcomings in this area: 
the Standing Committee had little knowledge of the conditions of 
state affiars; there were a few substantive discussions and there 
was little opportunity for contact.35 He asked for improvement. 
Luo viewed the problem from another dimension -- organiza-
tion development. He said that if the democratic parties hoped 
to co-exist with the Communist Party in the long run, three prob-
lems should be tackled: how to develop their organizations, how 
to take part in policy making conferences and how to improve the 
work of the grass-roots level organization. As for "long-term 
co-existence," Luo took the stand that in the organization of the 
democratic parties might find the conditions for co-existence, 
but added that it was too early to talk about the problem of co-
existence before the question of membership recruitment was 
solved. The democratic parties were not allowed to recruit mem-
bers from the masses of the workers and the peasants but only 
from the old-style intellectuals who were by then quite old. 
Since the road to socialism was a long one, the restriction of 
their recruitment to the middle-aged and old persons would 
deprive them of the longevity required for "long-term co-
existence. •36 
As a whole, it was impossible for the democratic parties to 
play a greater role if the Communist Party refused to provide 
them with stable and objective political environment. 
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Since the advocacy for political change in the orientation 
of democratization would endanger the dictatorship of Party rule, 
Zhang, Luo and Zhu were widely attacked as reactionary, anti-
party and anti-socialist. They were accused of opposing the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, opposing Party leadership and op-
posing the socialist road. The latter two had long been con-
sidered by Mao as the core of the Communist regime that could not 
be violated. It was said that any opinions which denied Party 
leadership or weakened Party leadership were incorrect. The 
speeches that deviated from orthodox socialism had to be rec-
tified. Ultimately, it was prescribed that all criticisms and 
suggestions had to be raised on the basis of upholding socialism 
and of consolidating Party leadership.37 According to this stan-
dard, Luo and Zhang's political suggestions were identified as 
distrust of Party leadership (that is, the political design de-
partment and the Commission for rectifying injustice) and were 
aimed at overthrowing the leadership position of the Communist 
Party. They were later accused of having formed an Anti-
Communist alliance with a "political plot• to bring about the 
capitalist system and were purged. 
B. Democratization in Deng's Era 
Case Three -- The Beijing Spring 
• • • Since for a period in the past demo-
cratic centralism was not carried out in the 
true sense, centralism being divorced from 
democracy, it is necessary to lay particular 
emphasis on democracy at present • • In 
ideological and political life among the 
ranks of the people, only democracy is per-
missible and not suppression or persecution r 
The constitutional rights of citizens 
must be resolutely protected and no one has 
the right to infringe upon them. In order to 
safeguard people's democracy, it is impera-
tive to strengthen the socialist legal system 
so that democracy is systematized and written 
into law in such a way as to ensure the 
stability, continuity and full authority of 
this democratic system and these laws.38 
This unprecedented stress on democracy by the Communist regime, 
together with the rehabilitation of the 0 Tian'anmen incidentn 
inspired the hope for democratization which resulted in the so-
called "Beijing Springn (Beijing Zhi Chun). 0 Beijing Springn was 
a democratic movement, during which there was active participa-
tion in the big-character poster movement among young intellec-
tuals and many unofficial publications appeared. Among them were 
April 5th Tribune (Si Wu Luntan), Beijing Spring (Beijing Zhi 
£h.!!!!) and Exploration (Tansuo). This section will focus on the 
most representative figure active in this democratic movement, 
Wei Jingsheng, since his viewpoints on democratization is the 
most systematic and comprehensive. 
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This democratic movement possesses two distinctive charac-
teristics. First, the majority of the participants were intel-
lectual youths who grew up "under the red flag." Their family 
backgrounds were mostly proletarian. Second, they did not super-
ficially raise demands for freedom and democracy, but were more 
realistic. They looked to "socialist democracy and socialist 
legality." They believed that there was the need to consider 
the necessity of democratization under the socialist system. For 
them, democracy was indispensable to socialism: democracy is not 
only the means but ought to be the end. Thus, based on their 
line of argument, the policy line of the state under socialism 
must be the will of the great masses; socialist legality must be 
perfected. For instance, there was a need to enact new laws for 
publication, to use laws to protect people's democratic rights, 
as well as the realization of supervision of the Party by the 
masses so that the people could become the "real masters" under 
socialism. 
The Perspective of Wei Jingsheng towards Democracy 
After the rise of Deng and the rehabilitation of the 
"Tian'anmen Incident,• under the slogan of "Four Moderniza-
tions,• Wei revealed his hopes for democratization to Deng. But 
he was soon disillusioned and regretful: the old political in-
stitutions that they (the people) abhorred refused change. The 
democracy and freedom for which they craved were not mentioned at 
all, and nothing has been done to improve their living stan-
dards.39 Thus, he wrote a number of big-character posters on 
democracy which he characterized as the "Fifth Modernization" to 
arouse the aspirations of the people to struggle for democracy by 
themselves. He was also the founder of Exploration (Tansuo). In 
a series of big-character posters, he concentrated on disclosing 
the dictatorial nature of the .Chinese Communist regime, pointing 
out that democracy was the only hope for the success of modern-
ization and better life and finally concluding that democracy 
could only be achieved through the struggle of the people 
themselves. 
1. Disclosing the Dictatorial Nature of the 
Communist Reg ime 
Wei radically pointed out that under the leadership of 
the Communist party, the Chinese people could only have "democra-
cy under a centralized leadership, • and this was not real de-
mocracy. Moreover, the people were always warned to be obedient. 
According to Wei, "the slogan that the 'people are the masters of 
history' has been turned into an empty phrase by the Party" be-
cause the people could not grasp their own fate in accordance 
with the wishes of the majority. Instead people were "good 
slaves. •40 He directly said that the people in China did not 
have democracy but they wished to and ought to be the masters of 
their own destiny. In fact, democracy has gone even within the 
Party under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat --
indeed, it was one-man dictatorship of the "great leader. •41 
Dictatorship had already violated Marxism: the premise of 
socialism is that the people or the prole tar ian masses are the 
- 75 -
masters of the country. But what Chinese people had was a 
Chinese-style socialist autocracy -- a feudalist monarchy under a 
socialist cloak.42 Wei made a comparison between totalitarianism 
and western democracy to highlight the dictatorial nature of the 
Communist regime: a to tali tar ian way of rule restrains person-
ality and makes slaves of the people whereas democracy is based 
on a mixture of personalities. Totalitarianism is characterized 
by its suppression of personality while freedom is identified by 
its safeguards and blending of personality.43 To put it clearly, 
Wei made it more explicit: 
The people in the West enjoy abundant free-
dom, yet they are still not satisfied. The 
Chinese people have already had a lot of dis-
cipline and someone still wants to give them 
more. Western governments take the protec-
tion of the 'citizens' human rights as one of 
their bases; whereas the right of the 
citizens in the 'socialist countries' is to 
be servile subjects of a few.44 
Wei ascribed totalitariansim to Marxism: democracy is only some-
thing the empty talkers of bourgeois society use to humble the 
people, dictatorship is the only way for the people to go to ob-
tain their rights to equality and freedom of living.45 
He boldly and openly declared that China under the Communist 
ideology was in fact a political dictatorship: 
In our country as the result of a long period 
of dictatorial rule under ideology of Marxism 
and Maoism, workers, farmers, soldiers and 
the masses have all lost every vestige of 
political freedom • • • By using the 
superstition of idealism in support of 
apolitical to bring everything under social 
control in a system of modern socialism, we 
have reached a state in which the people are 
deprived of all political rights and are en-
slaved and exploited in their daily life.46 
In saying these words, Wei aimed at disclosing the undemocratic 
and exploitative nature of Communist China. The hope was, in the 
first step, to help people to realize that their country was in-
deed a totalitarian one. 
2. Democracy -- The Way for the Good Life 
For Wei, democracy belongs to the people. If they ask 
for democracy, they are merely asking for what originally belongs 
to them. He described anyone (the Party leadership) who refused 
to return democracy to them (the people) as a "shameless robber.• 
Since democracy is the most formidable and irresistible enemy of 
dictatorship, the only alternative for liberation from the yoke 
of to tali tar ian ism is democracy -- people must first be the 
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masters in distribution, including power and resources. Democra-
cy, according to Wei, 
••• is to put power and authority under the 
control of the entire working people. In 
this way the people have the right to select 
their agents according to their own will' and 
have things done in conformity with their 
wishes and interests. In addition, they must 
have the power to recall those agents any 
time they want to, so as to prevent the 
agents from riding rought and shod over the 
people in their name.47 
Wei voiced his goal as achieving the restoration of the people as 
the masters of the country, and not as the modernized tools to 
satisfy the expansionist ambitions of dictators. 
From his observation of historical development, Wei reached 
the conclusion that the economy of any nation with a highly de-
veloped democratic system usually has a rapid grow rate in pro-
duction. The reasons are: {1) a free enterprise system1 (2) 
distribution, both in power and resources, is determined by the 
majority1 (3) free competition under the equal opportunity to 
control production; and (4) conflicts can be peacefully resolved 
by democratic politics.48 
To Wei, democracy, freedom and happiness were the sole ob-
jectives for modernization. He asserted that without this •Fifth 
Modernization, • the economic modernization would tend to be a 
failure. So the political system of Communist China must first 
be modernized and democracy must be put into practice before mod-
ernization can be achieved. Therefore he regarded that only if 
•there is democracy, can there be the possibility and opportunity 
to bring about equal human rights and the modernization of peo-
ple's lives. • This would arouse the democratic aspirations of 
the people and point out the direction of life they ought to 
pursue. 
3. The Achievement of Democracy by Struggle 
Wei's assertion that •let's have confidence in our 
strengths• and •human history is created by us• expressed his 
disillusionment over the dream of achieving democracy through 
Party leadership. He thus entrusted his hope in the people's 
common efforts: as long as the people can clearly discern objec-
tives and impediments, they can overcome every obstacle and dif-
ficulty. Since he never believed that the dictators would let 
the people carry out democracy, he appealed for people to join 
the battle in struggling for democracy: 
Every single branch of twig and true and 
valuable democracy has been saturated with 
blood of martyrs and tyrants. Each stride 
towards democracy has led to withstand the 
all-out assault of the reactionary forces. 
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That democracy has been able to overcome all 
these obstacles exactly throws light on its 
preciousness to the people • As long 
as they [the Chinese people] find out their 
right direction [that is, democracy], the 
power of the tyrants will no longer be 
undefeatable. 49 
He denounced the traditional practice of hanging the hope 
for better life on a handful of saviors: two thousand years of 
Chinese history tell us that a happy life cannot be secured by 
relying on salvation by a small number of people. The only reli-
able guarantee for the happiness of the majority is to struggle 
for a democratic social environment by themselves. He negates 
the Marxist theories in the pursuit of equality and democracy and 
insists that equal rights can be obtained only in practical and 
continual struggle in the evolution of human history.50 
Ultimately in achieving democratization, Wei stressed the 
importance of the rule of law. He felt that the system ought to 
bring about equal rights to the people: 
In the law-making process, the people should 
heighten their vigilance and focus their at-
tention on whether the law enacted is useful 
to us in maintaining equal human rights. 
Whoever attempts to stealthily change the 
contents will be our enemy.51 
In the final analysis, what he wanted was a democratic system 
based on the rule of law in which people have the final say 1n 
every aspect of social life. In the fulfillment of this aim, 
according to Wei, people must grasp the power of delegation and 
supervision. Moreover the procedures and rights of election and 
recall must be protected by law. 
Wei's uncompromising attitude towards dictatorship and arbi-
trary rule was revealed in his article entitled "Democracy or New 
Dictatorship?" The article was aimed at Deng because he criti-
cized the big-character posters as disturbing the social and 
political unity and stability which are pre-conditions for re-
alizing the Four Modernizations. Wei has bravely challenged 
Deng's understanding of democracy and has claimed that if the 
people do not possess the freedom of expression, how can there be 
democracy. He further warned the people to be aware of Deng be-
coming a new dictator. Indeed, the target of Wei was not only 
the Party leadership, but the system as a whole -- democra tiza-
tion of the political system in the orientation of the rule of 
law was the only alternative to rescue China and its people from 
poverty and slavery. 
In comparison with the "contending" and "blooming" in 1957, 
the speeches of those who participated in this democratic move-
ment were far more forceful than the "rightists" of the late 
1950s. For example, Wei was quite blunt in stating that "Mao 
Zedong thought is not much better than the medical plasters sold 
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by quacks," and has portrayed the dictatorship of proletariat as 
"feudalistic 100narchy under a socialist cloak." This, in fact, 
was seen as a direct challenge to Party prestige. Wei's radical 
and sharp criticisms were not tolerated by the Party. Thus Wei 
was arrested on March 29, 1979. Indeed during this period, many 
"democratic elements" like Fu Yuehua were arrested. But it is 
important to notice that the "Beijing Spring" did not end in a 
nation-wide suppression and large-scale political campaign like 
that in 1957. This more or less, reflects a change of attitude 
of the pragmatists toward legality. Finally, Wei was also "tried 
formally." 
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Chapter Five 
Justice in the Application of Law 
Justice is closely related to fairness and impartiality. At 
the most general level, the function of the legal system should 
reflect the society's perception of justice.l In the law, the 
term "justice" is used to cover the whole field of principles and 
procedures that ought to be followed.2 In upholding justice, the 
law protects rights. Thus a system of law is concerned with the 
protection of rights. A law can be called unjust for failing to 
meet the moral idea of justice. The same holds true for the ad-
ministration of law if it fails to meet the standard of firmness 
required by the procedures of the legal system. 3 The idea of 
justice is to defend the rights of the individual, even a guilty 
individual, against political utility.4 Generally speaking, in 
the legal realm, standards of justice are supposed to be univer-
sal. That is, the concept of justice is applicable to all and 
trascends class limits. Equal treatment for all is the basic 
requirement. 
A. Justice under Mao 
Mao believed that there was no such things as universal jus-
tice, but only "class justice": bourgeois justice versus pro-
letarian justice. Long before 1949, the Chinese practiced 
criminal justice from a class viewpoint. Counterrevolutionary 
elements from landlord-gentry, rich peasant and capitalist back-
grounds were punished severely, while in general those from the 
ranks of workers, peasants and toiling masses were treated with 
leniency. The "Statute of the Chinese Soviet Republic Governing 
Punishment of counterrevolutionaries• (1934) provided lighter 
penalties for crimes committed by workers and peasants: 
Workers and peasants who commit an offence 
but are not leaders or major offenders may 
have their punishment reduced from that 
stipulated in the various articles of this 
statute composed to elements from the land-
lords and bourgeoisie who commit the same 
class of offenses. (Article 34) 
Though it was no longer explicitly written in the law, criminal 
justice based on class lines continued after the establishment of 
the regime, which claimed to be a dictatorship of the proletar-
iat. In fact, socialist legality did not prevent the employment 
of extra-ordinary measures against persons branded as class foes. 
The adoption of a class viewpoint in the application of law 
was unjust as referred to in Article 85 of the Constitution 
(1954) which provided that "citizens of the PRC are equal before 
law.• The distinction between the •people" and •enemies• as well 
as the distinction between the two categories of contradiction in 
handling legal cases were political considerations which violated 
legal principles since they were subjected to different 
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treatment. nideological offencesn -- that is, a criminal offence 
in one's ideology reflected in one's writings, short of concrete 
action, and one's historical background, which was also treated 
as a source of evidence of crime -- were also regarded as unjust. 
The prejudice towards the intellectuals was explicit when Mao 
openly admitted that the masses might have some shortcomings, but 
nthese are to be removed by means of criticism and self-
criticism, discussion as well as education within the ranks of 
the people. n5 
According to the 1954 Constitution, in handling criminal 
cases: 
The system of people's assessors applies, in 
accordance with law, to judicial proceedings 
in the people's courts. [Article 75] 
Cases in the People's courts are heard in 
public unless otherwise provided by law. The 
accused has the right to defense. [Article 
76] • • • in administering justice the Peo-
ple's courts are independent, subject only to 
law. [Article 78] 
Case One -- The Incident of the 
Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Cligue 
1. Politicization of the Issue 
The incident (contradiction) had been transformed from the 
ideological level to the political level through the utilization 
of public opinion with Party direction and mobilization behind 
the case. The target was later extended to Hu's friends. 
a. The First Stage -- Ideological Criticism 
From October 1954 to March 1955, the criticisms on the 
•apinion• were restricted to the ideological realm. They focused 
on the discussion of whether Hu was a true Marxist or not. 
Zhou Chengchang alleged that Hu was not a areal Marxistn who 
employed a wujieii (classless) perspective to treat the question 
of literature.& 
Cai Yi pointed out that the fundamental difference between 
Marxist literary ideology and Hu' s bourgeois idealist literary 
ideology rested in the latter's denial that socialist realist 
writers •must possess the proletarian standpoint and Marxist 
viewpoint.• He thus concluded that Hu's literary theory was 
•idealistic,• •anti-people,• and nanti-realism.a7 Bao Chang held 
the similar view. He attacked Hu's literary theory as being of a 
capitalist nature and said that Hu resisted the Party's literary 
line in the name of Marxism-Leninism.8 
Mao Dun, the Minister of Cultural Department and the Chair-
man of All-china Federation of Literary and Art Circles, then 
launched the most comprehensive critic ism on Hu' s ideology. He 
- 84 -
charged that the literary theory of Hu was plagued with 
subjectivism, and that it was the negation of the importance of 
the proletarian world view on the part of the writers. Accord-
ingly, Hu's ideology was labeled as bourgeois subjectivism in 
Marxism color. His literary line had long been contradictory to 
that of Mao, and his activities were that of sectarianism.9 
b. Political Accusation and Broadening of the Scope of 
Struggle 
i. Anti-Party Stage 
The publication of Guo Moruo's article entitled Fan Shehui 
Zhuyi Di Hu Feng Gangling (Hu Feng 's Anti-Socialist Program) on 
April 1, 1955 in the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) marked the 
change of the incident from an ideological one to a political 
one. In the last point of the charge Hu was accused of attempt-
ing to deny Party leadership by suggesting the dismissal of the 
unified organization of the literary circle. Guo concluded that 
Hu's program was •anti-Party• and •anti-people• which indeed 
paved the way for the imposition of the charge of counterrevolu-
tionary crimes on Hu and his clique. The escalation of the inci-
dent from the ideological and literary sphere to the political 
sphere simply by utilizing public opinion without in-depth inves-
tigation was indeed unfair. 
The publication of Hu 's self-criticism together with his 
letter to She Wu before liberation served as evidence to prove 
that Hu's circle was an •anti-Party clique.• Especially mislead-
ing was the editorial remark added to Hu's self-criticism. In 
fact the editorial remarks which were said to be written by 
Maol6 implied that the Party rejected Hu' s self-criticisms and 
pointed out the direction of proceedings of the issue. Moreover, 
the headlines and concluding remarks given before and after the 
letters as well as the •interpretation• of the key words in the 
letters were intended to direct the readers to the Party tracks 
and to inform the writers of the standpoint and attitude of the 
Party in handling the issue. 
Finally, She Wu's criticism of Hu Feng was only a personal 
accusation without any legal ground. After that, the Party mobi-
lized all the pro-Party writers to launch personal attacks on Hu 
which had already transcended the limits of ideological conten-
tion. He was denied self-defense. The slogan at that time was 
•Enhance One's Vigilance, Disclose Hu Feng. •11 The editorial 
remark on May 18, 1955 in Renmin Ribao pointed out that Hu Feng 
and the elements of the clique were •pretending to support but in 
fact were opposing the people, and were pretending to support the 
revolution but in fact were opposing the revolution. •1"2 This 
remark already highlighted the ultimate aim of the Party. There 
were many articles writ ten attacking Hu and his friends in the 
Tianjin Da Gong Bao, Renmin Ribao, and Guangming Ribao. Among 
these articles, the most notable was also written by Guo and ad-
vocated that •au Feng should be dealt with according to the law.• 
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ii. The •counterrevolutionary• Stage 
Zhang Tianyi's article nThis Is the Struggle Between Revolu-
tion and Counterrevolution• first transformed the issue into a 
struggle between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. The 
Party also mobilized cultural circles through the press to con-
duct conferences to condemn Hu: May 17 in Canton, May 20 in 
Shanghai, and May 21 at Peking University. Then there came the 
publication of the •Materials on the Hu Feng Anti-Party Clique, 
Part II,• and the Joint Conference of the Federation and the 
Union presided by Guo Moruo on May 25. A resolution was passed 
on the grounds that Hu Feng was •a hidden counterrevolutionary 
element within literary circles•: 
1. According to the article 4 of the Const i tu-
tion of the Chinese Writers' Union, Hu was 
expelled and dismissed the directorship in 
the Union and the editorial member of 
•People's Literature.• 
2. Hu was dismissed from Committee Membership in 
the National Committee of All-China Federa-
tion of Literary and Art Circles. 
3. A suggestion was made to the Standing Commit-
tee of NPC, based on article 38 of the Con-
stitution, to dismiss Hu's qualifications as 
a delegate to the NPC. 
4. The suggestion was made to the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate: the counterrevolu-
tionary crime of Hu must be dealt with. 
5. The resolution prescribed that the elements 
of Hu Feng Clique in the ~ederation and Union 
must stand out to disclose Hu, conduct self-
criticism, and reform themselves. Whether 
their membership will be preserved or not 
would depend on the condition of their con-
crete action.l3 
May 31 marked another stage of the event when the slogan was 
changed to •Firmly and Thoroughly Crush Hu Feng's Counterrevolu-
tionary Clique• in the Renmin Ribao. Attacks were broadened to 
include Hu's friends like Liu Xuefeng, and Zhang Yu. The whole 
issue culminated in the publication of •Materials concerning Hu 
Feng 's Counterrevolutionary Clique, Part III. • It is worthy to 
note from the title that the term •anti-Party• was changed to 
•counterrevolutionary.• This time, the Party mobilized those who 
were far more important than those within the literary circles. 
Articles in the June 11th Renmin Ribao were written by Li Jishen, 
Chairman of Revolutionary Committee of Kuomentang: Shen Junru, 
Acting Chairman of China Democratic League; Ma Xulun, Chairman of 
China Association for Promoting Democracy; Peng Zemin, Vice 
Chairman of Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party; Chen 
Qiyou, Vice Chairman of China Zhi Gong Dang: Li Chunqing, Taiwan 
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Democratic Self-Government; Xi 
Chinese Buddhist Association. 
changed the slogan to "Firmly 
Hidden Counterrevolutionaries." 
Yao Jia Nuo, Acting President of 
On June 12, the Communists again 
Liquidate the Hu Feng Clique and 
Since the crime of Hu Feng's clique was elevated from anti-
Party to Counterrevolutionary, in the Communist regime, the coun-
terrevolutionary had to be suppressed. On this basis, Hu and his 
friends were no longer in the category of "people"; the con-
tradiction was being transformed into an antagonistic one which 
could not be solved by self-criticism or education but by 
struggle. 
Indeed, literary dissent ought to be resolved within the 
sphere of literature, it is not justified to raise the ideologi-
cal question into a political crime. The logic had gone too far. 
2. Counterrevolutionary Crime on the Basis of "Ideological 
Offenses" 
Hu's "Opinions" had undoubtedly shown the differences of 
ideological and policy orientations from the Party, yet Hu's ac-
tion was limited to verbal disagreement with Party control. In 
Hu's "Opinions," he launched his own criticisms on the present 
conditions of the literary circle. His suggestion was intended 
to "rescue" the literary circle from the dogmatic thinking and 
factionalism, and he "hoped" the Party would take measures to 
reverse the trend. It was correct that Hu and Mao had different 
interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist theory of literature, but 
it was difficult to distinguish whose version was the correct 
one. Indeed, this was open to debate: Hu was liberally-oriented 
while Mao was politically oriented. Yet in Communist China, 
where power politics prevailed, Mao was surely in the authorita-
tive position. He, as Liu Shaoqi once said in 1942, was the 
"only" legitimate interpreter of Marxism-Leninism in Communist 
China. Under this condition, any contradiction of Mao's version 
was treated as possessing the nature of "petty-bourgeois" world 
view or even counterrevolutionary. Even Hu's understanding of 
Marxism-Leninism was incorrect, it was still the question within 
the ideological realm. It was already too harsh to charge Hu as 
an ideological enemy to the Party. On no grounds could Hu be 
accused as a political enemy since he never took any political 
actions to sabotage the regime. The charge of "double-faced 
tactics"l4 was only a weak and vague substitution for that of 
counterrevolutionary crime. 
The proposal made by Hu from the perspective of the Party 
might be a direct challenge of Party's supreme power which had no 
precedence. Although Hu 's proposals were somewhat radical --
their aim was to minimize, if not to eliminate, the Party control 
over the literary circle -- his suggestions were made on paper 
only. He had not taken any steps to undermine Party leadership. 
Though his plan could be treated as reactionary, it was short of 
concrete action that could be transfomred into counterrevolution-
ar~ crimes. Under the "Act," the counterrevolutionary crime 
wh1ch related to speech is found in Article 10 (3): "Engaging in 
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counterrevolutionary propaganda in manufacturing and spread 
rumors. • But Hu's "Opinions" were submitted only to the 
Party. Never had he taken action to publicize his "Opinions" in 
the form of a leaflet or propaganda. Hu even notified his 
friends and followers about his action and the content of the 
letters. Still the Party could not charge Hu since his letter 
had been "formally" submitted to the Party which resembled the 
practice of appeal. 
In reviewing the Hu Feng incident, the Party accused Hu of 
being a counterrevolutionary simply on the grounds of the incor-
rectness of Hu's ideological perspective on literature's role in 
the Party, and the reactionary nature of the proposal he had 
made. This was in fact a question of ideology -- that is, the 
imprisonment or execution of anyone whose ideology is considered 
as offensive (or "ideologically offensive"). It was the "Hu Feng 
Incident" that set a precedent for "ideological offenses" and 
•crimes derived from one's speech or writings" as interpreted by 
the Party. This was the case in the "Anti-Rightist Movement." 
Throughout Hu 's case, the Party lacked substantive evidence to 
prove that Hu and his clique had taken actions which were "for 
the purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic regime and 
undermining the people's democracy." The case had reflected the 
political nature in the application of law in Communist China. 
3. Historical Background As a Source of Accusation 
As the event became more politicized and escalated under the 
slogan of "Firmly and Thoroughly Crush the Hu Feng counterrevolu-
tionary Clique," the Party in publishing the private letters 
between Hu and his friends, began to trace their historical back-
ground. This was to be the evidence to support the clique's 
counterrevolutionary attempt. At the same time the charge had 
been changed from "anti-Party• to "counterrevolutionary, n which 
expressed the change of the attitude of the Party toward the 
issue. In the editorial remark in the June lOth Renmin Ribao, a 
commentator wrote: 
1. Hu Feng in the first revolutionary 
civil war, had once joined the Communist 
Youth League. In 1925, when he was in 
Peking, under the threat of the rule of white 
terror of Duan Qishui, had firmly demanded 
the Party permission for withdrawal from the 
league. 
2. Later in the KMT army, he had prepared anti-
Communist political works and then went to 
Japan and engaged in sinister tasks. 
3. After his return, he sneaked into the leftist 
cultural body and conducted factional and 
destructive activities. 
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4. During the Hunan and Congqing periods, he had 
connections with many heads of KMT secret 
agencies. 
Based on this background knowledge, it was said of Hu that "be-
fore liberation, he had hidden in the mainland and continued to 
conduct more sinister counterrevolutionary activities. "1 One of 
Hu's closest friends had also served as a military officer of the 
KMT.l6 
The editorial remarks, in reporting their "reactionary 
political background," were aimed at strengthening their argument 
that they were in essence "counterrevolutionary." But this 
evidence was not strong in a legal sense. On the other hand, 
these "facts" were history, and it was difficult to distinguish 
whether they were strategic plays or not. On the other hand, 
there was no evidence of a connection between Hu's clique and the 
KMT after the liberation. All these inferences are attenuated. 
In fact, when the backgrounds of the top Communist leadership 
were reviewed, most of them, including Mao, had once acted as the 
KMT officers. The headings added among the letters were intended 
to disclose their reactionary nature. Yet in a legal sense, 
one's intentions cannot be guessed to serve as evidence. 
On June 20, 1955, the Renmin Ribao published the family 
background of Hu. The title was "Hu Feng's Attitudes Towards a 
Landlord Family as Evidence of His Counterrevolutionary Stand-
point." The article pointed out that "Hu's family is a family of 
counterrevolutionary landlords." Thus Hu was said to be "either 
a spy of the imperialistic KMT, a Trotskyist, or a traitor of the 
Communist Party. nl7 All these materials attempted to confirm 
Hu's counterrevolutionary standpoint from a historical and social 
approach. This method of tracing one's family background and 
social history was a general practice of the CPC in proving one's 
reactionary nature. But too heavy a reliance and reference to 
background is misleading and most of the time inaccurate, irrele-
vant and unfair. 
4. Lack of Legal Actions and Violation of Legal Practices 
The whole case was handled by a political rather than legal 
approach from the time Hu was accused as "anti-Party" to the 
final conclusion that he and his clique were "counterrevolution-
ary." Not only was action lacking, numerous violations of legal 
practice and procedures also occurred. 
With regard to the lack of legal procedure, the most notable 
omission was that no investigation was conducted by a People's 
Public Security organ which was supposedly to perform this func-
tion whether there was any trial. Moreover, there were viola-
tions of legal practices and procedures in handling the case 
under the Party's direction. In the first instance, it was ille-
gal to label Hu and his faction as an "anti-Party Clique" and a 
"counterrevolutionary clique" at the Party's whim before they 
were tried by the People's Court according to legal procedures. 
Second, even if the trial was going to take place, it was unfair 
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for the Party to utilize propaganda and public op1n10n to exert 
pressure on the accused and to influence the "would-be" decision 
of the court. Third, the evidence ought to have been kept in 
strict confidentiality before the trial and presented to the 
court only. Fourth, the joint-conference of the Federation and 
the Union was not in the position to determine that Hu had al-
ready committed the counterrevolutionary crime. Fifth, it was a 
violation of Hu 's legal rights to deny Hu and his clique the 
chance to defend their constitutional rights. Sixth, it was a 
legal abuse that the party made the final judgment. Stated Mao, 
"Hu Feng and his clique are indeed spokesmen for all counter-
revolutionary classes, groups, and individuals." Finally, the 
imprisonment of Hu Feng violated his right of freedom of person 
since it was not based on a decision made by the court. 
The Fate of Hu Feng and His Friends 
On July 18, the Secretary of the NPC, Peng Zhen, announced 
that Hu Feng had been arrested "according to the law" under Arti-
cle 37 of the Constitution: 
No deputy to the National People's Congress 
may be arrested or placed on trial without 
the consent of the National People's Congress 
or, when the National People's Congress is 
not in session, of its Standing Committee. 
This was done under the request of the Supreme People's Pro-
curatorate. After that backbone elements such as A Long, Lu 
Ling, Liu Xuewei, Chang Zhongzhao, Lu Diau, Fang Ran, and others 
totalling 130 people were arrested.l8 In 1956, Hu Feng was 
placed in Qin Cheng prison without investigation a!ld trial. In 
1958 Mao issued a directive ordering a trial for Hu. But since 
the incident was so politicized, it was difficult to adjudicate. 
The verdict was not rendered until 1965 and Hu was finally sen-
tenced to twelve years imprisonment.l9 Indeed the trial was only 
a formalistic one. 
Case Two -- The Anti-Rightist Campaign 
The original idea of the "blooming" and "contending" was to 
reduce the tension between the Party and the intellectuals. But 
the criticisms advanced by the intellectuals were aimed at the 
whole political system and its orthodox ideology, and even went 
as far as attacking the ruling policies. In short, criticisms 
were voiced by nearly all sectors of society against the Com-
munist regime. A similar strategy was employed against the lead-
ing figures of the intellectuals a·s in the Hu Feng incident. The 
chief target was the Zhang-Luo "anti-communist" Alliance. 
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1. The Employment of a Political Campaign Against the 
In te llec tuals 
In reaction to the accusations and hostile criticisms, Zhou 
Enlai, in the Fourth Session of the First National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China denounced these criti-
cisms as "vicious slander" against the regime. Thus they were 
"counterrevolutionary" and could not be tolerated by the Party: 
At present, some rightists have used the ex-
cuse of rectification to launch destructive 
attacks against the Party. Many of the at-
tacks are aimed at our political system. 
They attack our political system from the 
capitalist perspective. They accuse the Peo-
ple's democratic dictatorship as the root of 
all mistakes and shortcomings. They attempt 
to discredit our political system. They try 
to establish some kind of state organs, for 
example, the Political Design Department, the 
Commission for Rectifying Injustices, aside 
from our highest state organ -- the National 
People's Congress. Their objective is to 
separate the state authority from the working 
class and its vanguard -- Party leadership •• 
• • This kind of anti-socialist speech cannot 
be considered as criticism out of good will. 
The aim of the rightist is to pull our 
political system off the socialist road onto 
a capitalist road. This cannot be allowed by 
the public.20 
The brief blooming period was followed by the Party's Anti-
Rightist counter-offence. The campaign was an unjust one since 
it marked the violation of the promise of the Communist Party 
before the rectification -- that is, the principle of "blame not 
the speaker but be warned by his words." 
An editorial entitled "Why This?" in Renmin Ribao on June 8, 
1957 formally raised the curtain on the anti-rightist struggle --
against so-called "anti-Party, anti-Socialist" speeches. Indeed 
the momentum, nature as well as target of the campaign were di-
rected by editorials in Renmin Ribao. Politicization and escala-
tion of the issues to political and class struggle were the basic 
strategies -- the unnecessary intensification of the issues which 
were Jriginally non-criminal in nature. Besides that, the Party 
also mobilized public opinion against leading figures among the 
rightists: at first the "Zhang-Lo Alliance" and then the •anti-
Party Clique" formed by Ding Ling and Chen Qixu -- a repeat of 
the Hu Feng Incicent. 
The Party used the excuse of an anonymous letter which at-
tacked Lou Yuwen, a pro-Communist in the democratic party, to 
ignite the struggle. The Party alleged that the verbal attack 
signified that some people were trying to take the opportunity of 
recitification to launch class struggle against the Communists. 
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The editorial concluded that within our country, class struggle 
was still carrying on, so "we must employ the perspective of 
class struggle to interpret the present phenomenon in order to 
obtain the correct conclusion."21 Thus the Party took the action 
against those who criticized the regime and transformed the 
counter attack as a class struggle against the ideological 
enemies. The targets as highlighted by the editorial at that 
time were those who "ascribe to the Western style of politics," 
that is, Zhang and Luo, the most influential non-Communist intel-
lectuals at that time. They both leaned toward the democratiza-
tion of the regime. 
On June 14, the editorial entitled "Is It a Question of 
Political Stand?" pointed out those criticisms which denied the 
achievement of socialism departed from a non-socialist political 
stand. This implied the "critics" were "anti-socialist." On 
June 29, the editorial defined what was "right": those speeches 
and actions which hindered the unity among the people, obstructed 
the socialist reform and construction, and weakened the people's 
democratic dictatorship.22 This definition served as the politi-
cal standard for the Communists to identify those who were the 
"rightists." Zhang and Luo were now named as the chief targets 
for the struggle. "The Unusual Spring" had openly pointed out 
the ultimate intentions of the "rightists": "to attack the 
socialist system, overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and Party leadership.n23 On July 28, the editorial claimed that 
the "Anti-Rightist Struggle is a great socialist revolution on 
political and ideological front" which was said to be a life and 
death "struggle." The struggle was also brought into the Party 
against the "rightist" Party members -- Ding and Chen. The Anti-
Rightist campaign was greatly intensified by the editorial enti-
tled "Anti-Rightist Struggle Is an Important Test for Each Party 
Member," which implied that all Party members had' to devote them-
selves totally in the struggle. It was the September 15 
editorial which explained why the capitalist rightists were 
reactionaries who formally transformed the contradiction between 
the rightists and the people into an antagonistic one. 
The attack on Zhang and Luo started on June 10 when Wu Han 
expressed that Zhang, Luo and Zhu 's opinions did not represent 
the political stand of the Democratic League, and their opinions 
ought to be criticized. As from the very beginning, the issue 
was already treated as a political question. As Wu said, "Their 
opinions have already deviated from Party leadership, the direc-
tion of which was anti-socialist."24 The method employed was to 
expose their past mistakes by their colleageus. 
Zhang was accused of having a strong capitalist tendency 
because of his admiration of the capitalist system. The accusa-
tion rested on the ground that Zhang mentioned tranforming the 
NPC and the CPPCC into a bicameral system which takes after the 
Western representative political system. He had made a positive 
comment about the capitalist system: 
We cannot belittle capitalism. At present 
many have denounced the capitalist system. 
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In fact, capitalism also has its vigor. Why? 
Because there is a multi-Party system, a dem-
ocratic system, a House of Representatives, a 
Senate, a ruling Party and Opposition Party. 
Capitalism has its merits which are 
checks and balances as well as mutual 
supervision. n25 
More severely, Zhang was implicitly attacked as anti-Party 
leadership since he was politically ambitious and possessed a 
strong reactionary nature. This was shown by his treatment of 
the CPWDP (China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party) as his 
sphere of influence and thus his political asset. Moreover, he 
had never forgotten the third line -- anti-Marxist Reformism.26 
Luo was also said to be fundamentally anti-communist in light of 
his persistent opposition to the leadership of the CPC. 
In addition to the political alliance formed by Zhang and 
Luo being affirmed, the political ambition of the alliance was 
said to sabotage the leadership of the CPC. Thus the Zhang-Luo 
alliance was anti-party and anti-Communist. Most significant of 
all, Shen Diaoxu, the Chairman of the Democratic League, launched 
a political criticism camapign against Zhang and Luo: 
The mistake committed by the two leading fig-
ures of Democratic League, that is, Zhang and 
Luo, was a question of political stand, and 
not only ideological. They on the surface 
support socialism, but in fact oppose 
socialism. They on the surface support the 
CPC, but in fact despise the CPc.27 
Indeed, most of the accusations were grounded on subjective 
interpretation, exaggeration and deduction, and lacked concrete 
evidence. 
Pressure exerted on them was through the Democratic League 
manipulated by the CCP. Zhang and Luo were forced to admit there 
was an "anti-Communist" alliance between them, which harbored the 
ambition and a plot to control the Democratic League and Literary 
circle, and finally to overthrow socialism. This led to the 
self-criticism of Zhang and Luo. In fact, their confessions 
under large-scale personal attack and public pressure were extra-
legal. 
Deng Xiaoping 's report "On Rectification Campaign• of Sep-
tember 23, 1957 marked the end of the Anti-Rightist campaign. In 
the report, Deng concluded that "after more than three months' 
struggle, the conditions have been tremendously changed. Within 
the democratic parties, tertiary school, intellectual circle and 
organs in the provinces, the struggle has already gained decisive 
victory." He said that "as the struggle has ended, emphasis is 
to be put on thought reform and ideological education.• 
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2. The Redefinition of the "Principle" and "Ideological 
Accusation" 
In replying to whether the Party violated the basic princi-
ple of "blooming" and "contending," Guo Moruo quibbled that 
"non-crimina! speakers were non-crimina!, and crimina! speakers 
were criminal."28 He said that when one's words shocked the very 
foundation of the regime, how could the person still be inno-
cent?29 Thus only criticisms based on goodwill could be ac-
cepted. Indeed the editorial on June 29 set the limits for 
"blooming" and "contending": it could not surpass the locus of 
supporting the Communist Party and building socialism. Guo also 
confirmed that the struggle against the rightists was a political 
and ideological struggle. Guo's assertions at least reflected 
two things which were unfair to the intellectuals. The first one 
was that the Party never set the limits for criticisms before 
Guo's explanation as well as the June 29 editorial. Yet there 
still was no discernible criterion for distinguishing whether one 
was criminal before he launched his criticisms. It was rather 
the nature of the speeches as interpreted by the Party that 
determined whether one was a criminal or not. In fact Guo ex-
plained nothing on that point. It only showed the arbitrariness 
of the Communist rule. The second one was the open confirmation 
that speeches and ideological differences could also be a source 
of crime (there was no separation of political and criminal 
crimes in Mao's China). 
The formula for determining whether one's actions were 
criminal was puzzling: when one was displeased with the leader-
ship he was opposing the leadership; opposing leadership was op-
posing organiation; opposing organization was anti-Party; 
anti-Party was anti-people; anti-people was in fact counter-
revolutionary.30 This was a Stalinist method of dictatorial sup-
pression. The same was true for equating anti-Communist with 
anti-socialist, and anti-socialist with anti-people. The ex-
planation was quite ridiculous: 
Socialism is the result of victory over 
capitalist class and of the overthrow of 
capitalism by the working masses under the 
leadership of the Communist Party. The aim 
of socialism is to destroy the capitalist 
class, to reform the petty bourgeoisie and to 
eliminate the possibility of the capitalist 
restoration. There would be no proletarian 
victory and dictatorship of the proletariat 
as well as socialism .if there was no leader-
ship of the Communist Party. Because of 
this, the socialism in the world was led by 
the Communist Party, and only under the 
leadership of Communist Party. All anti-
Communist governments of the capitalist class 
in the world are anti-socialist. From this, 
we know that the leadership of the Communist 
Party was the best guarantee for socialist 
construction. Socialism is supported not 
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only by the proletariat, but also by the 
broadest working people. • • Socialism is 
the highest will and the best interest of the 
people. So Anti-Socialism is anti-people. 
Anti-Communist, anti-socialism and anti-
people were inexorably connected.31 
The logic seems to be misleading. The whole process of deduction 
is based on many assumptions which have not yet been or can 
hardly be verified. For example, it negates the concept of 
patriotism and nationalism as well as equating the Party to the 
state. Employing this formula to prove that intellectuals were 
guilty was in fact more political than legal. 
3. Historical Background as a Source of Accusation 
In order to prove the Zhang-Luo alliance was anti-Party and 
anti-socialist, the leadership of the De100cratic League traced 
back their political history to show their reactionary 
background. 
Wang Yixun pointed out that Zhang had a reactionary family 
background and a bourgeois educational background. Zhang was 
born in a landlord family and he had received "European bourgeois 
education and his brain is full of Western De100cracy. n3T In 
reviewing the political career of Zhang, Li Bazhu had concluded 
that Zhang had the political ambition to share China with the 
Communists: 
• He intended to control south of Yangtze 
River as his political asset. He predicted 
that Chiang [Kai-shek], under the American 
support, could still maintain control over 
Jiang Zhe [The Jiangsu and Zhejiang prov-
inces]. He felt that under such conditions, 
he could organize a coalition government with 
the Chinese Communists • • • His intention 
was to divide China by three powers.33 
Based on his attitude towards the Communist revolution, Zhang was 
accused that he was never pro-Communist, but even anti-Communist 
and had his own political line. According to Yan Xinmin: 
Zhang told people that 'you are afraid of 
contradicting the CPC. What I say is to com-
pete with the CPC.' M9reover, Zhang praised 
Chiang, and despised the CPC. He intended to 
play a balancing role between the two 
Parties. Zhang's political ambition and in-
dividual interest brought him to openly hate 
the Communist revolution, and the CPC. He 
especially despised those CPC members within 
the De100cratic League. Zhang had once in-
sulted Mao in stating 'Mao is the first big 
rogue in Chinese history.'34 
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Qu Tunan wrote an article which spelled out the reactionary 
political history of Luo Lungzhi. In the article, he said that 
Luo had a landlord family background. Moreover, Luo was pro-
American. He wanted to cultivate a third force based on American 
support to replace Chiang. Also, Luo always conducted anti-Party 
and anti-Socialist speeches and actions which were evidenced by 
his class nature and the class education he had received. Final-
ly, Luo had persistently been pro-Amercan and against the Soviet 
Union: 
For example, in 1956, Chiang and America 
signed the Sino-American trading treaty. Luo 
said that the treaty was an equal one. When 
the people of Shanghai held a conference to 
repudiate the treaty, Luo was discontent with 
the motion. In 1957, the Democratic League 
held a conference in Hong Kong. The resolu-
tion passed was to oppose Arne r ican imper i-
alism, to overthrow Chiang and to respond to 
the land reform called by the Chinese Com-
munists and to join the CPPCC. Luo did not 
accept this resolution, and still kept in 
contact with American imperialists and in-
sisted on a middle line and advocated peace 
talks. In 1949, Luo attempted to change the 
Chinese foreign policy of "learning to one-
side. n35 
Shang Jicheng accused Zhang and Luo of taking part in anti-
Communist actions in the past: 
In 1948, Zhang wrote a letter from Shanghai 
to oppose the resolution of the Democratic 
League. This resolution made it clear that 
the Democratic League was going to cooperate 
with the CPC, to go on the same road, to 
overthrow Chiang's reactionary government, 
and to oppose American imperialism. In late 
1948, the Central Committee of the CPC called 
for the conference of the CPPCC. At that 
time the Democratic League was drafting and 
discussing the new CPPCC platform. Among 
them were two: one was to use New Democracy 
as the guiding ideology, and another one was 
to admit the leadership of the CPC. But no 
conclusion was reached in the discussion. 
This was mainly due to the objection from 
Zhang in Hong Kong and Luo in Shanghai.36 
The detailed exposure of Zhang-Luo's political and social 
history to substantiate the Communist charge was the usual prac-
tice of the Party. But this had a profoundly negative influence 
on criminal justice in respect to Zhang and Luo. 
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4. Violation of Legal Procedures 
The CPC did not take any legal action to investigate the 
•anti-Party" and "anti-Socialist• nature of the intellectuals 
before the intellectuals were labelled as "rightist. • Neither 
were there any trials. Most of the actions taken by the Com-
munist Party violated the same legal procedures as in the Hu Feng 
incident. For example, the Democratic League was not in the 
position to make the decision that Zhang and Luo were •anti-
Party" and "anti-Communist• simply based on their interpretation 
of Zhang-Luo's speeches and past history. Moreover, it was ille-
gal to label Zhang, Luo and many intellectuals as rightists be-
fore they were tried by a People's Court. It was also unfair for 
the Party to utilize the propaganda and public opinions to exert 
pressure on the accused and to influence the •would-be" decision 
of the court. The trial of Lin Xiling serves as a good example. 
She was found guilty of counterrevolutionary activity by a court 
which was considered a formalistic one. 
"The Resolution of the State Council Concerning the Question 
on Labor Re-education" passed by the NPC on August 1, 1957, was 
aimed at the "rightists• who had emerged during the short-lived 
"Hundred Flowers Movement.• Article One applied to: 
Those crimes which are not serious, those 
counterrevolutionaries, anti-socialist reac-
tionary elements who are exempted from 
criminal accusation, and those who have been 
expelled by the units like organs, organiza-
tions, enterprises and schools.37 
This practice was considered as "violating socialist legality. • 
An editorial in the Soviet government newspaper Izvesta declared: 
In the vigorous movement against so-called 
"rightist" and "right-leaning opportunities," 
large-scale suppression was carried out. On 
August 1, 1957, the State Council of China 
passed a decision concerning re-education 
through labor. This decision granted ad-
ministrative agencies the power to confine 
almost any Chinese citizens indefinitely in 
special camps without investigation and tri-
al. • • • Several hundred thousand people 
were thus suppressed.38 
The crimes of Zhang and Luo's •anti-Communist alliance• were 
"conducting anti-Communist activities," and "plotting to over-
throw the present regime. They were also dismissed from their 
posts as deputies to the NPC. 
All those intellectuals who criticized Party rules were ac-
cused of being either •r ightists" or "counterrevolutionaries. • 
Virtually all sectors of the country were involved in the Anti-
Rightist campaign. Thereafter, the Communist Party insisted 
strongly that the intellectuals had to be continually subject to 
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ideological reform. The Party's distrust in the intellectuals 
grew. 
B. Justice under Deng 
Communist China under Deng has shown its resolution to re-
form the past practice of lawlessness in Mao's era. Under the 
presupposition of strengthening socialist legality, it is stipu-
lated that any offender must be dealt with in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed by the Constitution and law. There is also 
the reassert ion of "the equality of all people before the law" 
and public trial. These are aimed at the realization of impar-
tiality and universality (or uniformity) of socialist legality 
which was denied in the past. The trial of Wei Jingsheng was 
conducted under this new consideration. In fact, he was the 
first democratic element that was tried publicly since the rise 
of the democratic movement in China in late 1978. This section 
will analyze the handling of this case from two aspects, that is, 
procedure and substance, to examine justice in the application of 
law. 
Case Three -- The Trial of Wei Jingsheng 
The trial of Wei took place on October 16, 1978. 
1. Procedure 
The procedural aspects of Wei's trial will be discussed in 
four dimensions: (1) legal authorityi {2) public triali (3) the 
right to defensei and (4) the right to appeal. 
a. Legal Authority 
Although the new Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal pro-· 
cedure were already approved by the Second Session of the Fifth 
NPC in late June 1979, these laws were not put into effect until 
1980. Thus the Act for the Punishment of Counterrevolution 
(hereinafter "Act") promulgated in 1951 and the 1978 Constitution 
became the source of law for prosecution. There was disagreement 
over why the trial did not take place until 1980 since most of 
the provisions in the "Act" were outdated. Moreover, there was 
no law of criminal procedure to adhere to. All these would af-
fect justice in the course of handling the case. Nevertheless 
the trial had been conducted on the legal basis of the Constitu-
tion and the "Act.• 
Legal Sources of Arrest and Trial 
Article 47 of the 1978 Constitution provides that: 
No citizen may be arrested except by the 
decision of a people's court or with the 
sanction of a people's procuratorate, and the 
arrest must be made by a public security 
organ. 
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Accordingly, Wei was arrested by a Beijing public security organ 
on May 29, 1979 after the approval of the Beijing people's 
procuratorate. 
After the completion of the investigation, the trial was 
conducted by the court with the Beijing procuratorate as the 
prosecutor. Articles 41 and 43 grant "local people's courts at 
various levels and special people's court [the power to] exercise 
judicial authority" and "local people's procuratorates and 
special people's procuratorates [the power to] exercise procura-
torial authority within the limit prescribecd by law. • Thus the 
procedures for arrest and prosecution found their source in the 
Constitution. 
The Legal Source of the Prosecution and Adjudication 
The alleged crimes committed by Wei were: 
1. Supplying foreigners with military information. The 
accused Wei Jingsheng, shortly after the Chinese 
launched the self-defensive counterattack against the 
Vietnamese aggression of February 1979 supplied a for-
eigner with military intelligence including the names 
of the commanders, the number of Chinese troops, the 
developments of the fighting at the front and the num-
ber of casualties.39 By supplying a foreigner with 
military information, Wei had committeed the counter-
revolutionary crime specified in Article 6 of the 
"Act": "Stealing or giving out government secrets or 
providing internal and external enemies with secret 
information. • (first clause) 
2. Carrying out counterrevolutionary propaganda and agita-
tion. During the period between December 1978 and 
March 1978, Wei had written and distributed reactionary 
articles including, "The Fifth Modernization -- De-
mocracy and Others.," a sequel and second sequel to "The 
Fifth Modernization -- Democracy and Others" and "Human 
Rights, Equality and Democracy." These articles slan-
dered Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and advocated 
the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the socialist system and the seizure of state 
power.40 Article Two of the "Act" prescribed that 
"persons committing crimes for the purpose of over-
throwing the people's democratic regime and undermining 
the people's democracy shall be punished in accordance 
with this present "Act." According to law, those ac-
tivities aimed at overthrowing the regime of the pro-
letariat and socialist system and endangering the PRC 
were counterrevolutionary crimes. Since Wei agitated 
for such purposes, he had committed the crime of carry-
ing out counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation 
specified in Article 10: "Instigating the mass to show 
resistance to governemnt action in the purchase of 
foodstuffs and levying of taxes, to refuse to carry out 
conscription duties and perform military service, to 
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sabotage and to refuse to execute the orders of the 
people's government," (section 1) "Sowing dissension 
and hostility among the nationalities, democratic clas-
ses, parties and people's organizations, or undermining 
the unity of the people and the government," (section 
2) and "engaging in counterrevolutionary agitation, 
fabricating and spreading false rumors" (section 3).41 
The Adjudication 
The chief judge announced that Wei had betrayed the country 
by supplying the foreigner with military information. He also 
violated the Constitution in writing reactionary articles and 
engaging in counterrevolutionary activity. The nature of the 
crime was extremely serious. In order to safeguard the socialist 
system, to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to 
protect the smooth process of socialist modernization, it was 
necessary to suppress destructive counterrevolutionary activi-
ties. Wei was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and was 
deprived of political rights for another three years after serv-
ing this sentence under Article Two, and Article Six, sections 
One and Two, which provide: 
Persons who have committed an act of 
espionage, or acts aiding the enemy mentioned 
below are subject to the death penalty, life 
imprisonment, or under extenuating circum-
stances, a prison term of 5 years or more 
(Article Six) • 
The Court also invoked Article Ten, sections Two and Three, which 
provide: 
Persons who have committed for counter-
revolutionary purposes one of the following 
crimes aimed at incitement and provoking dis-
content are subject to imprisonment for a 
term of three years or more and, under ag-
gravating circumstances, to death penalty or 
life imprisonment~ 
as well as Articles Sixteen and Seventeen of the 0 Act," which 
provide: 
Persons who have committed other crimes for 
counterrevolutionary purposes that are not 
specified in this Regulation are subject to 
the crimes which most closely resemble those 
specified in this Act. (Article 16) Persons 
who have committed crimes specified in this 
Act will be deprived of political rights and 
their propertyf wholly, or in part. 
(Article 17).~: 
Thus both the prosecution aud the adjudication of Wei were 
based on the •Act.• 
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b. Public Trial 
According to the 1978 Constitution, •All cases in the 
people's courts are heard in public except those involving 
special circumstances as prescribed by law.• (Article 41) 
There is doubt as to whether the trial was really an •open• 
one in the Western sense, yet in comparison with past legal prac-
tice, hardly any case has been handled with such a degree of 
•openness.• Hu Feng and most of the counterrevolutionaries 
during the Anti-Rightist Campaign were tried secretly. At least 
the people had been informed when and where the trial of Wei 
would be conducted, and the crimes with which Wei was charged. 
During the trial, five to seven hundred people were selected to 
attend. Dissidents and foreign reporters were allowed to wait 
outside the court. Finally, people could get some information 
about the whole course of the trial and the verdict through tele-
vision and other mass media. This was the first occasion that a 
trial was conducted in public form in Communist China after the 
Gang of Four. 
c. The Right to Defense 
The Constitution offers the accused the right to defense. 
During the trial, Wei was also provided with the chance to exer-
cise this right. His efforts probably did not amount to •effec-
tive defense,• but, at least, it gave an impression of fairness. 
Wei addresses his reply to the charges point by point. Wei 
was of the opinion that the indictment of the Beijing procurator-
ate was untenable: 
First, he made defense to the charge of sup-
plying information to the foreigner. He said 
that the information he had given to the for-
eigner was not so important that it would 
affect the course and result of the war. On 
one hand, he did not know and had not known 
and had not been told what kinds of informa-
tion ought to be kept in secret, on the other 
hand, he had never seen any secret documents. 
So Wei concluded that he had not cherished 
the aim of betrayal7 he had not supplied any 
information to his foreign friend7 and what 
he had given to his foreign friend were not 
state secrets or military secrets. Thus the 
charge of betrayal was untenable.43 
Second, he denied the charge of being 
engaged in counterrevolutionary propaganda 
and instigation. He explored deeply the 
actual meaning of •revolution• and •counter-
revolution• in the refutation that what he 
had written was •counterrevolutionary.• 
Rather the opposite, the idea of his articles 
were •revolutionary.•44 
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The third point concerned the slandering 
of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. 
Wei said the Communist ideology he attacked 
in the articles was the version practiced by 
the Gang of Four and not pure Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.45 
The fourth point Wei rebutted was the 
charge of under the name of freedom of 
speech, and the demand for democracy and hu-
man rights, instigating the overthrow of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
socialist system. He pointed out that the 
prosecutor had quoted and interpreted his 
sentence of "feudalistic monarchy under a 
socialist cloak• as a reference to the Gang 
of Four; the half sentence of "not the mod-
ernized tools for satisfying the expansionist 
ambitions of the dictators," was followed by 
the sentence that "we demand the modern iza-
tion of the people's livelihood." The sen-
tence could only become meaningful and com-
plete when it was understood within its 
context.46 
The fifth point raised by Wei was simi-
lar to the fourth one. Wei just wanted to 
make clear that the Constitution had given 
people the right to criticize the leadership 
since they were not gods. They (the Party 
leadership) could minimize their mistakes 
only under the people's supervision. He 
stated that in order to reform the system, 
people had to be allowed to criticize and 
discuss the defects of· the system. But 
criticisms were mostly not nice words, nor 
could all be correct. To demand all criti-
cisms to be correct was equivalent to the 
denial of freedom of criticism and 
expression. 47 
d. The Right to Appeal 
Since there was no law of criminal procedure to refer to, 
and no provisions had been written in the 1978 Constitution, 
there was no legal authority granting the right to appeal. 
Nevertheless, Wei was given the right to appeal: 
If the accused is not convinced by this ad-
judication, he can appeal to the Beijing 
Municipal Higher People's Court within ten 
days after receiving the court verdict.48 
Wei did make an appeal to the Beijing Municipal High People's 
Court. 
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The Court heard the appeal on November 6 lodged by Wei 
against the judgment of the first instance made by the Beijing 
Intermediate People's Court on OCtober 16, the indictment of the 
public prosecutor and the defense by Wei and his advocate. After 
an exchange between the defendant and the prosecutor, the Chief 
Judge rejected the appeal by Wei and upheld the public trial 
judgment: the court ruled that Wei Jingsheng's appeal was 
groundless and had to be rejected and the original sentence was 
affirmed.49 
The Trial of Wei -- Substance 
The injustice of Wei's trial laid in the criminal charges. 
The charge of betrayal seemed to be too harsh and there was no 
evidence to support this charge. The charge of "instigating the 
overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
socialist system" tended to be too politicized since the verdict 
of criminal was derived from words (or speeches). Moreover, many 
suspected that the trial was an act only, and concluded that the 
sentence had already been decided before the trial. 
Concerning the •crime of treason, • Wei was only an average 
citizen. It is unlikely that he was privy to top secrets of the 
state. So what he knew about was no more than other people. 
Thus even if it was improper to talk with foreigners about mili-
tary affairs, this could not have been so serious as a crime of 
•treason." Moreover, one may question whether the names of the 
commanders and the number of Chinese troops, battle developments 
and the number of casualties were "military secrets. • There 
was much news about the battle both in the mainland presses and 
overseas. Accordingly, one of the elements of a counterrevolu-
tionary crime is that it was carried out intentionally. In fact, 
the court had not proven a motive of betraying the country when 
Wei talked about the war with the foreigner. Moreover, the Court 
should have considered whether one's behavior has endangered the 
society. From this perspective, the answer te·nded to be nega-
tive. Furthermore, during the trial many important questions 
were not mentioned and clarified: for example, the source of 
Wei's •military secrets,• to whom the information was supplied 
and under what conditions. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly supplied 
was neither called to testify or identify. Thus the evidence was 
not strong enough to support a term of fifteen years 
imprisonment. 
The core of Wei's arrest and the sentence of guilty from the 
beginning to the end, laid in his speeches and articles. Wei was 
accused of writing and publishing reactionary articles and public 
actions as a means to instigate the overthrow of the regime. The 
Court cited many examples from his articles as evidence. Most of 
them were interpreted and selected out of context (see examples 
above). It was clear that Wei's speeches were so tough and radi-
cal that they transcended the tolerable range of Party leaders. 
The Court seemingly meted out the sentence of counterrevolution-
ary simply because his speeches could not be tolerated by the 
Party leaders. Yet Wei only launched criticisms, and had not 
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taken any reactionary actions. The expression of opinions 
contrary to the socialist system was not equivalent to conducting 
subversive activities. In fact, there were constant demands for 
the abolition of "guilty derived from speech" in socialist law 
since this contradicted free exercise of the freedom of speech as 
protected by the Constitution. Wei's speeches might have had a 
harmful effect on political and social unity and stability which 
are indispensable for the modernization. On that ground Wei 
could be found guilty. But still the degree of severity could 
not justify the verdict of a counterrevolutionary crime. The 
impression that the Communist regime still adopts the unrea-
sonable principle of "guilt derived from speeches and writings" 
cannot be removed although Deng has claimed the abolition of such 
a practice many times. The trial of Wei was thus "pure form-
ality" and "he was presumed to be guilty.nSO 
Wei's trial illustrates that there has been an improvement 
in the form of handling the cases in respect to socialist legali-
ty. That is, the whole case has been hand led according to the 
provisions prescribed by the Constitution and laws. This tends 
to be fairer than the practice in Mao's era. One scholar com-
mented that the form of the trial was close to the Western 
model.Sl But the substance of the trial still was not free from 
political influence. The application of law under procedural 
justice cannot be perfected unless the spirit and substance of 
the trial are reconsidered and reformed. 
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Table II - A Collparlson of Justice In the Application of law 
Pre-Trial Media Accusation through 
public opinions 
Arrest 
Investigation 
Court Act I on i} Legal authority 
li) Public trial 
tlao 
The case of 
Hu Feng 
I. Anti-Party and 
Anti-Revolutionary 
2. Disclosure of past 
speeches and beha-
vior as sources of 
evidence 
3. Social and family 
backgrounds as 
sources of accusa-
tion 
4. Self-criticism was 
made and published 
Arrest was made in 
accordance with 
Article 37 of the 1954 
Constitution 
No Investigation 
Act on the Punishment 
of Counterrevolution-
aries {1951} and the 
1954 Constitution 
No public trial took 
place until 1965 
The case of 
Zhang-Luo 
I. Anti-Party and 
Anti-Revolutionary 
2. Disclosure of past 
speeches and beha-
vior as sources of 
evidence 
3. Social and family 
backgrounds as 
sources of accusa-
tion 
4. Self-criticism was 
made and published 
No Arrest 
No investigation 
No Court Action 
Deng 
The case of 
Wei Jingsheng 
1. No public accusation 
2. No self-criticism was 
made 
Arrest was made in accor-
dance with Article 47 of 
the 1978 Constitution 
Investigated 
Act on the Punishment of 
Counterrevolution 1951 
and the 1978 Constitutior 
Public trial took place 
on October 16, 1979 
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Adjudication 
Tl- Lapse 
Between Arrest. 
Trial. and 
Sentence 
1 Post-Trial ftedla 
Mature In the 
Application 
of Law 
Ill) Right to defense 
lv) Right to appeal 
The case of 
Hu Feng 
Not provided 
Not provl ded 
Hade by the Party but 
was confirmed by the 
Court in 1965 
10 Years 
Unclear 
Politicized 
ltao 
The case of 
Zhang-Luo 
Hade by the Party 
Politicized 
Deng 
The case of 
Vel .Jingsheng 
Provided 
Provided 
Hade by the Court 
7 to 8 Months 
Described as a fair trial 
Semi-Politicized 
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Chapter Siz 
Institutionalization of the Legal System and Democratization 
of the Political System: Limitations and Prospects 
The hope for the rule of law and democratization of the 
political system inspired by the slogan of "strengthening the 
legal system and promoting democracy" since the Third Plenary 
Session was quickly hampered by Deng's reassertation of the "Four 
Fundamental Principles" in April 1979. Although the Party con-
tinues to encourage the emancipation of the mind and intellectual 
freedom, and to urge the institutionalization and legalization of 
democracy, the Party criticism of Bai Hua and the arrest and the 
trial of Wei Jingsheng as well as other proponents of democracy 
bring into question the commitment of .the Communist Party. The 
core question is how far the legal system can be institutional-
ized and the political system will be democratized under the 
"Four Fundamental Principles." In fact, the criminal respon-
sibility of intellectuals is a dependent variable of these two 
tendencies. A basic understanding of the content of the "Four 
Fundamental Principles• under Deng is deemed necessary before an 
in-depth analysis can be offered. 
A. The Four Fundamental Principles under Deng 
The reassertion of the "Four Fundamental Principles" has a 
profound implication for the intellectuals. It is more or less a 
reply to the outcry for freedom and democracy from the the intel-
lectuals, especially from the younger intellectuals. As Deng 
expressed, "This time, I will concentrate on the criticism of the 
'Rightist' ideological tendencies that cast doubt or rejection on 
the Four Fundamental Principles•.! Thus this official announce-
ment of upholding the "Four Fundamental Principles" in the Con-
ference on the Party's Theoretical Work in April 1979 was intend-
ed to serve such purposes: to clarify the political attitude of 
the Central Party leadership~ to defend the value as well as to 
redefine the content of socialist principles and to set the 
limits for relaxation of political restrictions. 
1. Socialist Road 
In upholding the socialist road, Deng intends to rebute the 
opinion that "socialism is inferior to capitalism. • He argued 
that history has proved that •only socialism can save China" and 
blames the backwardness of the economy, technology and culture of 
socialist China on historical reasons and the Gang of Four. He 
has defined the superiority of the socialist system vis-a-vis the 
capitalist system by demonstrating that tremendous progress has 
been made under socialism and the growth rate has surpassed that 
of the capitalist countr ies.2 And most important of all, the 
socialist system entails public ownership, which is to serve the 
people's interest through a planned economy and centralized dis-
tribution. There is therefore no exploitation. Indeed, in order 
to make prominent the merits of socialism, he has eliminated the 
utopian and unrealistic elements and preserved the practical 
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ones. Most notably, he has replaced the idea of egalitarianism 
as advocated by the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution 
by the more realistic idea of "to each according to his ability.• 
He has also proposed that socialist economic construction must 
proceed according to objective economic law.4 In sum, the 
socialist road is the only direction of the Four Modernizations. 
2. Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
Deng has emphasized the democratic aspect of dictatorship of 
the proletariat which is said to be equated with socialist de-
mocracy, which is in his opinion the broadest and most practical 
democracy in his tory for workers, peasants, and intellectuals. 5 
He admits that the Party has failed to practice democracy. Yet 
the Party has already begun to take measures to correct such mis-
takes and to strengthen inner-Party democracy and people's de-
mocracy.6 While affirming that socialist democracy is vital to 
socialism and socialist modernization, he makes it explicit that 
in order to suit reality, democratization must be put forward 
gradually which is a function of the development of socialism. 
The reason for the need of dictatorship by the Party, as ex-
plained by oeng, is the existence of counterrevolutionaries, 
criminal offenders and other bad elements which will undermine 
political and social stability. According to Deng, this is a 
special form of class struggle differed from the past which no 
longer exists.? Deng cloaks the Party's dictatorship in terms of 
an essential element in developing socialism and democracy, and 
protecting socialist construction. 
3. Leadership of the Party 
Deng has claimed that it is impossible to have a dictator-
ship of the proletariat, or socialist revolution and socialist 
construction without Party leadership. The birth of a new 
socialist China is a concrete example. Accordingly, the Party is 
an indispensable organizer and leader for socialist modern iza-
tion. 8 There fore, in his mind, democracy can only be promoted 
under Party leadership, otherwise anarchism and political chaos 
will result. Deng has expressed that he considers to correct 
Party leadership which can be achieved by the adoption of mea-
sures to strengthen Party discipline, to promote inner-party de-
mocracy and people's democracy, to accept people's supervision, 
to eliminate corruptive practices as well as to raise the educa-
tional standards of the cadres and Party members. 
4. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedonq Thought 
Deng holds firmly that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
thought will continue to be the guiding ideology of the PRC. The 
Party must consistently adhere to Mao's thought since it is the 
application and development of Marxism-Leninism in China. Yet, 
he warns that distinction must be made between Mao Zedong thought 
and Mao's mistakes.9 He also deletes all the radical and revolu-
tionary romantic ideas from Mao's thought: continuing revolution 
under the dictatorhsip of the proletariat, political campaigns as 
well as the slogan of "Revolution is Justifiable. • He upholds 
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mostly the practical aspects of Mao's thought which serve the 
need of socialist modernization, stability and unity. He adopts 
Lenin's proverb: talk more about economics and less about 
politics.1.0 His attitude towards Mao's thought is reflected in 
his later policy line: the ideological line of preceding from 
reality and seeking truth from facts, the concept of shifting the 
focus to economic construction in light of China's reality, the 
principle of establishing a political system with a high degree 
of socialist democracy, the policy of developing socialist educa-
tion, science and culture, and the principle of. "letting a hun-
dred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend." 
In short, in Deng's conception, Communist-led modernization must 
be guided by Communist thought. 
B. Institutionalization of the Legal Systems 
To institutionalize China's legal system is to formalize its 
structure and the procedures of the legal processes. This neces-
sitates the establishment of a formal detailed and written set of 
rules with a well-institutionalized political organization 
capable of enforcing the compliance with these rules, to resolve 
ambiguities and to settle disputes effectively through procedural 
regularity. Most important of all, as a means to resolve con-
flicts and protect people's rights and freedoms, the law must be 
supreme vis-a-vis Party policy and the legal system must obtain 
an absolute degree of autonomy -- that is, judicial independence 
-- and must be free from the control or influence of other 
political organizations. Only under this setting can the legal 
system offer legal protection to the intellectuals and achieve 
stability, credibility and predictability. Also the universality 
and impartiality in the application of law can then be 
guaranteed. 
The pragmatic leaders have already realized the necessity of 
instituting a socialist legal system that stressed in-
stitutionalization and legalization as reflected in the Com-
munique of the Third Plenary Session. Yet the only obstacle for 
independence of justice comes from the leadership of the Party 
which is the core of the "Four Fundamental Principles"· 
The socialist system is basically the instrument of dic-
tatorship of the Party. This is a concrete principle in Com-
munist China. Thus the Party leadership over the legal system is 
undoubted.ll The 1982 Constitution ensured "judicial 
independence": 
The People's court shall in accordance with 
the law exercise power independently and will 
not be subject to interference by administra-
tive organs, public organization or indi-
viduals. (Article 126) 
However, the Party still retains its ideological and political 
leadership, personnel management and most of all, the Party acts 
as the supervisor of the legal system in law enforcement.l2 
Judicial independence is fragile, based on this relationship 
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between the People's courts and Party, since the "leadership of 
the Party" is confirmed by the Constitution. Moreover, the judi-
cial independence in the communist regime only takes the form of 
"the People's courts administering justice independently, subject 
only to the law." It is different from the Western practice of 
"judges administering justice independently, subject to no inter-
ference except by the law." In essence, "independent administra-
tion of justice" only means an exemption from extra-Party in-
fluence.l3 This arrangement has provided the cleavage to Party 
leadership within the judicial system. In fact, the realization 
of judicial independence depends to a great degree on the good-
will and the legal values of the Party. 
The lack of respect for law was the main reason for the col-
lapse of the legal system in Mao's era. If the sense of legality 
of the Party leaders and cadres is not strengthened, the legal 
system will never be an adequate mean to uphold justice and 
guarantee independent judicature. The spirit of the rule of law 
that "all are equal before the law" will never be achieved. In 
the past years, occasions of violating legal practice and pro-
cedures do have occurred. For example, the dissident Liu Qing 
was convicted and assigned three years of "labour reform" by the 
Beijing Public Security in July 1979.14 This practice violated 
the law since the accused must be tried and the verdict must be 
made by the courts. 
Another example is that in October 1980, Chairman Hua 
Guofeng in telling the reporters in almost the same breath that 
the Gang of Four would be tried, and that they would not be sen-
tenced "to death." In other words, Hua already knew the verdict 
before the trial. This leads to a very serious question of 
whether the court acts according to the law or the will of the 
Party leaders -- a concrete case of Party intervention in the 
administration of justice by the courts. Indeed many prominent 
scholars in law still ascribe to "Party control over the legal 
system. •15 
Still the endeavors to improve the legal system cannot be 
denied. First, the institutionalization of the "independence of 
justice" has shown the Party's determination to disengage itself 
from involvement in routine judicial works. Moreover, the 1982 
Party Constitution clearly defined the scope of Party leadership: 
Party leadership consists mainly in political, 
ideological and organizational leadership. 
The Party must formulate and implement correct 
lines, principles and policies, do its or-
ganizational, propaganda and education work 
well. • • • It must see to it that the legis-
lative, judicial and administrative organs of 
the state and the economic, cultura 1 and peo-
ple's organizations work in actuality with 
initiative, independently, responsibly and in 
harmony. (Preamble) 
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Second, the supremacy of law has been affirmed. Zhang Youyu 
stressed that the law is above the Party Committee or any indi-
vidual. Once the law is put into effect, everybody will have to 
observe it.l6 Thus it is said that abiding by the law means sub-
mitting to Party leadership. The revised (1982) Party Constitu-
tion prescribed that "from the central to the grass-roots level, 
all the activities of Party organization, and Party members can-
not be contravened the state Constitution and law." This inten-
tion manifested itself in the adoption of the principle of the 
supremacy of the Constitution by the CPC: 
This Constitution is the fundamental law of 
the state and has supreme legal authority. 
The people of all nationalities, all state 
organs, the armed forces, all political 
parties and public organizations and all en-
terprises and undertakings in the country must 
take the Constitution as the basic norm of 
conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the 
dignity of the Constitution and ensure its 
implementation. (Preamble) 
In short, the implementation of an independent administra-
tion of justice and the confirmation of the supremacy of law are 
crucial steps toward the strengthening of the legal system of 
communist China. These may pave the road to perfecting the legal 
protection of people's political rights and civil liberties as 
written into the Constitution and to promote legal justice in the 
application of law. 
c. Democratization of the Political System 
After thirty years of Communist rule, China remains in a 
state of backwardness and poverty. The people, especially the 
younger intellectuals, have begun to suspect the superiority of 
socialism as claimed and propagated by the Communists. The ten 
years of turmoil have greatly shaken their confidence in 
socialism and the leadership of the CPC. For those who are op-
timistic, they see the need to look for other alternatives to 
modernize China. They have looked to the Western advanced 
countries as a model for development. Those who cherish no illu-
sions about Communism have become cynical. This atmosphere cul-
tivates a tendency for what the Chinese Communists call "bour-
geois liberalism.• 
"The Four Fundamental Principles• are aimed against this 
tendency. According to Hu Qiaomu, the •bourgeois liberalization 
tendency• is characterized by •publicizing and advocating bour-
geois freedoms, calling for the adoption of the bourgeois par-
liamentarism, including the two-party system, campaigning for 
office, bourgeois freedom of speech, press, assembly and associa-
tion, bourgeois individualism and even anarchism to a certain 
extent.•l7 •tts advocates also promote the bourgeois profit men-
tality and behavior, the bourgeois way of life, vulgar tastes and 
standard of morality, and bourgeois arts."l8 The essence of this 
bourgeois ideological tendency lies in •consc iously and 
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unconsciously demanding China to forsake the socialist road and 
install the so-called capitalist liberal system in the political, 
economic, social and cultural arena. •19 Most importantly, as 
explained by Deng, the core of the bourgeois liberalization is 
•opposition to Party leadership.• 
The insistence on the socialist road is a reply to those who 
cherish the idea of transplanting socialism with capitalist ways 
of development. Deng has attributed past failures to the inex-
perience of the Party in the practice of socialism and mostly to 
the Gang of Four. As the Party has now realized and rectified 
its past mistakes, the Four Modernizations along the lines of the 
socialist road offer a greater possibility for the achievement of 
a strong China. 
In the discussion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
Deng has expressed his understanding of the value of democracy. 
In saying this, he hopes that the intellectuals and the democrat-
ic elements will be more patient and moderate toward democratiza-
ton which can only be gradually achieved as socialism advances. 
His viewpoint is just the opposite of the dissidents as repre-
sented by Wei. Wei treats democratization as the pre-requisite 
for the success of the Four Modern i:z:ations. Moreover, the con-
ception of democracy of Deng on the one hand, and Wei on the 
other hand are quite different. What Deng supports is socialist 
democracy, a directive democracy, that is, democratic centralism: 
Democracy and centralism are inseparable. 
Under socialism, centralism on a democratic 
basis alone conforms with the interests of the 
state and the people; and only democracy under 
the guidance of such centralism is socialist 
in nature. If and when there is centralism 
without democracy, then it is bureaucratic 
centralism; on the other hand, if an democracy 
without centralism, then will lead to ultra-
democracy and anarchism, which does not con-
form with the interests of the people.20 
Thus Deng's conception is a constructivist one: democracy ought 
to be promoted under the guidance of centralism in order to pre-
vent political and social chaos. For him, democracy is a means 
of unleashing fully the initiative and creativity of the intel-
lectuals, contributing to the socialist modernization, and 
achieving political stability and social unity. In fact, 
socialist democracy is based on collectivity. Thus, it is the 
antitesis of Western democracy, which stresses individualism. On 
the contrary, Wei believes in •spontaneous order,• so he rejects 
the notion that democracy ought to be carried out under the 
guidance of centralism or Party leadership. He regards each in-
dividual as possession the right to decide his own destiny which 
is not to be affected by collective interest. To Wei, democracy 
is the end rather than the means. Be emphasizes that the people 
ought to have the rights to elect, supervise and recall their 
government. The democratization of the political system towards 
this direction is exactly what most of the democratic elements, 
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notably Wang Xizhe have demanded. But this goes against the 
Party leadership which is absolute within the communist regime. 
Concerning the class struggle, Deng has clearly maintained that 
the anti-feudalistic and anti-bourgeois struggle will continue to 
exist in the ideological sphere in the socialist society. The 
target of this "special form" of class struggle is obviously the 
dem:>cratic elements who advocate "capitalist liberlization and 
dem:>cratization as well as those intellectuals who look for 
'bourgeois' freedom". 
The greatest force against dem:>cratization is perhaps the 
insistence on the principle of the leadership of the Communist 
Party which is an all-encompassing one. This has revealed the 
hope for a Western type of political system -- that is, a two-
party or multi-party system -- to be an illusion. Under this 
principle, it becomes meaningless for the people to be "the real 
masters of the state, society and enterprises, taking a direct 
part in making decisions in all fields" since the status of the 
Party is above the state. The Communist Party entrusts itself 
with the lofty mission of liberating all mankind, and its leader-
ship is beyond challenge. It is said that "the Chinese Communist 
Party is capable of discovering and correcting its mistakes. n21 
This implies, or even rejects, the redundancy of popular supervi-
sion over the Party. It is a very dangerous claim since it af-
firms the fully autonomous nature of the Party, the discipline of 
which highly depends on self-control. Thus, Party supremacy is 
the greatest enemy of democratization. 
Party leadership also extends to the socio-political and 
ideological sphere: the line that Marxism-Leninism is in the 
leading and guiding position must be carried out~ and the line 
that Party leadership in political ideology must be insisted.22 
Thus, the principle of "Two Hundred" cannot be understood as a 
detachment from Party leadership. The Party has the right to 
intervene into what is going to be publicized and published. 
Moreover, Party leadership in literature and the art is said to 
be vital to help the literature and art to develop along the line 
of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The spirit and es-
sence of Mao Zedong's "Talk At the Yenan Forum on Literature and 
Art• as the guiding ideolqqy for Chinese literature and art has 
been reaffirmed recently.2r In fact, the emancipation of the 
mind does not mean the denial of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought, but rather: 
It means, in the first place, that our cadres 
and people should free themselves from the 
shackles of the 'Cultural Revolution' and the 
'Leftist' errors of the preceding period as 
well as from fetters of the personality cult 
and dogmatism, return to the right track of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and 
uphold the fine tradition of seeking truth 
from facts.24 
The present position of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought 
in the intellectual and ideological spheres is quite clear. 
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Thus, the hope for releasing the intellectua: world from the yoke 
of orthodox thinking seems to be no more than wishful thinking. 
Yet since Deng has eliminated many idealistic and revolu-
tionary radical elements from Mao's concept of the "Four Fun-
damental Principles, • and his policies are far less dictatorial 
than Mao's, there is still much room for intellectual freedom and 
deoocratization of the political system. Moreover, since the 
role of the in te llec tuals has become more important as the 
socialist modernization program proceeds, a substantial degree of 
liberalization and deoocratization is inevitable. Indeed, the 
Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CPC has already specified that: 
The Plenary Session holds that is it our 
Party's unswerving policy to carry forward 
socialist deoocracy and perfect the socialist 
legal system, and to guarantee that the masses 
have the full right and opportunity to express 
their views on state affairs and raise sugges-
tions to and criticize Party and government 
leaders.25 
The 1982 Constitution later stipulated that the establishment of 
a socialist legal system based on socialist deoocracy is one of 
the chief goals of Communist China: 
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all 
nationalities will continue to adhere to the 
people's deoocratic dictatorship and follow 
the socialist road, steadily improve socialist 
institutions, develop socialist deoocracy, 
improve the socialist legal system and work 
hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, 
agriculture, national defend and since and 
technology step by step to turn China in to a 
Socialist country with a high level of culture 
and deoocracy. (Preamble) 
In the final analysis, deoocratization, the rule of law, all 
sorts of freedoms and political rights, as well as criticisms 
cannot transcend and must develop within the limits of the "Four 
Fundamental Principles.• 
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Cbapter Seven 
Conclusion 
This comparative study clearly indicates that both Mao and 
Deng have just constructed legal systems to suit their own needs. 
The legal system is a tool for achieving Party goals as defined 
by the leaders only. The comparative case studies of the 
criminal responsibility of the intellectuals provide a good il-
lustration. Indeed the legal frame of the Party leaders is the 
chief determinant of criminal responsibility. Yet at the macro 
level, Communist ideology as interpreted by Mao and Deng has 
determined the working principles of the legal system. First, 
their different understanding of the states of political develop-
ment determine the nature and form of class struggle. For Mao, 
the class struggle is a persistent and constant phenomenon un-
restricted by legal constraints. Deng believes that class strug-
gle has basically come to an end, and, therefore, all contradic-
tions ought to be handled in accordance with prescribed legal 
procedures. Second, their different conceptions of socialist 
construction determine the role of the legal system: while Mao 
adopted the strategy of permanent revolution in which revolution-
ary justice played the role of eliminating class enemies, Deng 
realizes that socialist modernization is only possible in an or-
derly environment in which procedural justice maintains order. 
These ideo1ogical differences have differentiated the revolution-
ary justice system from the procedural justice system. 
In light of the comparative case studies, several conclu-
sions can be summarized: 
(l) The legal system, that is, the procedural judicial sys-
tem that Deng aims to establish is fundamentally different from 
Mao's revolutionary judicial system both in form and content. 
(2) The working principles of the legal system have a di-
rect impact on justice in the administration of law. 
(3) The legal treatment of the intellectuals, to a large 
extent, is affected by the attitudes and policies of the Party 
leaders towards the intellectuals. 
(4) The degree of criminal responsibility of the intellec-
tuals is much higher under the revolutionary justice than under 
procedural justice. 
(5) In reacting to the demands for freedom and democratiza-
tion from the intellectuals, the procedural justice system has 
provided a certain degree of legal protection whereas the revolu-
tionary justice system has no room for such protection. 
(6) In handling these demands in the sense that they sur-
pass the tolerable range of the Communist leaders, Mao, in the 
revolutionary justice system, took extra-legal means and politi-
cized the issues, whereas Deng, within the procedural justice 
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system, tends to adhere more to the procedures prescribed by the 
Constitution and law. 
(7) The legal protection and the degree of criminal 
liability of the intellectuals highly depends on the democratic 
and legal values of the Party leaders. 
(8) In the light of (3), the legal system in Communist 
China is subordinate to the Party leaders' own ideological and 
legal framework. 
(9) The perfection of the procedural justice can be asses-
sed by the criminal responsibility of the intellectuals who have 
been the group most discriminated against in Communist China. 
( 10) The Communist ideology as represented by the "Four 
Fundamental Principles" under Deng is the chief obstacle for the 
full play of procedural justice. 
Concerning the first point, the orientation of Mao was to 
treat the legal system as a weapon of class struggle, both physi-
cal and spiritual, whereas Deng takes it as an indispensable in-
stitution for maintaining order. Mao de-emphasized the struc-
tural aspect of the legal system, but Deng stresses its in-
stitutionalization. For Mao, the content of the legal system was 
to be determined by the Party policy. For Deng, the content of 
the legal system is the supremacy of law. Class nature is of 
less significance. In short, the legal essence of Deng's ideol-
ogy is far much stronger than Mao's ideology. 
Mao's bias against the intellectuals rendered revolutionary justice unable to offer any legal protection to the intellec-
tuals. Every demand or criticism from the intellectuals had been 
treated as challenge to the authority of the regime and the 
leadership of the Party and as a form of manifestation of "reac-
tionary.• Deng is more willing to make concessions to the intel-
lectuals' demands and this has reduced the criminal liability of 
the intellectuals. Even a certain degree of guarantee is of-
fered. For example, the 1982 Constitution provides that the in-
tellectuals are no longer the "opposition force" and that "all 
are equal before the law.• 
Since the leadership of the Communist Party is the inal-
terable ruling principle in Communist China, the core of which is 
the leadership of a single leader or a committee, the legal sys-
tem is inevitably constructed to facilitate the fulfillment of 
the goals of Party leaders. As a whole, the orientation, form 
and content of the legal system are determined by the Party 
leaders. 
In conclusion, this study has shown that the procedural 
judicial system is superior to a revolutionary judicial system. 
This is true not only in the sense that the former can offer cer-
tain legal protection to the intellectuals, but also in that the 
pursuit of procedural justice marks an end to the revolutionary 
era and the system is evolutionary in nature. Evolutionary here 
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means that the system can be perfected through a series of steps 
gradually, most notably in the enactment of new laws and the pro-
fessionalization of the system. But the procedural judicial sys-
tem is still in its preliminary stage of development and has in-
herited some legacies from the revolutionary judicial system. 
For example, the system has not yet been completely depoliticized 
and institutionalized. Moreover, the legal system cannot be im-
proved drastically unless the regime puts an end to all forms of 
class struggle, including special forms as asserted by Deng. The 
existence of classes under dictatorship means that certain strata 
would be discriminated against and be treated unequally since 
they are said to be excluded from the category of the "people." 
This contradicts the principle that procedural justice is applied 
to all. In this case, the degree of criminal responsibility of 
the intellectuals is still uncertain. This can be illustrated by 
the criticism of Bai Hua and the arrest and trial of democratic 
dissents as well as the arbitrary sentence of Liu Qing. As a 
whole, this study has demonstrated that the criminal respon-
sibility of the intellectuals is a function of: (1) the degree 
of the monolithic rule demanded by the Party leader; and (2) the 
legal protection that can be offered by the legal system. The 
interrelationship can best be represented by the following 
formula: 
CR = f (M) 
LP 
CL: Criminal Responsibility 
M: Degree of Monolithic Rule 
LP: Legal Protection 
Since the ultimate goal is to establish a socialist legal 
system on the basis of socialist democracy which is the highest 
form of procedural justice, that is, the socialist rule of law, 
the prospect for its achievement depends on two factors. The 
first one is the cultivation of a legal tradition among the peo-
ple, cadres and Party leaders within the Communist regime. Only 
with a strong sense of legality and the establishment of a good 
legal tradition can the rule of law become possible. The other 
factor is the democratization of the regime -- that is, the in-
stitutionalization and legalization of socialist democracy. Too 
much emphasis on centralism would only be at the expense of de-
mocracy. The fulfillment of these two requirements would pave 
the way for the socialist rule of law. One hopes that when the 
socialist rule of law is achieved, the criminal responsibility of 
the intellectuals will be reduced drastically. Though procedural justice under Deng is moving in that direction, yet there is lit-
tle cause for optimism since Communist ideology possesses strong 
inherent dictatorial and anti-democratic tendencies. In short, 
the strict obsevance of law by all would undermine the Party's 
supremacy on which the whole Communist system rests. 
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